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Abstract
The principle of cooperation pervades our society and the natural habitat in which we function.
In the classic Darwinian framework of evolution, however, individuals rather tend to compete
with one another because of a perceived fitness advantage, while cooperation requires altruistic
behaviour. Hence, the emergence of cooperation is paradoxical. This leads to the following
interesting question: How can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without the interference
of central authority?
In game theory, the well-known prisoner’s dilemma is often employed as a simplified hypothetical
context in which to study cooperation and the factors that enable its persistence. Past studies
have shown that cooperation may be a viable strategy if the prisoner’s dilemma is placed within
an evolutionary framework. In evolutionary game theory, games are repeated and players with
bounded rationality and limited knowledge of these games are given the opportunity to learn and
adapt their strategies iteratively. In such a context, one mechanism that enables the persistence
of cooperation is the structure of interaction between players.
A mathematical framework is proposed in this thesis for the prisoner’s dilemma within an evo-
lutionary game theoretic context, called the Evolutionary Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma (ESPD).
This game is analysed on relatively simple graph structures in order to investigate the effect of
various spatial player arrangements on the emergence of persistent cooperation.
More specifically, analytical means (void computer aid) are employed to establish conditions for,
and the likelihood of, persistent cooperation among players of the ESPD on a circulant graph, a
natural extension of a cycle for which an analysis of the ESPD has already been analysed. The
objective is to determine how the extension of each player’s cyclic neighbourhood affects the
likelihood of persistent cooperation when players are arranged in a cyclic topology. It is found
that as players extend the sizes of their neighbourhoods from two to four players, the probability
of the emergence of persistent cooperation decreases.
A further analysis is carried out (this time with the aid of a computer) to investigate the
conditions for, and the likelihood of, persistent cooperation in the ESPD on small toroidal grid
graphs. The objective of this second analysis is to determine how the order of the underlying
graph affects the likelihood of persist cooperation. It is found that for certain (pay-off value)
parameter combinations, the probability of cooperation persisting increases as the order of the
underlying graph increases, while for other parameter combinations this probability decreases.
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Uittreksel
Die beginsel van samewerking deurgrond ons samelewing en die natuurlike habitat waarin ons
funksioneer. In die klassieke evolusie-raamwerk van Darwin is individue egter eerder geneig om
weens ’n oe¨nskynlike fiksheidsvoordeel met mekaar te kompeteer, terwyl samewerking altru¨ıstiese
gedrag vereis. Daarom is die ontstaan van samewerking paradoksaal. Dit lei tot die volgende
interessante vraag: Hoe kan samewerking in ’n weˆreld van ego¨ıste sonder die inmenging van ’n
sentrale gesag ontstaan?
In speleteorie word die bekende gevangene se dilemma dikwels as ’n vereenvoudigde hipotetiese
konteks gebruik om samewerking te bestudeer en die faktore wat die voortbestaan daarvan
moontlik maak. Vorige studies het getoon dat samewerking ’n lewensvatbare strategie kan
wees as die gevangene se dilemma in ’n evolusioneˆre raamwerk geplaas word. In evolusioneˆre
speleteorie word spele herhaal en spelers met beperkte rasionaliteit en beperkte kennis van
hierdie spele kry die geleentheid om strategiee¨ iteratief te leer en aan te pas. In so´ ’n konteks
is een meganisme wat die voortbestaan van samewerking moontlik maak, die struktuur van
interaksie tussen spelers.
’n Wiskundige raamwerk word in hierdie tesis vir die gevangene se dilemma in ’n evolusioneˆre
spelteoretiese konteks, bekend as die Evolusioneˆre Ruimtelike Gevangene se Dilemma (ERGD),
daargestel. Hierdie spel word op relatief eenvoudige grafiekstrukture ontleed om die effek van
verskillende ruimtelike speler-rangskikkings op die ontstaan van volgehoue samewerking te on-
dersoek.
In die besonder word analitiese tegnieke (sonder die gebruik van ’n rekenaar) ingespan om
toestande vir en die waarskynlikheid van volgehoue samewerking tussen spelers van die ERGD
op ’n sikulant-grafiek te bepaal, ’n natuurlike veralgemening van ’n siklus waarvoor ’n analise
van die ERGD reeds uitgevoer is. Die doel is om te bepaal hoe die uitbreiding van elke speler
se sikliese omgewing die waarskynlikheid van volgehoue samewerking be¨ınvloed wanneer spelers
in ’n sikliese topologie gerangskik word. Daar word bevind dat soos spelers die groottes van hul
omgewings van twee tot vier spelers uitbrei, die waarskynlikheid van die ontstaan van volgehoue
samewerking verminder.
’n Verdere analise word uitgevoer (hierdie keer met behulp van ’n rekenaar) om die toestande vir
en die waarskynlikheid van volgehoue samewerking in die ERGD op ’n klein toroidale rooster-
grafiek te ondersoek. Die doel van hierdie tweede analise is om vas te stel hoe die orde van
die onderliggende grafiek die waarskynlikheid van volgehoue samewerking be¨ınvloed. Daar
word bevind dat vir sekere (uitbetalingswaarde) parameterkombinasies, die waarskynlikheid
van voortgesette samewerking toeneem namate die orde van die onderliggende grafiek toeneem,
terwyl vir ander parameterkombinasies hierdie waarskynlikheid afneem.
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“The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.” — Bertrand Russel
1.1 Background
Not even Sherlock Holmes could have foreseen the mysterious events of Christmas eve 1914
— German and British soldiers meeting one another in the spirit of cooperation. During this
historic event known as the Christmas Truce, roughly 100 000 soldiers, fighting in the western
front-line trenches, exchanged seasonal greetings and sang Christmas carols together. In some
areas, soldiers ventured into no man’s land to exchange food, cigarettes and souvenirs with
British and German soldiers alike. Accounts of the truce even describe football matches being
played. The truce was not ubiquitous as fighting continued in many other sectors of the front-
line. After the Christmas Truce, the High Commands on both sides attempted to prohibit
further fraternisation during the war. Despite this, several incidents where soldiers deliberately
ceased fire to repair trenches and gather dead soldiers continued to take place [1].
Cooperation is formally defined as the process by which groups of organisms work or act together
in pursuit of a common or mutual benefit, as opposed to competing for selfish benefit. The words
of Charles Darwin, in his Descent of man [12], reveal the significant affect of man’s capacity to
cooperate: “The small strength and speed of man, his want of natural weapons, are more than
counterbalanced by his social qualities, which lead him to give and receive aid from his fellow-
man.” To Darwin, this ability to cooperate was man’s competitive advantage in the survival of
the fittest.
The emergence of cooperation may seem intuitive when it benefits all individuals involved in a
direct manner. This natural intuition does not, however, extend to the case in which benefits
are experienced in an indirect manner or when a greater benefit can be achieved through its
exploitation, such as the example of the Christmas Truce during the First World War, which has
baﬄed many philosophers and scientists. In the classical Darwinian framework, the emergence
1
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and persistence of cooperation is paradoxical as cooperators have to succeed in the struggle for
survival with defectors who, by definition, have a certain fitness advantage. Because of this
paradoxical quality, the emergence and persistence of cooperation attracts attention when it
occurs. Consequently, the question of interest becomes: Under what conditions will cooperation
emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? A review of the related literature reveals
that five main theories have been proposed in response to this question, namely the theories of
kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group selection and network reciprocity [49].
Kin selection [23] is based on the idea that cooperation can emerge if the donor and recipient
of an altruistic act are genetically related. More specifically, the cooperative behaviour is the
consequence of a “selfish gene.” The theory of direct reciprocity [70] assumes that encounters
between individuals are repeated and individuals adopt the thinking strategy “if I cooperate
now, you may cooperate later.” Similarly, the theory of indirect reciprocity [54] is built upon the
notion that observed acts of cooperation are discussed and stored within subsets of a population
(likened to a collective memory). Consequently, helpful individuals are labelled accordingly and
are thus more likely to receive help in the future. Group selection [69] employs the idea that
competition is not between individuals but rather between groups. A population will therefore
contain subsets of cooperators who then inherently compete against each other. The theory of
network reciprocity [57] assumes that the structure of a population allows certain individuals to
interact more often than others, thereby accepting responsibility for affecting the evolutionary
and ecological dynamics of the population and allowing clusters of cooperation to form. Within
the context of this thesis, network reciprocity is employed as underlying theory in order to study
the emergence and persistence of cooperation from a mathematical perspective.
The mathematical analysis of the emergence and persistence of cooperation takes place in this
thesis within a spatio-temporal framework and is the product of a synthesis between the fields
of game theory and graph theory. Game theory is “the study of mathematical models of conflict
and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers”[44], while graph theory facilitates
a study of the mathematical structures when modelling pairwise relations between objects.
Consequently, the evolution of cooperation is investigated in this thesis through the study of
games on graphs. More specifically, an adaptation of the well-known classical prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) within game theory is adopted as the modelling paradigm in this thesis. Because an
underlying population topology is assumed in combination with an ability of individuals to
learn and adapt their strategies within the context of the PD, the particular game considered
in this thesis is the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma (ESPD).
A review of the academic literature reveals that the majority of research on the evolution of
cooperation that employs the study of games on graphs has been conducted in a simulation
environment. This general use of simulation modelling makes sense as it is the most intuitive
approach when analysing the evolution of cooperation for a case-specific population structure.
A more fundamental approach is, however, adopted in this thesis by studying the evolution
of cooperation analytically on basic graph structures in order to contribute towards a general
understanding of the effect that spatial factors have on the emergence and persistence of coop-
eration.
1.2 Problem description
In this thesis, the effect of the structure of the underlying topology of the ESPD on the evolution
of cooperation is considered. More specifically, the two main research questions are:
1. In what manner does the size of every individual’s neighbourhood (i.e. the number of game
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interactions in which every individual partakes) affect the emergence and persistence of
cooperation within a population?
2. In what manner does the order of the underlying graph affect the probability of emergence
of persistent cooperation within a population?
The first research question is analysed in the context of the ESPD with an underlying cyclic
topology. The second is analysed in the context of both the ESPD with an underlying cyclic
topology and the ESPD with toroidal grids as underlying topology.
In order to analyse the emergence and persistence of cooperation, each case is studied analytically
in two main stages: The strategy configurations that the players of a game can exhibit are first
enumerated, after which a characterisation and enumeration follow of all states that allow for
cooperation to persist. This allows for the estimation of the likelihood of the emergence of
persistent cooperation.
1.3 Thesis scope
The scope of this thesis is limited to the modelling of pairwise cooperation in the context
of the PD. This well-known analogy employed to investigate the likelihood of the emergence
of persistent cooperation is well-suited to the purpose of this thesis. More specifically, the
analogy represents a very basic form of interaction between two entities within which cooperation
may manifest itself. The simplified type of interaction is fitting of the manner in which the
fundamental dynamics underlying the mechanisms of cooperation are investigated in this thesis.
Furthermore, the PD is contextualised in a spatio-temporal framework known as the ESPD.
Only instances of the ESPD with isomorphic interaction and updating structures, as well as
deterministic updating rules, are considered. On a more practical note, the work presented in
this thesis builds upon the work of Burger et al. [10, 11] and Van der Merwe [72].
As a fundamental understanding of the influence of spatial structure on the evolution of cooper-
ation is pursued in this thesis, only analytical techniques (i.e. excluding simulation modelling)
are employed in investigations of the game dynamics of the ESPD. Nowak [54] remarked “Games
on graphs are easy to study by computer simulations, but they are difficult to analyse mathemat-
ically because of the enormous number of possible configurations.” Due to the complexity of the
analysis, the thesis is limited to the study of two relatively simple underlying graph topologies:
The ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1,2〉 as underlying graph. The game dynamics of the
ESPD with the cycle Cn of order n as underlying graph has previously been studied by
Burger et al. [10]. The extension of each player’s cyclic neighbourhood from size two
to four is considered in this thesis when players are still arranged according to a cyclic
topology.
The ESPD with the toroidal grid as underlying graph. Only small toroidal grid graphs
(of dimensions at most 6× 6) are considered in this thesis.
No other underlying graph topologies are considered in this thesis due to time and space con-
straints. It is, however, anticipated that the modelling framework adopted and techniques
employed may be applicable to the analysis of other underlying graph topologies.
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1.4 Research objectives
The following six objectives are pursued in this thesis:
I To conduct a thorough survey of the literature related to the ESPD on various underlying
graph structures.
II To establish a mathematical model capable of capturing the emergence and persistence of
cooperation on various small, relatively simple, underlying graph structures.
III To analyse the likelihood that cooperation will persist in the long run in the ESPD with
the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
IV To compare the results obtained in pursuit of Objective III with the likelihood that coop-
eration will persist in the ESPD with a cycle as underlying graph, as reviewed from the
literature.
V To analyse the likelihood that cooperation will persist in the long run in the ESPD with
a small toroidal grid structure as underlying graph.
VI To recommend sensible follow-up work related to the work of this thesis which may be
pursued in future.
1.5 Thesis organisation
Apart from this introductory chapter, this thesis contains a further six chapters, a bibliography
and four appendices. Chapter 2 is devoted to a review of certain mathematical prerequisites for
following the arguments presented later in this thesis. First basic graph theoretic notions are
reviewed, and this is followed by a discussion on basic group theoretic notions.
The third chapter of this thesis is devoted to a brief review of the literature related to the ESPD.
The chapter opens with a review of central notions in classical game theory, and this is followed
by a brief history of developments in the field. Important concepts and terminology related to
the analysis of games are then presented. This is followed by the brief review of well-known
variations of two-person symmetric games and strategies that determine their game dynamics.
The focus of the chapter then shifts to evolutionary game theory where important concepts
and developments within that particular field are presented. A particular emphasis is placed
on the literature related to spatial evolutionary games and the various methods that have been
adopted in the literature to analyse the evolution of cooperation in that context, either adopting
a numerical approach, an analytical approach or other less conventional approaches.
In the fourth chapter, a mathematical framework for modelling games on graphs is established.
This includes the various rules which govern the dynamics of the ESPD. The notion of a state
graph is then introduced as a visual representation tool of game dynamics. The construction of
a pay-off parameter phase plane is finally described in order to allow for the identification of the
various parameter regions which may lead to fundamentally different game dynamics.
The effect of players extending their cyclic neighbourhoods when arranged according to a cyclic
topology on the game dynamics of the ESPD is investigated in Chapter 5. A brief overview of
the analysis of the ESPD game dynamics with a cycle as underlying graph is first reviewed from
the literature. Analytical means (void computer aid) are then employed to analyse the dynamics
of the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. This entails a characterisation and
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.5. Thesis organisation 5
an enumeration of the possible equilibrium states of the ESPD, followed by an investigation into
the likelihood of the emergence of persistent cooperation. The analysis is only fully presented
for a single phase plane parameter region (but the entire analysis for the remaining parameter
regions can be found in the first three appendices). The chapter closes with a comparison of
the analyses of the game dynamics of the ESPD with a cycle as underlying graph with that of
the ESPD with the circulant as underlying graph, in order to determine the effect of players
extending their cyclic neighbourhoods on the evolution of cooperation.
The dynamics of the ESPD with a small toroidal grid as underlying graph is investigated in
Chapter 6. Analytical means together with computer aid are employed throughout the chap-
ter. The chapter opens with a mathematical motivation for the need of computer aid due to
the inherent combinatorial explosion in the analysis. Because of this inherent combinatorial
complexity, a new analysis visualisation tool, called the equilibrium state diagram, is proposed
to replace the state graph for larger toroidal grid dimensions during analyses of ESPD game
dynamics. Various algorithms are proposed (and their implementation discussed) for the con-
struction of the equilibrium state diagrams. Equilibrium state diagrams are then computed for
the ESPD with the eleven underlying toroidal grids of dimensions 2×6, 3×3, 3×4, 3×5, 3×6,
4× 4, 4× 5, 4× 6, 5× 5, 5× 6 and 6× 6. Only the equilibrium state diagram for a validation
case (the ESPD on a 3 × 3 toroidal grid graph, previously analysed by Van der Merwe [72]) is
presented in the chapter, while the remaining equilibrium state diagrams are presented in the
fourth appendix. In each case, the number of components in the equilibrium state diagrams are
enumerated, and this is followed by an investigation of the likelihood of persistent cooperation
emerging. A collective analysis of the ability of a small toroidal grid to facilitate the emergence
of persistent cooperation in the ESPD is finally presented.
The contributions of the thesis are summarised in Chapter 7, and this summary is followed by
an appraisal of these contributions. Possible avenues for future research related to the work
presented in this thesis are finally suggested.
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The first section of this chapter is devoted to a review of basic notions from the realm of graph
theory. The second section contains a brief review of various basic notions from the realm of
group theory, with particular emphasis on the Cauchy-Frobenius lemma which is used extensively
for enumeration purposes later in this thesis.
2.1 Graph theoretic prerequisites
This section contains descriptions of basic notions in graph theory that are required for an
understanding of the work presented later in this thesis. The definitions and terminology adopted
conform to those in [26], unless otherwise stated.
2.1.1 A graph and its properties
A graph G is a finite, non-empty vertex set V (G) together with a finite, possibly empty edge
set E(G), where each edge is a set of (unordered) pairs from V (G). The number of vertices
in a graph G is called its order and is denoted by n(G), whereas the number of edges in G is
called its size and is denoted by m(G). Therefore, n(G) = |V (G)| and m(G) = |E(G)|. The
standard form of graphical representation of a graph is illustrated in Figure 2.1(a); each vertex
is represented by a point and each edge by a line or curve.
Two vertices u and v are adjacent if they are joined by an edge e = {u, v}. In this case, the
vertex u is incident with the edge e, and similarly for v and e. Two distinct edges, e1 and e2
are adjacent if they are incident with a common vertex.
The complement G of a graph G is a graph with vertex set V (G) = V (G) and for which the edge
set E(G) contains all two-element subsets {u, v} from V (G) that are not contained in E(G).
The complement of the graph G2.1 in Figure 2.1(a) is shown in Figure 2.1(b). A graph H is
a subgraph of a graph G if V (H) ⊆ V (G) and E(H) ⊆ E(G). A spanning subgraph of G is a
subgraph of G which contains all the vertices in V (G).
7
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Figure 2.1: A graph G2.1 and its complement G2.1.
The degree of a vertex v is the number of vertices adjacent to it, denoted by d(v). The minimum
and maximum degree over all the vertices in a graphG is denoted by δ(G) and ∆(G), respectively.
The parity of the degree of a vertex determines whether it is odd or even. The open neighbourhood
N(v) of a vertex v is the set of vertices adjacent to v, defined byN(v) = {u ∈ V (G) | uv ∈ E(G)}.
The closed neighbourhood of a vertex v is its open neighbourhood set together with the vertex
v itself, denoted by N [v] = N(v) ∪ {v}. Therefore, the size of the open neighbourhood of a
vertex is its degree. To elucidate, consider the vertex v3 in the graph G2.1 of Figure 2.1(a).
Its open neighbourhood is N(v3) = {v2, v4} and hence its degree is d(v3) = 2, while its closed
neighbourhood is N [v3] = {v2, v3, v4}.
The degree distribution P (k) of a graph is a function indicating the probability that a ran-
domly selected vertex of the graph has the degree k. The graph G2.1, for example, has degree
distribution
P (k) =

1
6 if k = 0
1
6 if k = 1
2
6 if k = 2
1
6 if k = 3
1
6 if k = 4.
An edge-weighted graph is a graph G in which each edge e is assigned a positive real number,
called the weight of e and denoted by w(e). Similarly, a vertex-weighted graph is a graph in
which each vertex v is assigned a weight, denoted by w(v). Examples of an edge-weighted graph
and a vertex-weighted graph are shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: (a) An edge-weighted graph G2.2 and (b) a vertex-weighted graph G2.3.
The cartesian product G = G1 × G21 of two graphs G1 and G2 is a graph with vertex set
V (G) = V (G1) × V (G2) in which the vertex set (u1, u2) is adjacent to (v1, v2) if and only if
1The cartesian product of two graphs G1 and G2 is also commonly denoted by G1  G2. In this thesis,
however, the older notation G1 ×G2 is adopted.
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either u1 = v1 and u2v2 ∈ E(G2), or u2 = v2 and u1v1 ∈ E(G1). An example of the cartesian
product of two graphs is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The cartesian product of two graphs G2.4 and G2.5.
2.1.2 Connectivity
A v0-vn walk in a graph G is an alternating sequence of vertices and edges v0, e1, v1, e2, . . . , vn−1,
en, vn beginning with the vertex v0 and ending with vertex vn, such that ei = vi−1vi ∈ E(G) for
all i = 1, . . . , n. A walk is even if its length is even, or else it is odd. Edges and vertices may be
repeated in a walk. The number of (not necessarily distinct) edges in a walk is called the length
of the walk. If v0 = vn, then the walk is closed ; otherwise it is open. A trail is a walk in which
no edges are repeated, while a path is a walk in which no vertices are repeated. A cycle is a
closed path containing at least three vertices. A graph is called acyclic if it contains no cycles as
subgraphs. In the case of an edge-weighted graph, however, the length of a walk, path or trail
is the sum of the edge weights in the corresponding walk, path or trail.
A graph G is connected if there exists a path between every pair of its vertices. A graph that
is not connected is called disconnected. A disconnected graph consists of maximal connected
subgraphs, called components. The number of components of G is denoted by k(G). A connected
graph G has a single component, and so k(G) = 1 in this case. The distance d(u, v) between
two vertices u and v in a connected graph is the length of the shortest u-v path in the graph.
2.1.3 Digraphs, multigraphs and pseudographs
A directed graph, or digraph, D is a graph in which each edge is directed from one vertex to
another. Such directed edges are called arcs. A digraph therefore consists of a vertex set V (D)
and an arc set E(D) containing ordered pairs of vertices. The order of D is |V (D)|, while its
size is |E(D)|. An arc (u, v) is represented graphically by means of an arrow, with its tail at the
vertex u and its head at the vertex v. The outdegree od(v) of a vertex v is the number of tails
incident with the vertex, while the indegree id(v) of a vertex v is the number of heads incident
with the vertex. The degree of a vertex in a digraph is the sum of its outdegree and its indegree,
i.e. d(v) = od(v) + id(v).
Each digraph D is associated with an underlying graph. The associated underlying graph is
obtained by removing the directions of all the arcs from the digraph, as well as all multiple edges
that may thus arise between pairs of vertices. A digraph and its underlying graph therefore have
the same vertex set. An example of a digraph together with its associated underlying graph is
shown in Figure 2.4.
A digraph D is symmetric if, for every arc (u, v) in D, the arc (v, u) is also present in D. A
digraph D is asymmetric if, for every arc (u, v) in D, there is no arc (v, u) in D. The digraph
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Figure 2.4: (a) A digraph D2.1 and (b) its associated underlying graph G2.6.
D2.1 in Figure 2.4 is therefore neither symmetric nor asymmetric.
A multigraph is graph in which there is more than one edge between some pair of vertices. The
various edges that join the same pair of vertices are called parallel edges. An edge that joins
a vertex to itself is called a loop. A pseudograph is a graph containing at least one loop. If
a graph contains both parallel edges and loops it is both a multigraph and a pseudograph. A
pseudodigraph is a pseudograph in which the edges are directed. Examples of a multigraph, a
pseudograph and a pseudodigraph are shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: (a) A multigraph G2.7, (b) a pseudograph G2.8 and (c) a pseudodigraph D2.2.
A digraph D of order n can be represented in terms of an n × n adjacency matrix A in which
the entry in row i and column j is Aij = 1 if (vi, vj) is an element of E(D), or Aij = 0 otherwise.
The adjacency matrix can then be used to calculate various metrics of the degree of connectivity
of the digraph. Two of these measures are used extensively throughout this thesis. First, in
order to enumerate the walks of a certain length within a digraph, the following theorem (whose
proof can be found in [65, Theorem 4.7.1] may be used.
Theorem 1. Let A be the n × n adjacency matrix of a digraph D of order n with vertex set
V (D) = {v1, . . . , vn}. Then the entry in row i and column j of the matrix power Ak is the
number of vi-vj walks of length k in D.
The following extension of Theorem 1 allows for the enumeration of the closed walks of a certain
length within a digraph. The proof of this extension can be found in [65, Theorem 4.7.3].
Theorem 2. Let A be the adjacency matrix of a digraph D and let CD(k) be the number of
closed walks of length k in D. Then∑
k≥1
CD(k)x
k =
−xQ′(x)
Q(x)
,
where Q(x) = det(I − xA).
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2.1.4 Trees
A tree is a connected graph which contains no cycles, while a forest is a graph without cycles.
Each component of a forest is therefore a tree. A directed tree is a digraph for which the
underlying graph is a tree. A rooted tree is a directed tree in which one vertex is designated
the root and which has the property that there exists a unique (directed) path from the root to
each vertex in a rooted tree [26]. A vertex of degree one in a tree is called a leaf.
An example of a rooted tree is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.6. The vertex set of the tree
has been partitioned into levels. The number of each level corresponds to the distance from the
root of the tree to each vertex in the level. The height of the tree is the largest numbered level
of the tree and hence the longest distance between the root and a vertex in the tree. The height
of the rooted tree T2.1 in Figure 2.6 is h = 4.
Figure 2.6: Graphical representation of a rooted tree T2.1.
If T is a rooted tree and u, v ∈ V (T ), then v is called the parent of u if there exists an arc from
v to u in T . In that case, u is then called a child of v. A vertex u is a descendant of a vertex
v if there exists a directed v-u path in T . In such a case, u is called an ancestor of v in T . To
elucidate, consider the rooted tree T2.1 in Figure 2.6. In this case, v1 is the parent of v2, while
v2 is a child of v1. Furthermore, v2 is an ancestor of v6, which is one of its descendants.
2.1.5 Isomorphisms
Two graphs G1 and G2 are isomorphic if they have the same order and there exists a permu-
tation φ from V (G1) onto V (G2), such that uv ∈ E(G1) if and only if φ(u)φ(v) ∈ E(G2). An
isomorphism between two graphs G1 and G2 is denoted by G1 ' G2. If there is no isomorphism
between two graphs G1 and G2, then this fact is denoted by G1  G2. An isomorphism between
a graph G and itself is called an automorphism of G. A vertex-transitive graph is a graph G
in which, for any two vertices v1, v2 ∈ V (G), there exists an automorphism φ of G such that
φ(v1) = v2. The notion of graph isomorphism is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
2.1.6 Special graphs
The most common graphs used to model games on graphs are reviewed in this section. Emphasis
is placed on the classes of graphs that are central to the work presented later in this thesis, which
are the circulant graphs and grid graphs.
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Figure 2.7: (a) A graph G2.9 and (b) a graph G2.10 isomorphic to G2.9.
A path graph Pn is a graph of order n ≥ 2 whose vertices can be listed as v1, v2, . . . , vn in such
a manner that each edge of the graph has the form ei = {vi, vi+1} for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.
Each path therefore contains two terminal vertices (leaves) of degree one and n − 2 vertices of
degree two. A cycle graph Cn is a graph of order n consisting of a single cycle. A cycle graph
therefore contains n edges and every vertex has degree 2. Examples of path and cycle graphs
are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: (a) The path graph P6 and (b) the cycle graph C6.
An r-regular graph is a graph G such that d(v) = r for every vertex v ∈ V (G). An example
of a 3-regular graph G2.11 is shown in Figure 2.9(a). A complete graph is a graph G in which
every pair of distinct vertices is adjacent. A complete graph of order n is denoted by Kn. The
complete graph K6 is depicted in Figure 2.9(b). Note that each vertex in K6 has degree 5. In
general, Kn is an (n− 1)-regular graph. An empty graph is a graph containing no edges. Such
a graph of order n is denoted by Kn. The graph K6 is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.9(c).
Figure 2.9: (a) A 3-regular graph G2.11, (b) the complete graph K6 and (c) the empty graph K6.
A k-partite graph is a graph whose vertex set can be partitioned into k ≥ 2 disjoint subsets
V1, . . . , Vk, called partite sets, so that no two vertices of the same partite set are adjacent. Such
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a graph is denoted by Kn1,...,nk where ni = |Vi|, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If k = 2, the graph is
called a bipartite graph. A complete k-partite graph is a k-partite graph in which each vertex
in Vi is adjacent to every other vertex that is not in Vi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The complete
bipartite graph K3,5 is depicted in Figure 2.10(a). If all partite sets have equal size, ` (say), then
the graph is called a complete balanced k-partite graph and is denoted by Kk×`. The complete
balanced 3-partite graph K3×3 is illustrated in Figure 2.10(b).
Figure 2.10: (a) The complete bipartite graph K3,5 and (b) the complete balanced 3-partite graph
K3×3.
A circulant graph is a graph of order n in which the ith vertex is adjacent to the (i + j)th and
(i − j)th graph vertices for each j in a so-called connection set. A circulant graph of order n
with connection set {j1, . . . , jk} ⊆ {1, . . . , bn2 c} is denoted by Cn〈j1, . . . , jk〉.
An elementary circulant, is a circulant graph in which the connecting set contains only a single
entry (i.e. k = 1). Otherwise, the circulant graph is called a composite circulant. A singular
circulant is a circulant in which both n is even and the connection set contains the entry j = n2 .
If n is even and the connection set does not contain n2 , or n is odd, then the circulant graph is
called a non-singular circulant.
The elementary, singular circulant C8〈4〉 and the composite, singular circulant C8〈1, 3, 4〉 are
illustrated graphically in Figures 2.11(a) and 2.11(b), respectively. Note that the cycle Cn is
therefore isomorphic to the circulant Cn〈1〉. The circulant C8〈1〉 ' C8 is illustrated graph-
ically in Figure 2.11(c). The complete graph Kn is furthermore isomorphic to the circulant
Cn〈1, . . . , bn2 c〉. The composite, non-singular circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 is considered extensively in this
thesis and therefore the circulant C8〈1, 2〉 is depicted in Figure 2.11(d).
Figure 2.11: Examples of circulant graphs of order 8. The circulant graphs in (a) and (c) are elementary,
while the circulant graphs in (b) and (d) are composite. Furthermore, the circulant graphs in (a) and (b)
are singular, while the circulant graphs in (c) and (d) are non-singular.
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A lattice is a regular grid-like structure which can be represented by an arrangement of points
in a regular periodic pattern. The points of a lattice may be seen as representative of unit cells
of various shapes, such as squares, rectangles or hexagons. A graph corresponding to a lattice
structure can be constructed by placing a vertex in the centre of each unit cell, representing
that unit cell. Two vertices are then adjacent in the graph representation if the corresponding
unit cells share a common border. A lattice graph resulting from a square unit cell is shown in
Figure 2.12(a). Similarly, the resulting triangular grid graph emanating from a hexagonal unit
cell is shown in Figure 2.12(b).
Figure 2.12: Examples of two lattice graphs. (a) A square grid graph over a square tiling landscape
and (b) a triangular grid graph over a hexagonal tiling landscape.
A lattice with vertices arranged in a rectangular array is often referred to as a grid graph or
a mesh. Within this thesis, a grid graph is the main lattice structure analysed in the context
of modelling games on graphs. More formally, a grid graph is the Cartesian product of a path
graph of order n and a path graph of order m, denoted by Pn × Pm. A path is therefore a grid
graph of dimension n × 1 while a grid of dimension 2 × 2 is a cycle of order 4. The vertices in
a grid graph Pn × Pm may be associated with integer coordinates (x, y), where x = {1, . . . , n}
and y = {1, . . . ,m}, and where two vertices are joined by an edge whenever the corresponding
points are at a distance of one in R2. All grid graphs are also bipartite graphs. This can be
verified by the fact that one can colour the vertices in a checkerboard fashion.
A grid graph can also be embedded on a torus. A toroidal grid can be constructed from a
plane grid by “gluing” both pairs of opposite sides together without twisting. In this way an
ordinary torus with a single “hole” results. An example of a grid and its corresponding toroidal
embedding is shown in Figure 2.13. A toroidal grid graph is therefore often also referred to as
a grid graph with wrapping. More formally, a toroidal grid graph is a Cartesian product of a
cycle graph of order n and a cycle graph of order m, denoted by Cn × Cm.
2.1.7 Complex graph types
Various complex graph topologies have been classified according to their characteristic clustering
coefficients and path lengths. According to this classification, a graph can mainly be classified
as either a homogeneous graph, a random graph, a scale-free network or a small-world network.
These various graph models have received significant attention in the literature during attempts
at modelling games on graphs and are reviewed briefly in this section. More specifically, the
classification merits are outlined and each graph class is elucidated together with its associated
properties.
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Figure 2.13: Examples of grid graphs and their embeddings on a torus. The red and blue lines are
shown on both graph representations to elucidate the concept of wrapping that emerges from the initial
plane embeddings.
The clustering coefficient is a graph characteristic which measures the tendency of the vertices
of the graph to cluster together. The local clustering coefficient Cv of a vertex v is the number
of edges that occur between the vertices in the open neighbourhood of v, normalised by dividing
by the maximum number of edges that can possibly exist between the vertices in its open
neighbourhood [8]. That is,
Cv = 2|{euw | vu, vw ∈ Nv, euw ∈ E(G)}|
dv(dv − 1) ,
where dv is the degree of the vertex v. The local clustering coefficient measures the ability of
the neighbourhood of a vertex to form a complete subgraph. The average clustering coefficient
CG of a graph G is obtained by averaging the local clustering coefficients of all its vertices [8].
That is,
CG = 1|V (G)|
∑
v∈V (G)
Cv.
The characteristic path length LG of a graph G is the average distance between pairs of vertices,
taken over all vertex pairs in G.
The first complex graph type mentioned above was a homogeneous graph. A homogeneous graph
is a graph which is regular or is very close to regular and therefore has a homogeneous degree
distribution. The graph exhibits a low level of randomness (and the probability that any two
randomly chosen vertices are adjacent is typically very low). Such a graph is characterised by
long characteristic path lengths and high clustering coefficient values. Regular lattices, as well
as trees, are examples of homogeneous graphs.
A random graph, also known as a random ER (Erdos-Renyi) network, is a graph constructed
by starting with a disconnected set of vertices that are successively paired with a uniform
probability. The degree distribution of such a graph follows the binomial distribution [5]. A
random graph typically has a short characteristic path length and a small clustering coefficient.
Many real-world networks, especially social networks, exhibit some of the characteristics of
homogeneous graphs and some of the characteristics of random graphs. Therefore, two alternative
network models combining the properties of the aforementioned complex graph types have been
developed, namely those of small-world networks and scale-free networks. These graph topologies
have attracted a large amount of attention in the literature [15, 8, 77, 5].
A small-world network is formally defined as a graph whose geodesic distance (i.e. the mini-
mum number of edges that must be traversed to travel from a starting vertex to a destination
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vertex) between vertices increases at a rate slower than the logarithm of the number of vertices
in the graph. Therefore, a small-world network is typically highly clustered, yet exhibits a small
characteristic path length. A graph is considered a small-world network if its average clustering
coefficient is significantly larger than that of a regular graph if both graphs were to contain the
same vertex set. Small-world networks are structurally very close to many real-world social net-
works. This type of graph was introduced simultaneously with so-called small-world phenomena,
popularly referred to as six degrees of separation (the property that in the social network of the
world, any person is linked to any other person by an average of six intermediaries [5]).
A scale-free network is a connected graph whose degree distribution follows the power law
P (k) ∼ k−λ, where P (k) denotes the probability that a randomly selected vertex in the graph
has degree k. The graph is called scale-free because zooming in on any part of the distribution
does not affect its shape. A scale-free network can be constructed by progressively adding
vertices to a graph with preferential attachment so that edges are constructed between newly
added vertices and existing vertices with probabilities proportional to the number of edges
incident with the existing vertices. Examples of scale-free networks include the topologies of
web page inter-connection, the academic citation network and the power grid of the western
United States [5].
2.2 Group theoretic prerequisites
A number of basic notions from group theory are reviewed in this section, so as to facilitate
an understanding of the enumeration material presented in the remainder of this thesis. The
primary sources of definitions and concepts in this section are [39, 65].
2.2.1 A group and its properties
A group is a set G together with a binary operation ◦ : G×G 7→ G (i.e. the mapping of an ordered
pair of elements of G to some other element in G) that satisfies the following four axioms:
1. The closure property: g1 ◦ g2 ∈ G for any pair g1, g2 ∈ G;
2. The associative property: g1 ◦ (g2 ◦ g3) = (g1 ◦ g2) ◦ g3 for all g1, g2, g3 ∈ G;
3. The existence of an identity element: there exists a unique identity element ι ∈ G such
that g ◦ ι = ι ◦ g = g for any g ∈ G; and
4. The existence of inverses: for every element g ∈ G there exists a unique element of G,
denoted by g−1, such that g ◦ g−1 = g−1 ◦ g = ι.
The order of G, denoted by |G|, is the number of elements contained in G. The order n of an
element g ∈ G is the smallest natural number n for which gn = ι, if such a number exists2. If
such a number does not exist, then g is said to have infinite order. From Lagrange’s well known
theorem (for which a proof can be found in [39, Corollary on p.78]) for a finite group g, the
order of each element g ∈ G is a factor of |G|.
2Here the notation gn is shorthand for g ◦ g ◦ g ◦ . . . ◦ g (that is, the combination of n − 1 instances of the
binary operations ◦).
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2.2.2 Symmetry groups and equivalence classes
The notion of symmetry groups and equivalence classes are described in this section within the
context of two-dimensional euclidean geometry.
A homomorphism µ is a mapping from a group G to a group G′ which transforms compositions
into compositions. That is, for every pair of elements g1, g2 ∈ G there are associated elements
µ(g1), µ(g2) ∈ G′ such that µ(g1 ◦ g2) = µ(g1) ◦ µ(g2). A homomorphism therefore maps one
group to another and preserves group structure (it may be thought of as the group analogy of a
linear transformation on a vector space). A homomorphism which is a 1-1 mapping and in which
µ(G) = G′ is called an isomorphism. An isomorphism µ : G 7→ G of a group G onto itself is called
an automorphism. A special case of an isomorphism is an isometry, which is defined on a metric
space3 and preserves distances. That is, if µ is an isometry, then, ||µ(v1)− µ(v2)|| = ||v1 − v2||
for all elements v1,v2 of a vector space, where || · || is a norm defined on the vector space.
In order to elucidate, various notations related to the most common forms of isomorphisms are
briefly introduced. Let ρ denote clockwise rotation through 90° of a set of points in the plane
about an axis O through the origin and orthogonally out of the plane. Then, ρ2 = ρ ◦ ρ denotes
rotation of the set through 180° about O, while ρ3 = ρ◦ρ◦ρ denotes rotation of the set through
270° about O. Furthermore, let σ denote reflection of a set of points in the plane about the
x-axis of a cartesian system in the plane; that is, σ((x, y)) = (x,−y) for any (x, y) ∈ R2. Finally,
let ι be the identity mapping on the plane which maps each point of the plane to itself. Hence,
σ2 = σ ◦ σ = ι. Isomorphisms such as ρ, σ and ι may also be combined under the operation of
composition. For example, for any point P ∈ R2, σρ(P ) = (σ ◦ ρ)(P ) = σ(ρ(P )).
Figure 2.14: The symmetry group of a square. (a) The identity symmetry, (b) reflection symmetries
and (c) rotational symmetries.
A symmetry group is a set of all the isomorphisms together with the binary operations of
composition in which the elements of the set (on which the operations of the group are defined)
remain invariant under the isomorphisms. By the definition of a group, any combination of two
isomorphisms within a symmetry group, or an isomorphism and its inverse, results in another
element of the symmetry group. To elucidate this concept, consider a square with its centre at
the origin of R2 and corner points at (−1, 1), (1, 1), (1,−1) and (−1,−1). The square has eight
isomorphisms under which it remains invariant: clockwise rotation by 90°, 180° or 270° about an
axis O through the origin and orthogonal out of the plane, reflection about the x-axis, the y-axis
and the two diagonal axes (within the plane) through the diagonally opposite corner points of
the square, and the identity isomorphism which maps every point to itself. The symmetry group
of a square is therefore the set of isomorphisms {ι, ρ, ρ2, ρ3, σ, σρ, σρ2, σρ3} together with the
3A metric space is a set equipped with a distance function defined on all pairs of elements of the set. Such a
distance function d on a set X satisfies the following four properties: Non-negativity (denoted d(x, y) ≥ 0 for all
x, y ∈ X), symmetry (denoted d(x, y) = d(y, x) for all x, y ∈ X), the triangle inequality (denoted d(x, y)+d(y, z) ≤
d(x, z) for all x, y, z ∈ X) and the identity of indiscernment (denoted d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y for all
x, y ∈ X).
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binary operation of composition. These various isomorphisms are illustrated in Figure 2.14. In
general, the dihedral group Dn is the symmetry group of a regular n-gon for some n ≥ 2 and has
2n elements, namely {ι, ρ, ρ2, . . . , ρn−1,σ, σρ, σρ2, . . . , σρn−1}. The symmetry group of a square
is therefore denoted by D4.
Let X be a set and let ∼ be an equivalence relation4 defined on X. Then the equivalence class
of an element a ∈ X is the set {x ∈ X | x ∼ a} of elements which are equivalent to a. The
collection of all equivalence classes of X forms a partition of X. Each equivalence class can be
represented by one of its elements called the canonical representative or the class representative.
In many enumerative analysis instances, an exclusive focus on the set of class representatives
instead of considering the entire set X is without loss of generality. The considerable utility of
this principle is exploited later in this thesis.
To elucidate the concepts of equivalence classes and of their class representatives, consider the
set of all possible colourings of a 2 × 2 grid in two colours such that each grid cell is assigned
exactly one of the colours, shown in Figure 2.15(a). A partition of this set into its equivalence
classes is shown in Figure 2.15(b). Note that all the elements within an equivalence class can
be formed by taking any element of the equivalence class, applying each of the isomorphisms of
the symmetry group D4 to this element and recording only the distinct
5 resulting states.
Figure 2.15: (a) The 16 ways in which a 2×2 grid can be coloured, using two colours, in such a manner
that each grid cell is assigned exactly one of the colours, and (b) the resulting six equivalence classes of
these colourings.
The well-known Cauchy-Frobenius lemma may be used to enumerate the equivalence classes of
a set. A proof of this result may be found in [39, Theorem on p.92].
Theorem 3. (Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma, also known as Burnside’s Lemma)
If a group G acts on a set X, then the number of equivalence classes into which X can be
partitioned by the action of G is
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|,
where Fg = {x ∈ X | pig(x) = x} and pig denotes the actions of the group element g ∈ G.
4An equivalence relation ∼ on a set X is a subset of the cartesian product X ×X that is reflexive (denoted
x ∼ x for all x ∈ X), symmetric (denoted x ∼ y if y ∼ x for all x, y ∈ X) and transitive (denoted x ∼ y and y ∼ z
imply x ∼ z for all x, y, z ∈ X).
5The descriptor distinct is used in this context to convey that the grid colouring appears different from a mere
visual perspective.
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In order to illustrate the application of the Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma, consider the number of
essentially different6 ways in which a 2×2 grid can be coloured with at most two colours. The six
possible colourings are shown in Figure 2.16(b). Recall that a square has the symmetry group
D4 = {ι, ρ, ρ2, ρ3, σ, σρ, σρ2, σρ3}. Applying the Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma, each isomorphism
within the symmetry group has to be considered and the number of different colourings that
yield an equivalent state when applying the isomorphism, enumerated. Consider first the identity
isomorphism. Under this isomorphism all the possible colourings of a 2 × 2 grid will result in
equivalent states, and so |Fι| = 24. Next, consider the isomorphism ρ which maps the first cell
in Figure 2.16(a) to the second, the second cell to the fourth, the fourth cell to the third, and the
third cell to the first. Hence, for an equivalent state to result under this isomorphism, all cells
must have the same colour, and so |Fρ| = 2. Now consider the isomorphism ρ2. The positions of
the first and fourth cells, as well as those of the second and third cells, are interchanged under
this isomorphism, and so each pair must have the same colouring in order to yield an equivalent
state under ρ2. Hence, |Fρ2 | = 22. The remaining isomorphisms within the symmetry group D4
can be analysed in a similar fashion. Carrying out the analysis, it is readily found that |Fι| = 24,
|Fρ| = 2, |Fρ2 | = 22, |Fρ3 | = 2, |Fσ| = 22, |Fσρ| = 22, |Fσρ2 | = 23 and |Fσρ3 | = 23. According to
the Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma, there are therefore 18(16+2+4+2+4+4+8+8) = 6 essentially
different ways of colouring a 2× 2 grid with at most two colours.
Figure 2.16: (a) A 2 × 2 grid with unit cells numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. (b) The six essentially different
colourings of a 2× 2 grid using at most two colours, which has D4 as symmetry group.
2.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, various mathematical concepts were reviewed that are prerequisites for under-
standing the work documented later in this thesis. In §2.1, fundamental notions of graph theory
were reviewed. In particular, the concepts of connectedness and graph isomorphisms were de-
scribed. Various types of graphs were also reviewed with an emphasis on circulant and (toroidal)
grid graphs. In §2.2 basic notions from group theory were reviewed. An emphasis was placed on
the notion of an equivalence class and on the Cauchy-Frobenious lemma, which is a very useful
tool in enumerative combinatorics.
6The descriptor essentially different is used in this context to convey grid colourings that are not isomorphic
and therefore do not belong to the same equivalence class.
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The literature related to classical and evolutionary game theory is reviewed in this chapter.
Important concepts and terminology required for the definition, classification and analysis of
games are also defined. This is followed by a brief background on various well-known two-player,
two-strategy symmetric games as well as updating rules commonly applied within evolutionary
games. Emphasis is finally placed on spatial evolutionary games, which is the main focus of this
thesis.
3.1 Classical game theory
The concept of conflict is prevalent in society and nature. It is relatively easy to delineate the
components of a conflicting situation: Several individuals making a series of decisions which
leads to a possible outcome that each individual values differently. Conflict arises from the
varied valuation of outcomes, and hence a collision of interests [71]. Although the notion of
conflict has been present since the origin of man, a scientific approach to its analysis was only
recently developed, as late as 1930, with the emergence of the field of game theory.
Game theory is a sub-discipline of operations research concerned with modelling and predicting
the outcome from the interaction, known as a game, between rational decision makers, called
players [16]. Each player selects a strategy, defining the player’s choice of actions for any scenario
within the game. The resulting interaction, and hence the outcome of the game, depends on
all players’ strategies, and each player is assigned a pay-off value accordingly. The goal of each
player is to maximise its own expected pay-off value.
Game-theoretic insights have been found in various ancient records. For example, in two of
Plato’s texts, the Laches and the Symposium [9], the moral dilemma of a front-line solider in the
Battle of Delium is recalled: A solider considers that his personal contribution is probabilistically
21
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insignificant to the outcome of the battle and by fighting he runs the risk of being killed or
injured. He is therefore better off running away. The dilemma is that if all soldiers acted
within their best interest, then no men will remain to fight and the battle will be lost. This
commentary affected the strategies of the Spanish conqueror Cortez [29]. When arriving in
Mexico, he removed the risk that his troops may act in their own best interest and retreat by
burning the ships on which they arrived. This episode gave rise to the modern saying “burning
your ships.”
Game theory is often applied in the fields of economics, the political sciences, tactical and
strategic military science, computer science, engineering and evolutionary biology [19, 43, 56,
48, 13, 55]. In engineering, the interest in game theory is motivated by the possibility of designing
large-scale systems that globally regulate their performance in a distributed and decentralised
manner. Modelling a problem within a game-theoretic setting is particularly relevant to any
practical application consisting of separate subsystems that compete for some limited resource.
3.1.1 A brief history of classical game theory
Originally, game theory focused on simplistic, strictly competitive games known as two-person
zero-sum games [16]. This simplification was due to limitations in the mathematical framework
available at the time, making the theory applicable only under special and limited conditions.
Although this level of simplification may seem inappropriate for the more practical games en-
countered in economics and politics, it formed the cornerstone of general game theory.
The very first theorem of game theory, published in 1913, is Zermelo’s Theorem [81]. Ernest
Zermelo applied set theory in an analysis of the game of chess. He proved mathematically that
chess is a strictly determined game1, but was unable to determine its winning strategy. Zermelo
also considered a wide class of parlour games including Checkers, Chinese Checkers and Go. He
formulated what is now known as Zermelo’s Theorem which applies to the following large class
of games including the aforementioned parlour games: Two-person zero-sum games of perfect
information2 without stochastic strategic elements that contain a finite set of positions and an
infinite sequences of moves. He proved that for these games it will never take more moves than
there are positions available to a player to win the game if the player is in a winning position3.
This theorem paved the way for more general results forming a foundation on which the field of
game theory could be developed.
The foundations of game theory were laid by the mathematician and computer scientist John von
Neumann in 1928, who is considered the ‘father of game theory.’ Although others preceeded him
in formulating a theory of games, notably Emile Borel [36], it was Von Neumann who published
the seminal paper Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele [74]. This paper provided a comprehensive
and exact formalisation of important notions in game theory, as well as a formal proof of the
Minimax Principle4. Von Neumann’s original proof used Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem on
continuous mappings into compact convex sets to show that every two-person zero-sum game
with finitely many pure strategies for each player is determined. The Minimax Principle became
the cornerstone of game theory.
1A strictly determined game is a two-player zero-sum game where, if both players use pure strategies, then
there is at least one Nash equilibrium [75].
2A sequential game has perfect information if each player participating in the game is perfectly informed of
all events that previously occured, including the initialisation event [75].
3A winning position is formally defined as the non-emptiness of a certain set containing all possible sequences
of moves that allow a player to win, independently of the moves of the opposing player [75].
4The Minimax Principle is a decision rule in which one minimises one’s own maximum loss [53].
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Von Neumann’s paper was soon followed by a book titled Theory of games and economic be-
haviour [75], co-authored with economist Oskar Morgenstern in 1944. The book provided the
climax of the pioneering period of game theory by providing a complete axiomatic utility theory,
enabling game theory to be considered a formal mathematical discipline. Although the book
was merely a review of previous work and contained no new results, it introduced the so-called
extensive form5 of a game, which was later reduced to the normal form6 of a game by Kuhn [35].
It also allowed for the fundamental development of the concepts of strategy, the strategic form
of a game, mixed strategies and individual rationality. The strategic form of a game, often rep-
resented as a pair of matrices for two-person games, is considered one of the most significant
contributions to game theory. This foundational work also demonstrated the broad applications
of game theory in economics and other well-known disciplines.
Another important milestone in the field of game theory occurred in 1950 when the American
mathematician John Forbes Nash [47] developed a criterion for mutual consistency of players’
strategies, known as a Nash equilibrium7. A Nash equilibrium may be seen as an extension
of Von Neumann’s minimax solution for n-player, non-zero-sum games. In zero-sum games, a
minimax solution is the same as a Nash-equilibrium. Nash further proved the existence of at
least one Nash equilibrium in each non-cooperative game. One of the most intriguing aspects of
a Nash equilibrium is that it is not necessarily efficient in terms of aggregated social welfare.
Game theoretic research rapidly expanded after 1950. Al Tucker [45] formulated the PD, and
the concept and analysis of repeated games emerged thereafter [23, 70, 76, 3]. A large amount
of experimentation was also conducted by notable mathematicians, such as Merril Flood and
Melvin Dresher, as part of RAND Corporation’s investigation into game theory [59]. RAND pur-
sued this investigation because of game theory’s potential application to global nuclear strategy
formation [59].
The field also found particular application to philosophy and the political sciences during this
time. In 1954, the first paper was published on the use of game theoretic concepts to determine
the power of the members of the United Nations Security Council [62]. This work further
facilitated the game-theoretic modelling of situations related to elections, legislature, politics of
interest groups, lobbies and bargaining, among others [21, 2, 43].
In 1973, two works pioneered the application of game theory to evolutionary biology. The
first was British evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith’s and American geneticist George
Price’s paper titled The logic of animal conflict [42]. This paper introduced the concept of
an evolutionarily stable strategy8. It also inspired further research which was summarised by
Maynard Smith a decade later in his book Evolution and the theory of games [40]. The second
was the American political scientist Robert Axelrod’s book The evolution of cooperation [3],
which explains, from a game-theoretic point of view, how cooperation may emerge, supporting
the theory of biological evolution. The emergence of cooperation was previously perplexing as it
appeared to oppose the Darwanistic framework of natural selection in which selfish individuals
are favoured.
5The extensive form of game is an explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequence of
a player’s possible moves, choices and potential pay-off values at every decision point. It is often represented
graphically in the form of a decision tree [75].
6The normal form of a game is the representation of a game by means of a matrix [35].
7A Nash equilibrium of a game is a state of strategies from which no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate
by choosing another strategy [47].
8An evolutionary stable strategy is a strategy which, if adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by a
mutant strategy that is initially rare [42].
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Utility maximising rationality has been observed to reflect the behaviour of animals better than
that of humans [16]. An experiment involving probability matching was performed in which the
subject must predict the binary outcome of an event where each outcome occurs with a certain
probability. The rational solution is to pick the outcome that is most likely to occur. Rats were
found to predict the correct event significantly more accurately than humans. These findings
support the application of game theory in the modelling of biological evolution.
Finally, in 1994, John Nash was awarded the Nobel prize in economics together with Hungarian-
American economist John Harsanyi and German economist Reinhard Selten for their contribu-
tions to non-cooperative game theory. The importance of the field can be accredited to the
eleven game theorists who have won the Nobel prize in economics, the latest being Jean Tirole
in 2014 for his work on market power and regulation.
For a further, more detailed account of the history of game theory the reader is referred to
Paul Walker’s chronology of game theory [76] or William Poundstone’s book titled Prisoner’s
dilemma: John von Neumann, game theory and the puzzle of the bomb [59].
3.2 Defining, classifying and analysing games
Game theory provides a basic mathematical framework according to which conflicting situations
can be defined, classified and analysed. This section contains definitions and explanations of a
number of basic game theoretic notions employed in the remainder of this thesis.
3.2.1 Basic concepts in game theory
A game is an abstract formulation of an interactive decision situation with possibly conflict-
ing interests. In game theory, there are two different ways of representing a game: Either in
extensive-form or in normal-form. In the former case, the game is represented as a rooted tree.
Each vertex of the tree represents a possible state of the game and each edge represents an event.
An event can either represent the enactment of a move by a player or the outcome of a stochastic
event. This is particularly beneficial in the analysis of incomplete information or asynchronous
games. Each extensive-form game can, however, also be represented as a normal-form game.
The latter is the standard form in which games are presented.
John Nash [46] first formally defined the notion of a normal-form game in terms of a game’s
players, their feasible actions (also called pure strategies) and the utilities or pay-off values
associated with each possible combination of actions that can be chosen by the players.
Definition 1. (Normal form of a game)
The normal-form of a finite, n-person game is a tuple (N,A,u), where
1. N is a finite set of n players;
2. A = A1 ×A2 × · · · ×An, where Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i;
3. u = (ui, . . . , un), where ui : Ai 7→ R is a real-valued utility function for player i.
In the case where there are only two players, N = {1, 2}, and the sets of available strategies
A1 = {s1,1, . . . , s1,m} and A2 = {s2,1, . . . , s2,m} are discrete, it is customary to write the game
in bi-matrix form G = (A,BT ) which is the shorthand form for the pay-off matrix
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Ψ =

s2,1 ... s2,m
s1,1 (A11,B
T
11) . . . (A1m,B
T
1m)
...
...
. . .
...
s1,m (Am1,B
T
m1) . . . (Amm,B
T
mm)
,
where Aij = u1(a1,i, a2,j) and B
T
ij = u2(a1,i, a2,j).
The strategy of a player (i.e. a row or column label in the pay-off matrix), is a pure strategy.
A pure strategy is one in which the player has a predetermined set of actions that are adopted
by the player according to the possible actions that can be taken by the opponent. In many
games, however, the players can play mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over
pure strategies. A player therefore randomly chooses the pure strategy to be adopted.
Definition 2. (Mixed strategy)
Let Ai = {ai1, ai2, . . . , aimi} be the set of actions available to player i in a finite, n-person game,
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then a mixed strategy for player i is a vector (pi1, p
i
2, . . . , p
i
mi) where
pij ∈ [0, 1] for all j = 1, . . . ,m satisfying pi1 + pi2 + · · · + pim = 1. Such a strategy dictates that
player i will choose action aij with probability p
i
j, for all i = 1, . . . , n and all j = 1, . . . ,m. The
set of all mixed strategies available to a player is called the player’s strategy set.
A pure strategy is therefore a mixed strategy in which pij is a binary number for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 3. (Strategy profile)
A collection of strategies s1, . . . , sn adopted by the players of an n-person game is called a strategy
profile of the game and is denoted by s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn).
The timing of a game in normal form is that players independently, but simultaneously, choose
one of their feasible actions without knowing the decisions of the other players. Players then
receive pay-off values according to the strategy profile realised.
3.2.2 A classification of games
A game can be classified according to its players and their strategies. Referring to a game as an
N × |S| game is an example of such a classification, where N represents the number of players
and |S| the number of pure strategies available to each player. For example, a 2 × 2 game
represents a game containing two players who each has two pure strategies available.
Games are often also classified according to their pay-off structure or the type of rules employed.
A cooperative game is a game in which all agreements, promises and threats are fully binding
and enforceable. Players are also allowed to communicate in cooperative games. The opposite
is true in non-cooperative games [22]. Only non-cooperative games are considered in this thesis.
A game can either be symmetric or asymmetric. In a symmetric game, all game players have
identical strategy options and pay-off values. If M is the pay-off matrix for player 1 in a two-
player symmetric game, then MT is the pay-off matrix for player 2. It is therefore irrelevant
whether a player is considered in the role of player 1 or that of player 2. Hence, a two-player
symmetric game can be denoted by G = (A,AT ). The well-known PD, the Hawk-Dove and the
coordination games are all examples of two-person symmetric games. Two-person asymmetric
games, on the other hand, are denoted by G = (A,BT ), where A 6= B. In this case, it makes
a difference whether a player is considered in the role of player 1 or player 2.
A two-person zero-sum game is a two-player game in which the pay-off value of one player is
equal to that of the second player, but different in sign. In this case, the game may be denoted
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by G = (A,−A). The same game can also be referred to as a constant-sum game, as the pay-off
values can alternatively add up to a constant other than zero. This is because the player utility
functions are linear, allowing for the application of linear transformations to the pay-off vector
without changing the outcome of the game.
Definition 4. (Zero-sum game)
Let Aj denote the set of actions of player j in a finite two-person game and let uj : A 7→ R
denote the utility function of player j ∈ {1, 2}. Then the game is called a zero-sum game if there
exists some real constant c such that u1(a) + u2(a) = c for all a ∈ A1 ×A2.
The players of a game can implement their strategies simultaneously or sequentially. A game can
therefore be classified as either a synchronous game or an asynchronous game. In asynchronous
games, players have some knowledge of the decisions made by other players during earlier moves
of the game. As mentioned previously, the extensive form of a game is often used to represent
asynchronous games. A game may also incorporate a combination of sequential and simultaneous
events.
A game of perfect information is one in which all players know the exact state of the game as
well as which decisions are made within each round of the game. An example of a game with
perfect information is chess. Each player knows the rules of the game and observes all moves
made by the other player. If this property does not hold for a game, it is known as a game of
imperfect information. An example of such a game is bridge, in which the players have limited
knowledge of the cards held by the opposite player. In a game of complete information, every
player knows the strategies and pay-offs available to the other players, but not necessarily their
actions.
3.2.3 Analysing games
In order to analyse a game and determine which strategies will be optimal for the various players,
a solution concept is required. A solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game
will be played. Depending on the complexity of the game, various solution concepts have been
developed over the years.
Minimax and maximin strategies
In order to determine which action is best for each player within a zero-sum game, two solution
concepts have been defined. According to the minimax concept, each player minimises its
opponent’s maximal pay-off values, whereas according to the maximin concept, each player
maximises its own minimal pay-off values. According to a theorem by Von Neumann [75], the
minimax and maximin solutions are identical in zero-sum games. For non-zero games, however,
they are not generally equivalent.
Strategy dominance
When comparing various strategies within a game, the notion of strategy dominance is central.
Strategy dominance occurs when one strategy is better than another strategy for one player
regardless of the actions taken by the player’s opponents. The formal definition of strategy
dominance and its use as a solution concept of the game is as follows. A dominant strategy can
either be weakly or strictly dominant.
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Definition 5. (Weakly dominant strategy)
Consider an n-player game in which the strategy set and the utility function of player i are
denoted by Si and ui, respectively, for all i = 1, . . . , n. A strategy si ∈ Si is a (weakly) dominant
strategy for player i if ui(s1, . . . , si−1, si, si+1, . . . , sn) ≥ ui(s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn) for all
s′i ∈ Si and all sj ∈ Sj, j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n}.
In the case of a strictly dominant strategy (for player i), the inequality in Definition 5 changes
to ui(s1, . . . , si−1, si, si+1, . . . , sn) > ui(s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn) for all s
′
i ∈ Si with s′i 6= si.
According to the standard minimal definition of rationality [2], rational players seek to optimise
their pay-off values and therefore always play dominant strategies. Therefore, if the solution to
a game may be predicted by simply eliminating all strictly non-dominant strategies, it is said
to be dominant solvable. Eliminating non-dominant strategies may not always be sufficient to
reach a single, unique solution, and so further requirements may often be necessary. A stronger
solution concept, which is applicable to all games, is the concept of a Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium
The most influential concept developed in classical game theory is a Nash Equilibrium, developed
by John Nash in his PhD dissertation entitled Non-cooperative games [46]. He proved that each
game with a finite set of players and actions will have at least one Nash Equilibrium. The proof is
based on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [32]. In order to define a Nash Equilibrium, the concept
of a best response is required. If a player knows what strategy the other players are going to play,
it can determine its best response following the approach of single-agent utility-maximisation.
Definition 6. (Best response)
Consider an n-player game in which the strategy set and the utility function of player i are
denoted by Si and ui, respectively, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Given strategies sj ∈ Sj for all players
other than player i, a best response for player i is a strategy si ∈ Si such that ui(s1, . . . , si−1, si,
si+1, . . . , sn) ≥ ui(s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn) for all s′i ∈ Si.
The best response can be unique in the case where it is a pure strategy. Otherwise, it is a mixed
strategy and hence there may be infinitely many best responses.
Informally, a Nash equilibrium is a solution in which no player has the incentive to change its
strategy to enhance its pay-off value, given that all other players keep to their original strategies.
Definition 7. (Nash equilibrium)
Consider an n-player game in which the strategy of player i is denoted by si, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Nash equilibrium if si is a best response for all i = 1, . . . , n.
More than one Nash equilibrium may exist for a given game and identifying these equilibria can
be difficult. Pareto efficiency is a refinement of the notion of a Nash equilibrium which provides
a mechanism for equilibrium selection when the Nash equilibrium criterion alone would provide
more than one solution. A Pareto efficient solution is an outcome of a game for which there is
no other outcome that renders every player at least as well off (in terms of their pay-off values),
with at least one player strictly better off.
One of the most intriguing aspects of a Nash equilibrium is that it is not necessarily Pareto
efficient in terms of the aggregate social welfare. Two archetypical examples of this situation are
the PD and the Tragedy of the commons. Such situations are called social dilemmas and their
analysis, avoidance or possible resolution is one of the most fundamental issues in economics
and the social sciences.
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Risk dominance and pay-off dominance are two refinements of the Nash equilibrium established
by John Harsanyi and Reihard Selten [24]. A Nash equilibrium is considered pay-off dominant
if it is Pareto efficient with respect to all other Nash equilibria in the game, while a Nash
equilibrium is considered risk dominant if it has the largest natural attraction (i.e. the more
uncertain players are about the actions of their opponents, the more likely they will choose the
strategy associated with the risk dominant Nash equilibrium).
The evolutionary stable strategy
In evolutionary game theory, the most important solution concept is the evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS) which is closely related to that of a Nash equilibrium. Maynard Smith and
Price [42] defined an ESS as “a strategy such that, if most of the members of a population adopt
it, there is no ‘mutant’ strategy that would give a higher reproductive fitness.” Players playing
an ESS fare better than players playing only mutant strategies and therefore outperform and
expel invaders.
Definition 8. (Evolutionary stable strategy)
Given a two-player symmetric game and a player utility function u, a mixed strategy s is an ESS
if there exists a positive real number   1 such that u(s, (1− )s+ s′) > u(s′, (1− )s+ s′)
for all s′ 6= s.
An ESS can also be defined in terms of two properties. More specifically, a strategy is an ESS
if, for all s′ 6= s, either
1. u(s, s) > u(s′, s), or else
2. u(s, s) = u(s′, s) and u(s, s′) ≥ u(s′, s′)
is satisfied. An ESS is therefore a refinement of the notion of a Nash equilibrium. All ESSs are
Nash equilibria, but a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily an ESS.
3.3 Types of 2-person, 2-strategy games
Since symmetric 2-person, 2-strategy games with pure strategies are the focus of this thesis, this
type of game is considered in more detail in this section. Suppose the strategies available to the
players in this case are cooperation (denoted by C) and defection (denoted by D). Then the
pay-off matrix takes the form
Ψ =
[ C D
C R S
D T P
]
, (3.1)
where the pay-off values included in the matrix are those received by the row player, where R is
called the reward for mutual cooperation, P is called the punishment for mutual defection, T is
called the temptation to defect and S is called the sucker’s pay-off. Various orderings of these
pay-off values define different well-known games. The (S, T )-phase plane is shown in Figure 3.1,
forming various well-known games when the pay-off matrix is normalised so that R = 1 and
P = 0.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.3. Types of 2-person, 2-strategy games 29
Figure 3.1: Partitioning of the (S, T )-phase plane if R = 1 and P = 0 in (3.1). Each of the 12 regions
refers to a specific type of 2× 2 game. Those of particular interest are named in the diagram.
3.3.1 The prisoner’s dilemma
The best-known game in game theory is the PD. The game was proposed in 1950 by Albert
Tucker who gave the game its name and interpretation based on numerical experimentation by
Flood and Dresher at RAND Corporation, a military-subsidised think tank based in the United
States [45]. The game was soon recognised as an important and fundamental analytical tool in
the context of conflict situations [60]. Due to the threats of moral considerations emerging from
technological development, it has been argued that the PD is “one of the premier philosophical
and scientific issues of our time.”
The dilemma is presented in the form of a parable in which two suspects are arrested by the
police. Having insufficient evidence to convict them, the police offer both prisoners the same deal
separately: Each prisoner can either defect (D) and hence testify against the other prisoner, or
cooperate (C) by remaining silent. If both prisoners choose to cooperate, they are each sentenced
to a short prison term, represented by a pay-off value R. If, however, one prisoner defects while
the other cooperates, the former goes free and hence receives a pay-off value T while the latter
receives the full sentence and hence a pay-off value S. If both prisoners defect, they share the
sentence and each receives a pay-off value P . Under the PD model’s standard restrictions, the
parameter ordering condition T > R > P > S holds for the pay-off values. The dilemma is
therefore that each prisoner, unable to communicate with the other prisoner, should decide on
a strategy which maximises his own reward or pay-off value by minimising his prison sentence.
Defection is known to be the best response for both players in a single PD, resulting in a Nash
equilibrium. The optimal solution, allowing for maximum individual benefit, however, is for both
players to cooperate [58]. If the PD is considered within an evolutionary context, it is modelled
as repeated rounds and called the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). A central underlying
assumption of the IPD is that the number of rounds is unknown in advance to all the players.
Within this context cooperation has been observed to emerge as an optimal strategy [58].
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3.3.2 The hawk-dove game
Upon altering the parameter condition of the PD so that S > P , hence resulting in the alternative
inequality chain T > R > S > P , the well-known hawk-dove game is obtained which is sometimes
also referred to as the game of chicken or the snowdrift game [42].
The game was first introduced by Sugden [66] and derives the name hawk-dove from the situation
where individuals compete for a shared resource. Players can either contest for the resource,
known as playing hawk, or share the resource, known as playing dove. If both players play hawk
and fight for the resource, they both incur a large cost whereas if both players play dove, they
share the resource with no cost incurred. If, however, one player plays hawk and the other dove,
then the hawk gains the entire resource and the dove nothing. A hawk will always contest for
sole ownership of the resource while the dove is willing to share the resource.
3.3.3 The stag-hunt game
Constricting the parameters of the pay-off matrix by the inequality chain R > T > P > S
results in the so-called stag-hare game. The stag-hunt game may also be explained by means of
a parable [63]: Two hunters going on a hunt are able to choose whether to hunt a deer (stag)
or a hare. In order to succeed in hunting a deer, a hunter requires the cooperation of the other
hunter. A hunter is, however, able to hunt a hare independently, but hunting a hare is worth
less than hunting a deer.
The stag-hunt game has two Nash-equilibria: Where both players cooperate or where both
players defect. The first is considered pay-off dominant, while the latter is considered risk
dominant.
3.3.4 The public good game
The public good game is played by N players who are each able to cooperate or defect. Each
cooperating player contributes a benefit b to the public good, while incurring a cost c to himself.
On the other hand, each defecting player does not contribute anything to the public good and
also does not incur any cost. The total current public wealth is distributed equally among all
the players regardless of their strategy.
This game is also known as the Tragedy of the commons [21], which exemplifies the major related
concerns of political philosophy and economic thinking, of which the tragedy is that without
central planning and global control, private incentives lead to over-utilisation of public resources
and insufficient contribution to public goods.
3.4 Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory is based on the assumption that players have limited knowledge of
the game and only bounded rationality. The games in evolutionary game theory are repeated
in rounds and players are given the opportunity to adapt and learn good strategies as the game
repetition occurs. Evolutionary game theory emerged as a refinement of classical static games,
but now deals with more dynamic games of adaptation [76].
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3.4.1 Classical vs evolutionary game theory
Classical game theory is based on two key assumptions, namely that all players have perfect
rationality and that this is common knowledge. Perfect rationality means that players have
well-defined pay-off functions and that they are fully aware of their own and their opponents’
strategy options and pay-off values. They have no cognitive limitations in deducing the best
possible way of playing despite the complexity of the game. Hence, computation is costless and
occurs instantaneously. Common knowledge implies that all players know that all other players
are rational, and that all players know that all other players know that they are all rational [20,
21].
As described in §3.2, classical game theory is concerned with games, defined in terms of players,
strategies and utilities. The objective is to find a solution concept, i.e. a set of solution strategies
for each player [67].
Evolutionary game theory branched off from classical game theory due to three key deficiencies of
the latter field. The first is that of equilibrium selection by rational agents in the case of multiple
Nash equilibria. The second problem is hyper-rationality, which is required to assign cardinal
utility functions to the agents. Studies have shown that human behaviour rather coincides with
the assumptions of hyper-rationality. The third difficulty lies in the lack of dynamism within
classical game theory. Classical game theory assumes static preferences and does not address
the process of rational deliberation and learning.
Evolutionary game theory is the theory of dynamic adaptation and learning in infinitely repeated
games played by bounded rational agents. The key assumptions are that players have limited
knowledge of the game and only bounded rationality. Players are given the opportunity to
adapt and learn as game repetition occurs. The focus in evolutionary game theory is therefore
on strategies and how they persist through time.
In classical game theory, each player’s rationality and self-interest serve as the agent of op-
timisation, whereas in evolutionary game theory, the selection process serves as the agent of
optimisation. For a more detailed discussion on the differences between the two sub-fields of
game theory, the reader is referred to Maynard Smith’s seminal paper Evolutionary game the-
ory [41].
3.4.2 Evolution and natural selection
Evolutionary game theory originated from observations in nature exhibiting evolution and nat-
ural selection. In biology, evolution is the generational change in the physical, genetic or be-
havioural characteristics of a population enabled through natural selection. Genes are the basic
heritable unit which collectively form an organism’s phenotype. When a heritable characteristic
provides a reproductive advantage, it becomes more abundant in a population as time progresses.
Wright [80] introduced the concept of a fitness landscape in which fitness is plotted against gene
frequency. Fitness is a measure of an individual’s ability to survive and reproduce.
Evolutionary game theory centres on the study of evolution when selection depends on the
relative abundance of game strategies in a game strategy population, hence the study of the
dynamics of a game strategy population’s fitness landscape. The interactions between members
that affect their fitness are conceptualised as a game, with pay-off values representative of repro-
ductive success. Vincent and Brown [73] provided a detailed discussion on evolutionary game
theory and its application to studying natural selection. They described a game in evolutionary
game theory as consisting of two parts: The inner game, defining the available strategies and
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pay-off values achieved by the players, and the outer game, describing the game dynamics where
pay-off values are translated into changing strategy frequencies.
3.4.3 Strategies
As mentioned, the focus in evolutionary game theory is on the evolution of game strategies.
Axelrod [3] proposed a set of criteria for a strategy to be evolutionary viable.
Robustness. A strategy must be able to survive in an environment containing a variety of
strategies.
Stability. A strategy must be able to resist invasion by another, mutant strategy.
Invasiveness. A strategy must be able to invade an environment dominated by rival strategies.
Axelrod and Hamilton [4] were the first to investigate the evolutionary viability of various
strategies in the context of the IPD. They conducted a computer tournament in which various
strategies competed within a mixed population of strategies. Sixty two different strategies
were formulated by professional game theorists and scientists globally. Each strategy competed
against each other strategy in a round-robin fashion. The strategy that scored the highest
average over all the rounds was declared the winner. It was found that the most successful
strategies in the IPD are those in which the following three attributes prevail:
Niceness. Defection is never played first.
Forgiveness. Cooperation is restored after an accidental defection.
Retaliation. If the opponent starts playing the strategy of defection, react by also playing
the strategy of defection.
The most successful strategy in Axelrod and Hamilton’s tournament was the tit-for-tat strategy.
The tit-for-tat strategy is one in which a player cooperates during the first round of the game,
after which it merely mirrors the opponent’s move during the previous round. If the opponent
played the strategy of defection during the previous round, the player plays the strategy of
defection during the current round. The tit-for-tat strategy was shown to be evolutionary viable.
It therefore demonstrated that cooperation based on reciprocity can emerge in a population of
egoists, with a small portion of reciprocates, and resist invasion by mutant strategies.
Nowak and Sigmund [53] also investigated and analysed the Pavlov strategy, which was found to
be extremely effective in situations where the IPD is played in an evolutionary context among
more than two players. The Pavlov strategy is based on the “law of effect” or “win-stay/lose-
shift.” Hence, the Pavlov strategy cooperates on the first move and thereafter repeats its previous
move if the opponent cooperated, otherwise it switches.
In evolutionary game theory, players are given the opportunity to learn and adapt their strate-
gies. This process is modelled by a dynamic updating rule which showcases the way in which
evolution is incorporated.
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3.4.4 Updating rules
In an evolutionary game theoretic model, each round is partitioned into two phases: The playing
phase followed by the updating phase. During the playing phase the game is played by each
player against a subset of its neighbours. Within the updating phase, each player is given the
possibility of changing its strategy to either cooperation or defection during the next game
round. The updating phase is determined by a dynamic updating rule. Various updating rules
are available in the literature, such as the replicator rule, the Moran rule and the unconditional
imitation rule.
The replicator rule
Player i randomly chooses one of its neighbours to play the game against. If the chosen neigh-
bour player j achieves a larger pay-off value then player i, player i adopts the strategy of player
j during the next round with a probability proportional to the difference of their pay-off val-
ues. Therefore, the replicator rule is a local updating rule as it does not look at the entire
neighbourhood of player i.
Often the noise caused by the effect of irrational choice is also modelled. In this case, the
aforementioned probability depending on the difference in pay-off values is taken as
Hi7→j =
1
1 + exp[(pii − pij)/κ] , (3.2)
where κ characterises the noise reflecting irrational choices. Hence, κ = 0 and κ = ∞ denote
completely deterministic and completely random selection, respectively. The effect of the param-
eter κ on the cooperation frequency has been studied in detail in [37]. The reader is also referred
to Mukherji et al. [50] for a detailed account of the role of stochasticity upon this updating rule.
The Moran rule
At the end of each playing phase, player i evaluates a set of probabilities, one for each neighbour
proportional to that neighbour’s pay-off value. Player i then randomly selects the neighbour’s
strategy for adoption during the next round according to the set of probabilities. Hence there is
a chance that an agent can select a strategy that performed worse during previous rounds. As
the rule involves the entire neighbourhood of player i, it is referred to as a global updating rule.
The unconditional imitation rule
This rule is a completely deterministic rule. It is based on the principle of imitating the best.
Player i is chosen randomly for updating. It adopts the strategy of one of its neighbours or
retains its own strategy based purely on which pay-off value is largest (i.e. the strategy of the
player in player i’s closed neighbourhood with the largest pay-off value). The unconditional
imitation rule is also a global updating rule.
3.5 Evolutionary spatial games
Mathematical analyses of evolutionary games have shown that costly cooperation between mem-
bers of a population cannot evolve unless there is some mechanism in the evolutionary process
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that supports them. Spatial structure is one such mechanism. The main focus of this thesis is
on evolutionary spatial games.
The emergence of cooperation can be enhanced when an evolutionary game is combined with
spatial effects. Spatial structure within a population of players allows for localised interactions.
According to this structure, individuals play a game against specified neighbours as opposed
to against random opponents or all members of the population. The interaction between the
players is typically modelled by an underlying graph. This kind of spatial structure promotes
the survival of cooperators by allowing clusters of cooperators to form, enabling the benefit of
mutual cooperation to outweigh losses incurred against defectors and allowing for cooperation to
persist. This also facilitates the invasion of populations of defectors by clusters of cooperators.
3.5.1 The social structure of a game
Spatial effects were not considered in early evolutionary game theoretic studies. A well-mixed
population was typically assumed instead, in which different individuals interact with each other,
depending on their relative frequency within the population. The pay-off value of a strategy was
then related to its change in frequency. The dynamics of these games were typically described
by time-continuous differential equations of the form
dxi
dt
= xi
 n∑
j=1
Aijxj −
n∑
i=1
xi
n∑
j=1
Aijxj
 ,
where xi is the frequency of strategy i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Aij is the pay-off matrix of the game and
t denotes time. For an extensive mathematical analysis of the use of differential equations for
modelling game dynamics the reader is referred to [28].
In order to model a game taking spatial structure into account, a graph may alternatively be
used to define the underlying topology of the game. The vertices of the graph represent the
players, and edges joining the vertices represent playing interactions between players. Each
player plays a PD against each of its neighbours independently. The underlying topologies that
are commonly considered include complete graphs, lattices, small-world networks and scale-free
networks [67]. Mean-field games assume a complete graph as their underlying topology, as any
player is equally likely to interact with every other player.
3.5.2 Numerical analysis of spatial games
Axelrod [3] was the first to suggest placing the players of an ESPD on a two-dimensional spatial
array, where in each round each player plays a PD with each of its immediate neighbours
independently. He focused his investigation on analysing the effectiveness of various strategies
within this spatio-temporal game setting. More specifically, he carried out a mathematical
analysis showing that cooperation based on reciprocity can emerge in a population of egoists
with a small proportion of reciprocators, and resist invasion by mutant strategies. This strategy
of reciprocity is the tit-for-tat strategy.
Based on Axelrod’s work, Nowak and May [51, 52] performed the ground work for evolution-
ary games in spatial contexts, adopting a computer simulation approach. They showed that it
is possible for cooperation and defection to co-exist on a two-dimensional spatial array, where
each player plays a PD against each of its neighbours independently. The PD was adopted and
strategic complexities and memories of past encounters by players were neglected. A discrete-
time model was assumed together with a deterministic update rule. The outcome of the model
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depended on both the initial configuration and the rescaled pay-off matrix described by a sin-
gle parameter b, characterising the measure of temptation to defect. Nowak and May studied
the ESPD on square lattices where players interact with their four or eight nearest neighbours.
Hexagonal lattices were also considered as the underlying graph where players interact with
six neighbours, including or excluding self-interaction. The analysis focused on parameter val-
ues within the range b ∈ (1.8, 2). This region allows for the emergence of unstable clusters of
cooperators, eventually exhibiting spatial chaos and dynamic fractals with chaotic fluctuations
around long-term averages. The asymptotic proportion of sites occupied by cooperators fluc-
tuate around 0.318. In the case of symmetric initial conditions and symmetric update rules,
“evolutionary kaleidoscopes” were found, which are reminiscent of Persian carpets and Andalu-
sian tiles. The final states of these evolutionary kaleidoscopes were shown to be unpredictable,
thereby combining chaos and symmetry.
The typical shape and growth of clusters of cooperators or defectors in these models were also
analysed. It was observed that for some parameter values, a square of cooperators expands at
its corners, but shrinks along its sides. A lone defector, on the other hand, was shown to do
well initially, but by prospering, defectors surround themselves with other defectors, thereby
diminishing their own return. This process of cooperator and defector growth yielded highly
intricate patterns. The model’s outputs for the case where a single defector is placed in the
centre of a 49 × 49 array of cooperators with fixed boundary conditions and b = 1.85 is shown
in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Simulation results obtained by Nowak and May [51] for the case of placing a single defector
in the centre of a 49 × 49 array of cooperators with fixed boundary conditions and b = 1.85. Each grid
shows the spatial distribution after 200 generations. The colour coding is as follows: blue = cooperation,
red = defection, green = cooperation changing its strategy to defection, and yellow = defection changing
its strategy to cooperation [51].
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Nowak and May’s deterministic model is equivalent to a two-state cellular automaton9 with
the property that the transition rule depends on the state of the nearest neighbours as well as
on that of their nearest neighbours. Comprehensive studies have been performed in respect of
cellular automata, most recently by Wolfram [79]. One of the most famous cellular automata is
Conway’s Game of life [7]. Nowak and May’s model exhibited most of the gadgetry of Conway’s
Game of life (such as periodic blinkers and gliders of cooperators).
Hubermann and Glance [30] studied a similar model to that considered by Nowak and May,
namely an ESPD on a two-dimensional lattice, but employed continuous-time simulations in
their analysis, where players are chosen at random for strategy updating purposes. The model
therefore allows for asynchronous updating. They considered the possibility of the co-existence
of cooperators and defectors in both continuous and discrete time in the stochastic case.
Szabo and Toke [68] studied the ESPD with a square lattice as the underlying topology and
employed systematic Monte Carlo simulation and generalised mean-field techniques in order to
calculate the asymptotic density of cooperators as a function of the parameter b for different
noise levels.
Killingback and Doebeli [34] conducted a similar study as that of Nowak and May, but considered
the Hawk-Dove game instead of the PD. They showed that the long-term proportion of Hawks is
smaller than the equilibrium proportion predicted by classical evolutionary game theory. They
also observed a complex dynamic that is different from the spatio-temporal chaos observed in the
ESPD studied by Nowak and May. For a substantial range of parameters, their system organises
itself into a state in which its dynamic behaviour is governed by long-range spatial and temporal
correlations, and by power laws. One such property is that the system exhibits extremely long
transients initially from very complicated dynamics to very simple periodic orbits.
A systematic study of various 2 × 2 games on lattices and random graphs was conducted by
Hauert [25]. He considered two-dimensional regular lattices and random networks as the un-
derlying graph, each with degree 4, 6 and 8, separately. A simulation approach was adopted to
study the ESPD with the parameters in the pay-off matrix set to R = 1, P = 0, −1 < S < 1 and
0 < T < 2. The various quadrants in the (S, T )-phase plane were considered independently. An
investigation was also carried out in respect of the replicator rule, the multiple replicator rule,
the Moran rule and the unconditional imitation rule as update rules. They found that combi-
nations of various graph structures and various parameter values either enhanced or prevented
the emergence of cooperation. It was shown, in particular, that lattices, as well as random
graphs, promote the evolution of cooperation. The adoption of random graphs and lattices of
the same degree yielded very similar results. An increase of the graph regularity from 4 to 6 and
further to 8 resulted in a larger degree of cooperation along a wide range of parameter values.
The results also showcased the existence of phase transitions, with clear boundaries between
different regions in the phase plane. It was further shown that the effect of spatial structure on
the persistence of cooperation is strongly dependent on the updating rule adopted.
Roca et al. [61] took this work further by conducting an analysis of small world networks. They
showed that the effect of spatial structure promoting cooperation is directly linked to clustering
in the underlying graph. Hence, small-world networks with large clustering coefficients were
studied and shown to promote the emergence of cooperation. The property of small characteristic
path lengths of small-world networks create “shortcuts,” thereby allowing cooperation to spread
quicker. It was thus established that games with a small-world network as underlying topology
reach equilibrium quicker than when employing regular lattices.
9A cellular automaton, first conceived by Von Neumann [75], is a collection of cells arranged in a grid of a spec-
ified shape that evolves through discrete time steps according to specified updating rules based on neighbouring
cell states.
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Further work has been done on scale-free weighted networks by Du and Zheng [15]. Weighted
networks were examined to investigate the effect of contact frequency between players. The
authors considered the effect of edge weight heterogeneity on the cooperation frequency within
a network when an IPD game is played on a scale-free network. They used the Barabasi-Albert
(BA) scale-free network model to generate the network as well as to assign the edges’ weights
according to the formula wij = (ki× kj)β, where ki and kj represent the degree of vertices i and
j, respectively. The value of β controls the heterogeneity of the edge weights. The larger β, the
higher the heterogeneity. Through the use of simulation, the authors found that cooperation
frequency exhibits strong dependence on the value of β. The system’s cooperation frequency is
maximised when β = 0 or when β < 0 and |β| is large.
3.5.3 Algebraic analyses of spatial games
A minimal amount of algebraic analysis (i.e. analysis without the use of computer simulation)
has been carried out in the context of the ESPD. This is due to the enormous number of possible
configurations that can arise. Burger et al. [10, 11], however, conducted an asymptotic analysis
of the ESPD on paths and cycles. Both the steady states and the initial states that lead to the
emergence of cooperation were characterised in the case of these underlying graph structures.
The probability that a randomly generated initial state will result in persistent cooperation was
also determined.
Van der Merwe [72] further studied the ESPD on very small grid structures, again adopting an
analytical approach. The game dynamics for small grids were characterised. The phase plane of
an ESPD on a grid with or without wrapping at the edges was analysed and the influence of the
size of the grid on the isoclines present in the phase plane was determined. In order to analyse
the ESPD on grids, the authors enumerated the ESPD state space for the ESPD in n×m grids
with and without wrapping at the edges (excluding the case where n = m).
Bergroth [6] studied the ESPD analytically in respect of graphs with infinitely many players and
an equal number of neighbours for each player. He determined the probability that cooperation
survives in an evolutionary fashion on these graph structures. Formally, Bergroth [6] determined
the probability piip(C) = limt→∞ P (sit(p) = C), where sit(p) denotes the strategy adopted by
player i at time t and where p denotes the probability that the player starts with the strategy of
cooperation when t = 0. For a one-dimensional lattice, it was found that piip(C) is independent
of the pay-off parameters values. For a one-dimensional and a two-dimensional lattice, the
expectation of an i-cluster of cooperators was also determined. The author further determined
the probability piip(C) for the ESPD on binary and (n−1)-nary trees, and also on d-dimensional
lattices.
3.5.4 Other analysis approaches of spatial games
Various other approaches have also been adopted towards placing the PD in a spatial set-
ting. Hutson and Vickers [31], as well as Ferriere and Michod [17], considered one-dimensional
reaction-diffusion models which lead to travelling waves of players adopting a tit-for-tat strategy
invading inveterate defectors. Hertz [27] took the approach of viewing the ESPD as an Ising-
type model from the realm of statistical mechanics. In such models, the behaviour of games are
studied in terms of their pay-off structure and the abstract fitness landscape that develops.
Doebeli and Knowlton [14] considered mutualistic interaction between different species playing
an ESPD. In their model, the two species occupy two different superimposed lattices. Interspe-
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cific interactions occur between individuals at corresponding locations in these lattices and the
pay-off values of these interactions determine the competition within each lattice. The authors
showed that spatial structure is even more essential for the evolution of mutualism in this setting
than in one-lattice games.
Ohtsuki et al. [57] considered the evolution of cooperation in an ESPD involving a population
whose structure is partitioned into an interactive graph H, defining against whom PD instances
are played, and a replacement graph G, specifying evolutionary competition and updating of
strategies. This model structure was assumed to accommodate the fact that decision-making
is often based on additional information about interacting players obtained through networks
that rarely overlap perfectly with the network of interactions. The authors found that whenever
the symmetry between the graphs G and H is broken, the probability of the emergence of
cooperation and its frequency reduces compared to the case where the two graphs coincide.
3.6 Chapter summary
Various basic definitions and concepts in classical and evolutionary game theory were reviewed in
this chapter. The notions of classical game theory, together with a brief history of the important
developments within the field, were reviewed in §3.1. In §3.2, the basic mathematical framework
and required definitions for representing games were recounted. Various methods for classifying
games and a review of a number of solution concepts (for analysing games) were also presented.
A number of types of 2-person, 2-strategy games in the literature on evolutionary game theory
were finally reviewed. In §3.4, the development of evolutionary game theory from classical game
theory was recounted as were the core differences between the two sub-felds. The connection
between evolutionary game theory and biology was also discussed in terms of evolution and
natural selection. Various strategies from the literature adopted by players of evolutionary
games were presented and this was followed by a review of a number of updating rules that may
govern the dynamics of an evolutionary game. In the final section of the chapter, §3.5, the field of
evolutionary spatial game theory was briefly reviewed. The literature was analysed according to
the various methods adopted to analyse the evolution of cooperation, either adopting a numerical
approach, an analytical approach or other less conventional approaches.
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A framework for representing games on graphs is established in this chapter. The framework is
similar to those developed by Nowak and May [51, 52] and by Burger et al. [10, 11] where each
player plays a PD instance against each of its neighbours based on an underlying topology. The
chapter opens with a mathematical representation of a game instance, followed by a description of
the techniques used to model the game dynamics. The notion of a state graph is then considered
as a visualisation tool of the ESPD game dynamics. The assumptions made in respect of the
pay-off values in order to reduce the complexity of modelling the game are also outlined in this
chapter. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion on the construction of the parameter phase
plane associated with an ESPD instance.
4.1 The mathematical representation of a game
An evolutionary game can be represented by a pair, Υ = (Π, G). The first element of this pair,
Π = {T,R, S, P}, is the set of pay-off parameters contained within the two-player PD pay-off
matrix [ C D
C R S
D T P
]
,
where C denotes the strategy of cooperation and D represents the strategy of defection. The
second element of Υ is the underlying graph G which represents the structure according to
which the PDs are played. It may occur, in general, that the game is governed by two under-
lying graphs, an interaction graph Gi and an replacement graph Gr. The graph Gi determines
players’ neighbourhoods according to which their pay-off values are calculated, while the graph
Gr determines the update neighbourhoods of the players. In this thesis, however, Gi = Gr.
Therefore, a single underlying graph G is sufficient to describe the structure of the game.
39
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A state of the ESPD is captured by a 2-colouring of the vertices of the underlying graph, denoting
the distribution of the strategies adopted by the various players during a particular round of
the game. A state of the ESPD is therefore represented by a pair S = (G,X), where G is the
aforementioned underlying graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Furthermore, X is a
function f : V (G) 7→ {C,D} that assigns the two strategies of cooperation C or defection D to
each vertex of G. In graphical representations of ESPD states, players adopting the strategy of
cooperation are denoted by solid vertices (i.e. coloured black) and players adopting the strategy
of defection are denoted by open vertices (i.e. coloured white). An example of such a graphical
representation of an ESPD state is shown in Figure 4.1 where each vertex represents a player,
the vertex colouring captures the strategies of the players during a particular round of the game,
and each edge indicates an independent PD that is to be played by the players represented by
the two vertices incident with the edge.
Figure 4.1: The graphical representation of an ESPD state with the graph G4.1 as underlying graph.
Defecting players are denoted by solid vertices, while cooperating players are denoted by open vertices.
The underlying graph of the ESPD is therefore interpreted as a labelled graph, as each vertex
represents a specific player participating in the game. Due to the possible symmetries that
may exist in the underlying graph, as well as the inherent symmetry of the update rule, certain
distinct ESPD states may nevertheless be considered equivalent. The set of states may therefore
be partitioned into equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.1.5, the notion of an automorphism.
An automorphism φ between two ESPD states s1 = (G,X1) and s2 = (G,X2) is the one-to-
one mapping of the set of vertex labels in V (G) onto itself so that adjacency, as well as the
particular colouring of the underlying graph, is preserved. In particular, uv ∈ E(G) if and
only if φ(u)φ(v) ∈ E(G) and X1(v) = X2(φ(v)) for all v ∈ V (G). Two ESPD states are said
to be automorphic if there exists an automorphism between them. Note that when two states
are automorphic, the states obtained after playing one round of the ESPD, starting from these
states, will again be automorphic. Automorphic ESPD states therefore exhibit equivalent game
dynamics.
An automorphism class is a maximum set of automorphic game states. A class representative is
associated with each automorphism class. Because each state of an automorphism class exhibits
equivalent game dynamics, only the class representative has to be considered in an exhaustive
game dynamic analysis. The state with the smallest lexicographical order in an automorphism
class is chosen as the class representative.
Lexicographical order is the convention according to which words are ordered alphabetically in
terms of their component letters. In order to determine the lexicographical order of a number
of distinct game states, each state’s vertices are first considered in the order in which they are
labelled. These ordered vertices induce a string of characters from the set {C,D} that can then
be ordered lexicographically. A solid vertex, representing a player adopting the strategy of coop-
eration, is denoted by the character C in this string, while an open vertex, representing a player
adopting the strategy of defection, is denoted by the character D. As C < D alphabetically, a
solid vertex precedes an open vertex. Therefore, the smaller of two states is the one with the
smallest strategy (i.e. C) corresponding to the first vertex of the underlying graph for which the
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two states differ in strategy. An example of the lexicographical order of pairs of ESPD states
is shown in Figure 4.2. The number of solid vertices within a state is called the weight of the
state. Note that a state with a larger weight than another state may precede the latter state in
lexicographical order, as illustrated in Figure 4.2(c).
Figure 4.2: Examples of the lexicographical ordering of game states. (a) The labelling of the vertices
of the underlying graph G4.1. (b) and (c) Examples of the lexicographical order of pairs of game states.
In (c), the graph G4.3 precedes G4.1 lexicographically but has a larger weight than G4.1.
To elucidate the partitioning of distinct game states into automorphism classes, consider the
ESPD instance with G4.1, as shown in Figure 4.1, as underlying graph. Note that the graph
contains a vertical symmetry axis through vertex 5, therefore admitting a single reflectional
symmetry. The 25 = 32 distinct ESPD states are therefore partitioned into 20 automorphism
classes as shown in Figure 4.3. Each class representative, which has the smallest lexicographical
order within its class, is shown first in the figure.
Figure 4.3: The distinct states of the ESPD withG4.1 as underlying graph, organised into automorphism
classes. The first state displayed in each class is the class leader. The states have further been organised
according to their weights as indicated by the various rows in the table.
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The shorthand notation 〈C〉i or 〈D〉i denotes i consecutive players adopting the strategy of
cooperation or defection, respectively, in a string representation of an ESPD state when the
players are considered in the order in which they are labelled. 〈C〉i is also referred to as a run
of cooperators of length i within the remainder of this thesis, and similarly for 〈D〉i.
4.2 Dynamic rules of a game
When modelling an instance of the ESPD, each player is first assigned a strategy in order to
generate an initial game state, as described §4.1. The game is then played in rounds. Each
round consists of two phases, the playing phase and the updating phase, respectively. During the
playing phase, each player’s score is determined, while during the updating phase each player
updates its strategy. The game is terminated when either the system reaches a steady-state, a
limit cycle or a pre-determined number of rounds have been played.
During the playing phase, each player plays an independent PD against each of its neighbours.
The pay-off value of each player is calculated by determining the average pay-off value resulting
from each of the PD games in which the player participates. Calculating the average pay-
off values facilitates a comparison of the relative success of the various strategies when they
are adopted by players that have different numbers of neighbours in the underlying graph.
Consider, for example, a player v who has x neighbours adopting the strategy of cooperation
and y neighbours adopting the strategy of defection. The pay-off value of player v in this case is
piv =
{
1
x+y (xT + yP ) if v adopts the strategy of defection
1
x+y (xR+ yS) if v adopts the strategy of cooperation.
To elucidate the playing phase, consider the ESPD instance Υ = ({5, 3, 0, 1}, G4.1) illustrated in
Figure 4.4. The labelling of vertices is shown in (a), where player i is represented by vertex vi.
In the initial game state shown in Figure 4.4(b), player 1 is represented by a solid vertex and
therefore adopts the strategy of cooperation. The vertex v1 is adjacent to two solid vertices v2, v5
and one open vertex v4. Player 1 therefore has two cooperating neighbours and one defecting
neighbour. The pay-off value of player 1 is consequently
pi1 =
1
2 + 1
(2(3) + 1(0)) = 2.
The pay-off value of each player is denoted next to its corresponding vertex in Figures 4.4(b)–(d).
Figure 4.4: An example of the game dynamics of the ESPD instance Υ = ({5, 3, 0, 1}, G4.1). (a) The
labelling of the various players of the game. (b)–(d) Subsequent rounds of the game in which pay-off
value of each player is denoted next to its corresponding vertex.
During the updating phase of each round, the player updates his strategy according to a dynamic
updating rule, as discussed in §3.4.4. The updating rule considered within this thesis is the
local form of the unconditional imitation rule. A player updates his strategy by adopting the
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strategy of the player with the largest pay-off value in its closed neighbourhood. If the player’s
own strategy achieves the largest pay-off value, it will retain its strategy. In the case of a tie
between a player’s own pay-off value and the largest pay-off value of a player in the player’s
open neighbourhood, it is assumed that the player will retain its own strategy. This assumption
is based on a presumed reluctance of a player to change its strategy as there may be a small
cost associated with this process.
As an example of an updating process, consider again the game Υ = ({5, 3, 0, 1}, G4.1) shown in
Figure 4.4. Consider the initial game state shown in part (b) of the figure. Player 1 evaluates
the maximum pay-off value in its closed neighbourhood N1 = {3, 5, 3, 2}. The maximum pay-off
value 5 is received by player 4, who adopts the strategy of defection. According to the updating
rule, player 1 therefore imitates the strategy of player 4 by adopting the strategy of defection
during the next round of the game. This is illustrated in the subsequent game state shown in
part (c) of the figure in which player 1 is now represented by an open vertex. The same process
is then repeated during subsequent rounds of the game. Consider next the game state resulting
after a single round of the game, as shown in Figure 4.4(c). Player 1 again evaluates the pay-off
values in its closed neighbourhood N1 = {1, 1, 32 , 113 }. The largest pay-off value 113 is obtained by
player 1. Player 1 therefore retains its strategy of defection during the next round of the game.
The resulting game state, after having applied the updating process to each player in the game,
is shown in part (d) of the figure. Note that all players in Figure 4.4(d) adopt the strategy of
defection. Hence, the all-defector steady state has been reached. As all subsequent rounds of
the game will result in the same game state, the end of the game has been reached.
4.3 The state graph
The state graph of an ESPD instance is a vertex-weighted pseudo-digraph in which each vertex
corresponds to the automorphism class of a game state, represented by its class representative.
Within the state graph, a vertex u is adjacent to a vertex v if the associated game state u in
Υ transitions within a single round to the associated game state v. The weight of the vertex
is the weight of the associated game state. The state graph therefore captures the dynamics of
the game in the form of transitions between its successive game states. An example of the state
graph of the ESPD instance Υ = ({5, 3, 0, 1}, G4.1) is shown in Figure 4.5.
As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the roots of the various components of the state graph represent
the steady states of the game. In the state graph, a steady state is therefore a state that is
adjacent to itself. A limit cycle is represented by a directed cycle of length at least two. The
state graph in Figure 4.5 does not contain a limit cycle. The state graph in the figure contains 20
vertices organised into three components. The game can end in any one of three steady states.
Note that the vertices of this state graph correspond to the 20 automorphic classes shown in
Figure 4.3.
4.4 The pay-off values
Both the topology of the underlying graph and the pay-off values Π = {T,R, S, P} influence
the outcome of an instance of the ESPD. The pay-off values can, however, be normalised to
reduce the number of parameter regions in the ESPD phase space that have to be considered.
A normalisation of the pay-off values is introduced in this section, and this is followed by an
analysis of resulting parameter regions that have to be considered independently when modelling
ESPD game dynamics.
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Figure 4.5: The state graph of the ESPD instance Υ = ({5, 3, 0, 1}, G4.1). The red arrows in the graph
represent the particular game dynamics illustrated in Figure 4.4.
4.4.1 Normalisation of the pay-off values
Burger et al. [10, 11] showed that by normalising the parameter values of the ESPD it is possible
to model the game dynamics in terms of two parameters only, instead of four. This reduces the
complexity of the modelling process considerably as far fewer parameter combinations have to
be considered. The game is modelled in the remainder of this thesis in terms of the normalised
pay-off values Π = {T, 1, 0, P}. This normalisation does not influence the game dynamics [72].
The pay-off matrix is therefore replaced by the normalised pay-off matrix,
[ C D
C R S
D T P
]
→
[ C D
C 1 0
D T P
]
,
where the parameter inequalities T > 1 and 0 < P < 1 hold.
4.4.2 The phase plane
When a change in the parameter values influences the outcome of the updating process of one
or more players during the game, the change is called a phase transition. A phase plane may
be constructed by plotting the values of T and P for which such phase transitions occur. The
lines in the phase plane associated with phase transitions are called isoclines. These isoclines
partition the phase plane into disjoint parameter regions. Any pair of T and P values in the
same region of the phase plane will result in equivalent game dynamics.
During the updating process, a player compares the pay-off values of the highest scoring coop-
erator and defector in its closed neighbourhood. Let the pay-off value of player v adopting the
strategy of cooperation or defection, with i cooperators and j defectors in its open neighbour-
hood, be denoted by ci,j and di,j , respectively. Then the values of ci,j and di,j are functions of
the parameters T and P . It is customary to find the isoclines of the phase plane where ci,j = dk,`
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for i, j, k, ` ∈ (0, dv). This is because a change in the outcome of the game only occurs when the
pay-off values of players adopting different strategies are compared.
Since a player’s pay-off value is determined by the average of the pay-off values of the players
in its open neighbourhood, an important quantity in the analysis of phase plane transitions is
the proportion of cooperators or defectors in a player’s open neighbourhood. As ci,0 = cj,0,
di,0 = dj,0, ci,i = cj,j and di,i = dj,j for all i, j ∈ N0 only one of these pay-off values need to be
considered when identifying the various isoclines. Furthermore, there are no isoclines associated
with the value of d0,i for any i ∈ Z. This is because the defector has no cooperators in his closed
neighbourhood, and will hence continue to adopt the strategy of defection independently of the
value of the parameters T and P . Therefore, the parameter values do not influence the updating
process of a player with pay-off value d0,i.
It is further noted that the isoclines of the phase plane are only concerned with ci,j = dk,`
if kk+` <
i
i+j . This is because a defector with a larger proportion of cooperators in its open
neighbourhood will always achieve a larger pay-off value than a cooperator with an equivalent
or smaller proportion of cooperators in its open neighbourhood. In order to understand this,
note that if kk+` ≥ ii+j , then dk,` > ci,j , as the parameter inequalities T > 1 and P > 0 result in
the inequality chain
dk,` =
1
k + `
(kT + `P ) >
k
k + `
T >
k
k + `
≥ i
i+ j
= ci,j .
As an example of the construction of a phase plane, consider again the ESPD Υ = ({T, 1, 0, P},
G4.1). The graph contains vertices of degree two and three. Therefore, the possible different pay-
off values that a player can achieve are c0,2, c0,3, c1,1, c1,2, c2,0, c2,1, c3,0, d0,2, d0,3, d1,1, d1,2, d2,0, d2,1
and d3,0, which may be written in terms of the parameters T and P as 0, 0,
1
2 ,
1
3 , 1,
2
3 , 1, P, P,
1
2T+
1
2P,
1
3T +
2
3P, T,
2
3T +
1
3P, and T , respectively. Again it is true that dk,` > ci,j if
k
k+` ≥ ii+j ,
while d0,2 and d0,3 does not affect the outcome of the updating process of a player in the game.
Therefore, the transitions in the phase plane are given by the six equations
c3,0 = d2,1 ⇒ 3 = 2T + P,
c3,0 = d1,1 ⇒ 2 = T + P,
c3,0 = d1,2 ⇒ 3 = T + 2P,
c2,1 = d1,1 ⇒ 4 = 3(T + P ),
c2,1 = d1,2 ⇒ 2 = T + 2P, and
c1,1 = d1,2 ⇒ 3 = 2(T + 2P ).
These isoclines result in a phase plane with nine parameter regions which potentially induce
different game dynamics, as shown in Figure 4.6. When investigating the game dynamics, each
of these parameter regions therefore has to be analysed separately.
All the underlying graphs considered within the remainder of this thesis are 4-regular. Therefore,
if the number of cooperators i in a player’s open neighbourhood is known, the number of defectors
j can be calculated as j = 4 − i. Therefore, the shorthand notation ci = ci,j and di = di,j is
adopted within the remainder of this thesis.
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Figure 4.6: The P -T phase plane for the ESPD Υ = ({T, 1, 0, P}, G4.1). There are nine disjoint
parameter regions, labelled from A to I.
4.5 Chapter summary
A mathematical representation of an ESPD instance, consisting of an ordered pair containing a
set of pay-off parameters and an underlying graph, was proposed at the start of this chapter,
and this was followed by a description of the framework adopted in this thesis to model a game
state. The modelling of the entire game dynamics was also discussed, making use of the notion
of a state graph as a visual representation tool. An important concept also introduced is that
of an automorphism class of game states. In the final section of the chapter, a normalisation
of the pay-off matrix was suggested to reduce the complexity of the game analysis without
influencing the game dynamics. This was followed by a discussion on the construction of a
(pay-off parameter) phase plane. The various parameter regions of this phase plane have to be
considered separately when analysing the game dynamics of an ESPD instance.
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In this chapter, an analytical approach void of computer-based support is adopted to investigate
the game dynamics of the ESPD on the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. The game
dynamics on the cycle Cn ' Cn〈1〉 as underlying graph has previously been studied [11]. The
main objective of the analysis in this chapter is to determine how an extension of each player’s
neighbourhood affects the likelihood of persistent cooperation when players are arranged in a
cyclic topology.
The chapter opens with a brief background on the previous investigation of the game dynamics
of the ESPD with a cycle as underlying graph. The focus of the chapter then shifts to the
investigation of the game dynamics of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. First the
various parameter regions of the phase plane which induce different game dynamics are identified.
All equilibrium states are then characterised and enumerated for each parameter region. These
enumerations are next employed to present various results that facilitate an investigation of
the game dynamics to be investigated without explicitly having to play the ESPD for each
distinct game state and underlying graph order. The probability of persistent cooperation is
then calculated for a general underlying circulant graph order. The chapter finally closes with
a comparison of the results emanating from the analysis of the game dynamics of the ESPD
on a circulant underlying topology (contained within this chapter) and those emanating from
the aforementioned previous analysis of the game dynamics of the ESPD on a cyclic underlying
topology (found in the literature).
5.1 Background
Recall, from §3.5.3, that Burger et al. [11] studied the long-term behaviour of the ESPD with
a cycle of order n as underlying graph. They characterised and enumerated all steady states
47
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associated with this instance of the ESPD. They also computed the probability of randomly
generating an initial state which leads to some form of persistent cooperation. Figure 5.1 contains
an illustration of the resulting relationship between the order of the underlying cycle and the
probability of cooperation persisting for the two different parameter regions of the phase plane.
Figure 5.1: The probability of a randomly generated initial state for the ESPD on a cycle of order n
resulting in any form of persistent cooperation [11].
The main objective in this chapter is to determine the effect of an extension of each player’s
cyclic neighbourhood from that in Cn〈1〉 to Cn〈1, 2〉 (i.e. so that each player plays a PD with
each of its direct neighbours as well as with their neighbours) has on the characteristics of the
equilibrium states and the probability of cooperation persisting. The cycle C8 = C8〈1〉, as well as
the circulant C8〈1, 2〉, is depicted in Figure 5.2. Note the change in each player’s neighbourhood
size as indicated in the figure by dotted lines for the player marked in red.
Figure 5.2: The extension of each player’s neighbourhood from two to four players, when changing the
ESPD underlying graph from (a) C8 to (b) C8〈1, 2〉.
The remainder of this chapter builds on the work of Burger et al. [11], in the sense that the evo-
lutionary behaviour of the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph is investigated
and compared with the game dynamics of the ESPD with Cn〈1〉 as underlying graph.
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5.2 Representation and enumeration of game states
In order to analyse the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph, the isometric
representation of the underlying graph shown in Figure 5.3(c) is adopted in the remainder of
this chapter. This form of visualisation is used to facilitate a classification and enumeration of the
equilibrium states of the game. To elucidate this isometric representation, consider the circulant
C8〈1, 2〉 represented in its well-known circular form in Figure 5.3(a). An isometric representation
of the same graph is shown in Figure 5.3(b), exhibiting a triangular lattice structure. Adopting
this structure, but omitting the three edges joining the left-most and right-most most vertices,
indicated in red in Figure 5.3(b), the isometric representation in Figure 5.3(c) is obtained. Hence,
only a subgraph of the underlying graph is, in fact, shown in part (c) of the figure, with the
dotted lines on either side of the graph representing the remaining edges (and also vertices in
the case of Cn〈1, 2〉 for n > 8) omitted.
Figure 5.3: (a) A standard representation of the circulant C8〈1, 2〉, (b) a triangular lattice representation
of the same graph, and (c) an isometric representation of Cn〈1, 2〉.
In this chapter, it is assumed that the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
whose vertices are labelled −bn−12 c, . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , dn−12 e. Vertex dn−12 e is assumed to
be adjacent to −bn−12 c and −bn−12 c + 1, while vertex dn−12 e − 1 is assumed to be adjacent to
−bn−12 c. The labelling of vertices −3 to 4 is illustrated in Figure 5.3(c).
There are 2n different ways of assigning one of the two strategies, C or D, to each of the n vertices
in the aforementioned labelled underlying graph. Many of these states are, however, equivalent
as a result of rotational symmetry, reflectional symmetry and glide reflection symmetry in the
underlying graph. Rotational symmetry occurs about an axis orthogonal to the page and through
the centre of the ciruculant in its standard representation shown in Figure 5.3(a) by degree either
360i
n where i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Reflectional symmetry occurs about an axis in the plane of the
page and running through the vertices i and i+ n2 if n is even, or otherwise through the vertex i
and the centre of the edge joining vertices i+bn2 c and i+dn2 e if n is odd, where i ∈ {0, . . . , bn2 c}.
Glide reflection symmetry occurs as a result of the composition of any of the above two possible
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symmetries. The equivalent states resulting from these symmetries can therefore be organised
into automorphism classes, as described in §4.1. The number of these automorphism classes for
Cn〈1, 2〉 is equal to that for the cycle Cn〈1〉. This is because the additional edges of Cn〈1, 2〉
over and above those of Cn〈1〉 do not change the symmetry properties of the underlying graph.
The number of automorphism classes of game states for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
underlying graph is given by
Λ(n) =
{∑
d|n
φ(d)2n/d
2n + 2
n−1
2 if n is odd,∑
d|n
φ(d)2n/d
2n + 2
n
2
−1 + 2
n
2
−2 if n is even,
(5.1)
where φ(·) is the well-known Euler totient1 [18]. The sequence Λ(n) is listed as Sloane’s sequence
A000029 [64]. Investigating the enumeration of game states is equivalent to a well-known count-
ing problem documented in the literature in which the number of necklaces that can be created
from a total of n beads of 2 possible colours are enumerated. The reader is reminded that
because all states in an automorphism class lead to similar game dynamics, it is only neces-
sary to investigate the ESPD game dynamics resulting from the various automorphism class
representatives.
5.3 The phase plane of the ESPD on Cn〈1, 2〉
When investigating the game dynamics of the ESPD, not only does the underlying graph topol-
ogy, but also the values of the parameters T and P in the pay-off matrix, have to be considered
as these parameter values may affect the dynamics of the game. In this section, the phase plane
for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph is constructed using the notation and technique
described in §4.4. The various parameter regions in which game dynamics are to be investigated
independently are then identified from the phase plane.
The circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 is 4-regular (i.e. each player of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
has four other players in its open neighbourhood). Therefore, if the number of cooperators i in a
player’s open neighbourhood is known, the number of defectors j can be calculated as j = 4− i.
The pay-off value of player v adopting the strategy of cooperation or defection, with i cooperators
in its open neighbourhood, is denoted by ci or di, respectively. Hence the possible different
pay-off values that a player can achieve are c0, c1, c2, c3, c4, d0, d1, d2, d3 and d4, which may be
written in terms of the parameters T and P as 0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 , 1, P,
1
4T +
3
4P,
1
2T +
1
2P,
3
4T +
1
4P and T ,
respectively.
Recall, from §4.4, that di > cj for all values of i and j satisfying i ≥ j. The pay-off value d0
also does not affect the outcome of the updating process of a player in the game. Therefore, the
transitions in the phase plane are given by the six equations
c4 = d3 ⇒ 4 = 3T + P,
c4 = d2 ⇒ 4 = 2T + 2P,
c4 = d1 ⇒ 4 = T + 3P,
c3 = d2 ⇒ 3 = 2T + 2P,
c3 = d1 ⇒ 3 = T + 3P, and
c2 = d1 ⇒ 2 = T + 3P.
1The Euler totient of a positive integer n > 1 is the number of positive integers less than n that are relatively
prime to (i.e. do not contain any factor larger than 1 in common with) n [38].
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These isoclines result in a phase plane with eleven parameter regions which potentially induce
different game dynamics, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: The P -T phase plane for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph,
containing eleven disjoint parameter regions, labelled A to K.
When considering the various cases for which the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph will result in each of the six isoclines mentioned, it can be seen that for certain isoclines, the
outcome of the updating process depends on another isocline. Therefore, the isocline considered
does not result in a phase transition and may hence be ignored in the subsequent phase plane
analysis.
Consider, for example, the isocline 4 = T +3P . The case in which a player compares the pay-off
values c4 and d1 is illustrated in Figure 5.5. The players achieving c4 and d1 are marked in
red. As each player compares the pay-off values of the largest-valued cooperator and defector
in its closed neighbourhood, all players between the two red marked players rather compare the
pay-off values of c4 and d2. The updating process therefore depends on the isocline 4 = 2T +2P .
Hence, the isocline 4 = T + 3P does not change the dynamics of the game, and therefore need
not be considered. Applying similar analyses to each isocline in turn, a simplified phase plane
may be constructed from which the isoclines 4 = T + 3P , 3 = T + 3P and 2 = T + 3P are
absent. The resulting phase plane with five distinct parameter regions is shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.5: The case of the isocline 4 = T + 3P for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as under-
lying graph. Black vertices represent players adopting the strategy of cooperation, while white vertices
represent players adopting the strategy of defection. The pay-off values of the players are shown above
the corresponding vertices. The two players with pay-off values of c4 and d1 are marked in red.
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Figure 5.6: The simplified P -T phase plane for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph, containing five disjoint parameter regions, labelled A to E.
5.4 Equilibrium states analysis
In order to study the long-term behaviour of the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph, each region of the phase plane shown in Figure 5.6 is studied independently due to the
potentially different game dynamics induced by these parameter regions. In this section, it
is first shown that parameter region D is incapable of inducing persistent cooperation, while
parameter regions A,B,C and E all allow for the possibility of persistent cooperation. For the
latter set of parameter regions, the equilibrium states are characterised in each case in order
to facilitate the construction of corresponding state graphs for the ESPD with the circulant
Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
5.4.1 Characterisation of equilibrium states
Burger et al. [11] showed that for any connected graph G of order n with maximum degree
∆, the state graph of the ESPD with G as underlying graph has exactly two components if
T > ∆(1 − P ) + P . Applying this theorem to the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph, it
follows that if T > 4(1−P )+P , or equivalently, if T > 4−3P (i.e. the game parameters lie within
region D of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the state graph has exactly two components.
These two components contain the all-cooperator state 〈C〉n and the all-defector steady state
〈D〉n, respectively. All states except 〈C〉n are attracted by the all-defector steady state 〈D〉n
in this case. Hence persistent cooperation is not possible unless the strategy of cooperation is
universally adopted by all players initially.
Each of the other four parameter regions is considered independently. Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4
elucidate the various strategy adoption structures required for cooperation to persist to the
next round of the game for parameter regions A, B, C and E, respectively. Only the proof of
Lemma 1 is provided in this section. The same proof technique may, however, be applied to
establish the results of Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, as demonstrated in Appendix A.
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Lemma 1. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the game parameters lie within region A of
the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two or three can persist intact to the next round of the
game,
(b) a cooperation run of length four can persist intact to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked by two defection runs, each of length at least three, and
(c) a cooperation run of length at least five can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by either a run of defectors of length at least two or by a
run of the form DCD.
Proof:
(a) A cooperation run of length one has the form DCD. Figure 5.7 illustrates this configuration
for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. Black vertices represent play-
ers adopting the strategy of cooperation, while white vertices represent players adopting the
strategy of defection. Grey vertices represent players with unknown strategies. This graphical
representation format is used in all figures throughout this proof.
Figure 5.7: Configuration of a cooperation run of length one for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
In the configuration shown in Figure 5.7, for the cooperating player 0 to persist to the next
round of the game, it requires a pay-off value at least as large as the largest pay-off value of the
two defecting players −1 and 1 in its open neighbourhood. As shown previously, di > cj if i ≥ j
for all i, j ∈ Z. Let
ai =
{
0, if player i adopts the strategy of defection, or
1, if player i adopts the strategy of cooperation.
Therefore, the pay-off value of the cooperating player 0 is ca−2+a2 and the pay-off values of the
defecting players −1 and 1 are d1+a−2+a−3 and d1+a2+a3 , respectively. It can now be seen that
a−2 + a2 ≤ 1 + a−2 + a−3 and a−2 + a2 ≤ 1 + a2 + a3. Therefore, d1+a−2+a−3 > ca−2+a2 and
d1+a2+a3 > ca−2+a2 . The cooperating player 0 will consequently not be able to achieve a pay-off
value at least as large as either of its two defecting neighbouring players −1 and 1, and will
hence adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game. This shows that no
cooperation run of length one can remain intact to the next round of the game.
Consider next a cooperation run of length two. Such a run has the form DCCD. This config-
uration is shown in Figure 5.8 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
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Figure 5.8: Configuration of a cooperation run of length two for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
The pay-off values of the cooperating players 0 and 1 are c1+a−2 and c1+a3 , respectively, while
the pay-off values of the defecting players −1 and 2 are d2+a−2+a−3 and d2+a3+a4 , respectively.
Therefore, using a similar logic as for a cooperation run of length one above, it can be seen
that the inequalities c1+a−2 < d2+a−2+a−3 and c1+a3 < d2+a3+a4 hold as a result of the fact that
1+a−2 < 2+a−2 +a−3 and 1+a3 < 2+a3 +a4. The two cooperating players 0 and 1 are hence
unable to achieve pay-off values at least as large as those of their two defecting neighbours −1
and 2, and will consequently adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game.
This shows that no cooperation run of length two can remain intact to the next round of the
game.
Finally, consider a cooperation run of length three. Such a run has the form DCCCD. This
configuration is shown in Figure 5.9 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph.
Figure 5.9: Configuration of a cooperation run of length three for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
The pay-off values of cooperating players 0, 1 and −1 are c2, c2+a−3 and c2+a3 , respectively,
while the pay-off values of the defecting players −2 and 2 are d2+a−3+a−4 and d2+a3+a4 , respec-
tively. Therefore, using a similar logic as for a cooperation run of length one, this results in the
inequalities d2+a−3+a−4 > c2+a−3 , d2+a−3+a−4 > c2, d2+a3+a4 > c2+a3 and d2+a3+a4 > c2 because
of the relationships 2 + a−3 + a−4 ≥ 2 + a−3, 2 + a−3 + a−4 ≥ 2, 2 + a3 + a4 ≥ 2 + a3 and
2 + a3 + a4 ≥ 2. The three cooperating players 0, 1 and −1 are therefore unable to achieve
pay-off values at least as large as those of their two defecting neighbours −2 and 2, and will
hence adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game. This shows that no
cooperation run of length three can remain intact to the next round of the game.
(b) A cooperation run of length four has the form DCCCCD. This configuration is illustrated
in Figure 5.10 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
The pay-off values of players −1, 0, 1, 2, representing the run of cooperators of length four, are
c2+a−3 , c3, c3 and c2+a4 , respectively. The largest cooperator pay-off value is therefore c3. Since
only the largest-valued cooperator is relevant in each player’s closed neighbourhood during the
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Figure 5.10: Configuration of a cooperation run of length four for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
updating process, only c3 is compared with the pay-off value of the players in the cooperation run
of length four. The pay-off values achieved by the defecting players −2 and 3 are d2+a−3+a−4 and
d2+a4+a5 , respectively. In the parameter region A, however, c3 > d2. Therefore, in order for the
inequalities c3 > d2+a−3+a−4 and c3 > d2+a4+a5 to hold, ensuring the largest-valued cooperator
has a larger pay-off value then the largest-valued defector, it must hold that a−3 + a−4 = 0 and
a4 + a5 = 0. In order for these equalities to be satisfied, it is required that a−4 = a−3 = a4 =
a5 = 0. It can therefore be deduced that, in order for the run of cooperators of length four to
persist intact to the next round of the game, it must be flanked by two defection runs, each of
length at least three.
(c) A cooperation run of length five has the form DCCCCCD. This configuration is illustrated
in Figure 5.11 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
Figure 5.11: Configuration of a cooperation run of length five for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
The run of cooperators of length five, consisting of players −2,−1, 0, 1 and 2, achieve the pay-off
values c2+a−4 , c3, c4, c3 and c2+a4 , respectively. The largest pay-off value achieved by a coop-
erator in this run is therefore c4. Since each player compares the pay-off value achieved by
the largest-valued cooperator and defector in its closed neighbourhood, only the largest pay-off
value c4 is relevant. The two neighbouring defectors, players −3 and 3, achieve the pay-off values
d2+a−4+a−5 and d2+a4+a5 , respectively. According to the parameter region inequalities, however,
d3 < c4. Therefore, in order for the inequalities d2+a−4+a−5 < c4 and d2+a4+a5 < c4 to hold, it is
required that 2 +a−4 +a−5 ≤ 3 and 2 +a4 +a5 ≤ 3. Hence, both a−4 +a−5 ≤ 1 and a4 +a5 ≤ 1
must hold. There are only three binary combinations of (a−4, a−5), namely (0, 0), (1, 0) or (0, 1),
which satisfy the first inequality a−4 +a−5 ≤ 1. These combinations represent the three possible
configurations DD, CD or DC which are required to flank the negative side of DCCCCCD. In
the combinations in which a−4 = 0 (i.e. player −4 adopts the strategy of defection), the strategy
of player −5 is shown to be irrelevant to the outcome of the updating processes of the players
within the cooperation run of length five. This is because a−5 either has the value of 0 or 1 for
the above inequality to hold. There are also three binary combinations of (a4, a5), namely (0, 0),
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(1, 0) or (0, 1), satisfying the second inequality, a4 + a5 ≤ 1. This allows for the positive side of
DCCCCCD to be flanked only by either DD, DC or CD. In the combinations in which a4 = 0
(i.e. player 4 adopts the strategy of defection), the strategy of player 5 is again irrelevant to the
outcome of the updating processes of the players within the cooperation run of length five. It
can therefore be deduced that, in order for the run of cooperators of length five to persist intact
to the next round of the game, the run must be flanked on both sides by either a defection run
of length two or by the configuration DCD.
A run of cooperators of length greater than five has the form D〈C〉iD for i > 5. Within
this configuration, the largest cooperator pay-off value is c4. The two outer defectors, namely
players b−n−12 c and dn−12 e obtain the pay-off values d2+a−d i2 e−1+a−d i2 e−2 and d2+ad i2 e+1+ad i2 e+2 ,
respectively. These pay-off values are similar to those for a cooperation run of length five. Since
each player compares the pay-off value achieved by the largest-valued cooperator and defector
in its closed neighbourhood and these are equivalent to the situation for a cooperation run of
length five, the same result as mentioned above is obtained. It can therefore be deduced that,
in order for the run of cooperators of length i ≥ 5 to persist intact to the next round of the
game, the run must be flanked on both sides by either a run of defectors of length two or by the
configuration DCD. 
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 establish the various strategy adoption structures required for cooperation
to persist to the next round of the game for parameter regions B, C and E, respectively, as
indicated in Figure 5.6.
Lemma 2. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P > 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region B of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two or three can persist intact to the next round of the
game, and
(b) a cooperation run of length at least four can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by a run of defectors of length at least three.
The proof of Lemma 2 may be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 3. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within
region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two, three or four can persist intact to the next round of
the game, and
(b) a cooperation run of length at least five can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by a run of defectors of length at least three.
The proof of Lemma 3 may be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 4. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two, three or four can persist intact to the next round of
the game, and
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(b) a cooperation run of length at least five can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by either a run of defectors of length at least two or by a
run of the form DCD.
The proof of Lemma 4 may be found in Appendix A.
5.4.2 Enumeration of equilibrium states
Using the structures identified in Lemmas 1–4 that allow cooperation to persist to the next
round of the game, all possible equilibrium states of the game can be enumerated. In order
to enumerate the equilibrium states, a well-known fact characterising distribution problems in
the realm of combinatorial analysis is first presented in Lemma 5. The equilibrium states for
each of the parameter regions in the phase plane of Figure 5.6 are thereafter enumerated. Only
the proof for parameter region B is presented in this chapter. The same proof technique may,
however, be applied for parameter regions A,C and D, as demonstrated in Appendix B.
In combinatorial distribution problems, the following lemma, whose proof can be found in [39],
may be adopted to enumerate all possible distributions of indistinguishable objects into distin-
guishable containers.
Lemma 5. There are
(
m+n−1
m
)
distinct ways of distributing m indistinguishable objects among
n distinguishable containers in the case where empty containers are allowed.
Consider an example of six distinguishable containers in which ten indistinguishable objects are
arbitrarily distributed according to the representation • • | • • | • • | | • • • | •, where an object
is denoted by the symbol “ • ” and a divider separating the objects into different containers is
denoted by the symbol “|”. Note that only five divider symbols are shown, but six containers
are, in fact, represented. Therefore, the number of dividers is one fewer than the number of
containers. The first and last container are not delimited by a divider at the beginning or end
of the string of symbols, respectively. If the string starts or ends with the character “|”, the
first or last container is therefore considered to be empty. It can also be seen that the fourth
container in the example above contains no “ • ” and is therefore empty.
The quantity enumerated in Lemma 5 is therefore equivalent to the number of distinct strings
which can be constructed by a linear arrangement of n−1 indistinguishable characters, denoted
by “|”, and m indistinguishable characters, denoted by “ • ”. There are (m + n − 1)! different
ways of forming strings from m + n − 1 distinguishable characters. Discounting the number of
ways of arranging the m indistinguishable characters “ • ” and the n distinguishable characters
“|” results in the number of distinct strings being
(m+ n− 1)!
m!(n− 1)! =
(
m+ n− 1
m
)
.
The result of Lemma 5 is used in the proof of the following result.
Theorem 4. Suppose the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉.
(a) If the parameter inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium states
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of the game is given by
2+
bn7 c∑
i=1
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S1
(
(n− 5i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i2 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
+
bn7 c∑
i=1
1
i
[(
n− 6i− 1
i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S1
(
(n− 6i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i2 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + b i2c − 2
b i2c − 2
)]
+
bn−87 c∑
i1=1
bn−7i18 c∑
i2=1
1
2i1 + i2
[(
(i1 + i2 − 2)!
(i1 − 1)!(i2 − 1)!
)(
n− 5i1 − 7i2 − 1
2i1 + i2 − 1
)
+(
(gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 2)!
( i1(2i1+i2)/gcd(2i1+i2,j) − 1)!( i2(2i1+i2)/gcd(2i1+i2,j) − 1)!
)
∑
j∈S2
(
(n− 7i1 − 8i2) gcd(2i1 + i2, j)/(2i1 + i2) + gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 1
gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 1
)
+(2i1 + i2)
(
( i1+i2−22 )!
( i1−12 )!(
i2−1
2 )!
) bn−7i1−8i22 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k + 1)
(
k + b 2i1+i22 c − 2
b 2i1+i22 c − 2
)]
,
(5.2)
where S is the set {x ∈ N | (i1 + i2) divides n gcd(i1 + i2, x) and x < (i1 + i2)}.
(b) Else if the parameter inequalities 3T +P > 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within
region B of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium states is given by
2 +
bn7 c∑
i=1
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈Sˆ
(
(n− 5i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i2 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
(5.3)
where Sˆ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
(c) Else if the parameter inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e. the
parameters lie within region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium
states is given by
2 +
bn8 c∑
i=1
1
2i
[(
n− 6i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S¯
(
(n− 6i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−8i2 c∑
k=0
(n− 8i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
(5.4)
where S¯ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
(d) Else if the parameter inequalities 3T +P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within
region E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium states is given by
2+
bn8 c∑
i=1
2i−1
i
[(
n− 6i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S˜
(
(n− 6i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−8i2 c∑
k=0
(n−8i−2k+1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
(5.5)
where S˜ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
Outline of Proof: The equilibrium state enumeration process is carried out for the case in
which the parameters lie within region B of the phase plane in Figure 5.6. As the technique
used to enumerate equilibrium game states when the parameters lie within the regions C and E
is similar, only the enumeration formulae are shown. A slight adaptation of the proof technique
is required to enumerate the equilibrium states when the parameters lie within region A. This
adaptation is described at the end of the proof outline.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.4. Equilibrium states analysis 59
Recall, from Lemma 2, that for cooperation to persist to the next round of the game, a coop-
eration run of length at least four flanked on both sides by a run of defectors of length at least
three is required. In order to enumerate the number of equilibrium states resulting from such
a configuration, the number of states containing only the substates 〈D〉n1〈C〉n2〈D〉n3 has to be
counted, where n1 ≥ 3, n2 ≥ 4 and n3 ≥ 3. These states have the form
CCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · CCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i− 1
DDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
, (5.6)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and defectors,
as appropriate. As the underlying graph is a circulant, it is vertex-transitive. The endpoints in
the partial state (5.6) have therefore been chosen arbitrarily.
Note that the structure of (5.6) is similar to the string containing the characters “|” and “ • ”
mentioned above. Each separating character “|” is now represented by either the run CCCC
or DDD, and each object character “ • ” by either the symbol C or D. As the ordering of
the cooperation and defection runs has already been fixed in (5.6), the symbols C and D can
be considered indistinguishable for enumeration purposes, serving merely as place holders from
a combinatorial point of view. The partial state (5.6) contains 7i symbols, leaving n − 7i
indistinguishable symbols to be distributed amongst the 2i distinguishable runs.
All equilibrium states can be represented by (5.6), except for the all-cooperator and all-defector
steady states. As deduced from Lemma 2, no run of cooperators of length smaller than four
or run of defectors of length smaller than three prevails in any steady state. Therefore, let Qi
denote the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising i cooperation runs and i defection
runs, starting in a run of cooperators and ending in a run of defectors as shown in (5.6). The
total number of equilibrium classes is therefore given by
2 +
bn
7
c∑
i=1
Qi.
Let χ be the set of all states of the form (5.6). In order to determine Qi, the game states within
the set χ have to be partitioned into game state equivalence classes (in order to prevent the
enumeration of equivalent states) and the number of classes enumerated. Let G be the group of
permutations that partitions χ into its equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.2.2, that the Cauchy-
Frobenius Lemma can be used to determine the number of these equivalence classes. The value
of Qi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn7 c} is therefore given by
Qi =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (5.7)
where |Fg| is the number of states in χ that remain invariant under a permutation g.
In order to determine the symmetry group of the states of the form (5.6), let ι be the identity
permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ χ. Let ρj be the permutation which modular
shifts each run in (5.6) j positions to the right. Let δ furthermore be the operation that reverses
the order of the runs in (5.6) so that the first run remains in its original position followed by
runs i, i− 1, . . . The symmetry group G = {ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρi−1} of order 2i is
thus formed under the binary operation of permutation composition. In order to calculate Qi,
according to (5.7), all states that remain invariant under each permutation within G has to be
considered.
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First, consider the identity operator ι. This operator leaves all elements of χ invariant and there-
fore |Fι| = |χ|. To calculate the number of states within χ, the number of ways of distributing
n − 7i indistinguishable symbols amongst 2i distinguishable runs has to be determined. Using
Lemma 5, it follows that
|Fι| =
(
n− 5i+ 2i− 1
2i− 1
)
=
(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
. (5.8)
Next, consider the permutation ρj . For a state to remain invariant under the permutation ρj ,
the first j pairs of runs have to be equivalent to all subsequent runs. To elucidate this claim,
consider applying ρ1 to a state s ∈ χ. When performing this operation, run i is mapped to run
i+ 2 which, in turn, is mapped to run i+ 4, and so on. Hence, the numbers of symbols in runs
1 and 2 determine the numbers of symbols in runs 3 and 4 as well as the numbers of symbols in
runs 5 and 6, and so on. Therefore, each pair of runs have to be equivalent. Hence, the number
of possible states that remain invariant under ρ1 can be determined by finding the number of
distinct ways of distributing 22i(n− 7i) symbols among two containers, which is given by
|Fρ1 | =
(n−7i
i + 2− 1
2− 1
)
=
n− 7i
i
+ 1.
Note that if j exactly divides i, then the first j pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i − j)
runs. Otherwise, the first d = gcd(i, j) pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i− d) runs. The
number of possible states that remain invariant under ρj can therefore be determined by finding
the number of ways to distribute 2d2i (n− 7i) symbols among the first 2d runs. The enumeration
is given by
|Fρj | =
(2d
2i (n− 7i) + 2d− 1
2d− 1
)
=
(d
i (n− 5i)− 1
2d− 1
)
.
If, however, din is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols to complete the pattern of
runs in order to achieve an invariant state and so |Fρj | = 0. Therefore,
|Fρj | =

( gcd(i,j)
i
(n−5i)−1
2gcd(i,j)−1
)
, if gcd(i,j)i n ∈ Z or
0, otherwise.
(5.9)
Consider next the permutation δ, which reverses the order of the runs so that the first run
remains in its original position, the second run is projected onto the last run, the third run is
projected onto the second last run, and so on. Runs 1 and i+ 1 are projected onto themselves,
while runs 2 to i map onto runs i+2 to 2i, respectively. Let k be the number of indistinguishable
symbols that are distributed among the i−1 distinguishable runs not mapping onto themselves.
The number of ways of distributing the k symbols among these i−1 runs is (k+i−2i−2 ), provided that
the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i holds. The remaining n− 7i− 2k symbols are distributed among
the two runs that map onto themselves, which can be done in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1
distinct ways. In order to enumerate the number of distinct game states that remain invariant
under the permutation δ, all possible values of k are to be considered. Therefore,
|Fδ| =
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
. (5.10)
Finally, consider the permutation composition δρj which shifts the runs j positions to the left
and then reverses the order of the runs. Under this permutation, runs j + 1 and i+ j + 1 map
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onto themselves, while runs j + 2 to i+ j map onto runs j − 1 to i+ j + 2, respectively. Once
again k indistinguishable symbols can be distributed among i − 1 distinguishable runs that do
not map onto themselves in
(
k+i−2
i−2
)
different ways, provided that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i
holds. Again, the remaining n − 7i − 2k symbols can be distributed among the two runs that
map onto themselves in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1 distinct ways. Therefore, the number
of distinct game states that remain invariant under the permutation δρj equals the number in
(5.10).
Taking all the various permutations into account and therefore substituting (5.8),(5.9) and (5.10)
into (5.7), the number of equilibrium states for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
and for which the inequalities 3T + P > 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within
region B of the phase plane in Figure 5.6) is
Qi =
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S
(
(n− 5i)gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
where S is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}. 
In the same way the enumeration of the equivalence classes for parameter regions C and E,
given by (5.4) and (5.5), can be carried out. For the enumeration of the equivalence classes
corresponding to parameter region A an adaptation of the proof is required. This is because
an equilibrium state can take on more than one form in this case. Recall, from Lemma 1, that
in order for cooperation to persist to the next round of the game, either a cooperation run
of length four flanked on both sides by a defector run of length at least two or a cooperation
run of length greater than four flanked on both sides by either a run of defectors of length at
least two or by the configuration DCD is required. It can be shown in the latter case that
the configuration DCD flanking the cooperator run will transform into the configuration DDD
during the next round of the game. This claim is proved in the following lemma and then used
to illustrate the adaptation of the enumeration of equivalence classes for parameter region B
previously presented, in the case of parameter region A.
Lemma 6. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region A of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6), then an equilibrium state must contain the following for cooperation
to persist:
(a) A cooperation run of length four flanked on both sides by a defection run of length at least
three, or
(b) a cooperation run of length at least five flanked on both sides by a defection run of length
at least two.
Outline of Proof: Consider a run of cooperators of length greater than four with one side
flanked by DCD. A substate of this configuration consisting of a cooperation run of length five
flanked on the right by DCD is illustrated in Figure 5.12.
Consider the playing and updating phases during a single round of the game for the player
marked in red in the figure. During the playing phase, the pay-off value achieved by this player
is at most c2 = 2. Furthermore, during the updating phase, the defector and cooperator with
the largest pay-off value in this player’s closed neighbourhood are compared. The defector with
the largest pay-off value achieves the pay-off value d3 = 3T + P and is marked in blue in the
figure. In order to determine the cooperator with the largest pay-off value, the strategy of
the grey player is required. The grey player can either adopt the strategy of cooperation or
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Figure 5.12: Configuration of a cooperation run of length five flanked on the right side by DCD. The
parameter values that are known for the various players within the configuration are denoted above or
below the corresponding vertices. The player marked in red, will adopt the strategy of defection during
the next round of the game, if the parameter values T and P lie within parameter region A.
defection. In the case where the grey player adopts the strategy of cooperation, it is able to
achieve the largest pay-off value c3 = 3 of all the cooperating players in the red player’s closed
neighbourhood. Otherwise, in the case where the grey player adopts the strategy of defection,
the red player achieves the largest pay-off value of all the cooperators. In the two cases, the
inequalities d3 > c3 and d3 > c2 hold, respectively. The player indicated in red will therefore
adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game. The resulting configuration
after a single round of the game is subsequently 〈C〉5DDD. Hence, in order for cooperation to
be present in an equilibrium state, a run of cooperators of length four flanked on both sides by
a run of defectors of length at least three or a run of cooperators of length greater than four
flanked on both sides by a run of defectors of length at least two is required. 
Employing Lemma 6, the adaptation of the enumeration of the number of equivalence classes
for parameter region B so as to be applicable to parameter region A can now be demonstrated.
First, the set of all possible game states S can be partitioned into two sets X and Y as illustrated
in Figure 5.13. The set X consists of all states that contain the configuration DDD〈C〉4DDD,
while the set Y consists of all states that contain the configuration DD〈C〉nDD, for some
n ≥ 5. The set X∩Y contains all states that contain both the configuration DDD〈C〉4DDD and
DD〈C〉nDD, for some n ≥ 5. The number of equilibrium states |χ| is therefore |X|+|Y |−|X∩Y |.
In order to enumerate the overall number of equivalence classes, the number of equivalence classes
in each set can be determined using the same technique as that used to enumerate the number
of equivalence classes for parameter region B. The number of equilibrium states for the ESPD
with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph is illustrated in Figure 5.14 for 1 ≤ n ≤ 20 for each of the
parameter regions in the phase plane of Figure 5.6.
5.4.3 Enumeration of the components in the state graph
The enumeration of the equilibrium states presented in Theorem 4 may be utilised to enumerate
the components in the state graph. A fundamental prerequisite to the enumeration of the
components in the state graph is, however, that the state graph is a rooted pseudo-forest. In
order to establish this property it is necessary to investigate the existence of limit cycles within
this graph. More specifically, the possibility of oscillation of game states in the state graph must
be ruled out in order to establish that limit cycles do not exist. To that end, the following result,
namely that defection is inherently more stable than cooperation, is useful. This result can be
used to show that oscillation between game states is not possible and therefore that limit cycles
do not exist. The result, however, only holds for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
and for the parameter regions C,D or E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6. The enumeration of
the components in the state graph is therefore only carried out for these cases.
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Figure 5.13: A Venn diagram illustrating the partition of the set of all game states into subsets. The
set X consists of all states that contain the configuration DDD〈C〉4DDD, while the set Y consists of all
states that contain the configuration DD〈C〉nDD, where n ≥ 5.
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Figure 5.14: The enumeration of the equilibrium states, up to automorphism, of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph for the various parameter regions of the phase plane in Figure 5.6.
Lemma 7. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequality 2T + 2P > 3 holds (i.e. the parameters lie within region C,D or E of the phase plane
in Figure 5.6), then each component of the state graph is a rooted pseudo-tree.
Proof: Consider a player adopting the strategy of defection. In order to investigate the ability
of the player changing its strategy to cooperation, three cases in which the player has different
open neighbourhood configurations have to be considered. In the first two cases, the defecting
player is shown to retain its strategy, while in the third the defecting player retains its strategy
only under certain parameter conditions.
First, consider the case where the defector has four defectors in its open neighbourhood. In
this case, the defector will certainly defect again during the next round because there are only
defectors in its closed neighbourhood. Consider next, a defector with one cooperator in its open
neighbourhood. The configuration is illustrated in Figure 5.15, where player 0 is the defector
and player 2 is the cooperator.
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Figure 5.15: Configuration of a defector with one cooperator in its open neighbourhood.
Player 0, adopting the strategy of defection, achieves a pay-off value of T + 3P , while player
2, adopting the strategy of cooperation, achieves a pay-off value of either 0, 1 or 2, depending
on the strategies of players 3 and 4. In the configuration shown, one of player 0’s defecting
neighbours will always be adjacent to the cooperating player 2 (i.e. player 1). Player 1 achieves
the pay-off value of 3T + P or 2T + 2P , depending on the strategy of player 3. Player 1’s pay-
off value is strictly larger than player 2’s pay-off value for each possible strategy configuration
assigned to players 3 and 4, as T > 1. Therefore, the player with the maximum pay-off value in
the closed neighbourhood of player 0 is player 1. According to the local imitation rule, player 0
will therefore retain the strategy of defection during the next round of the game.
Finally, consider the case where the defector has at least two cooperators in its neighbourhood.
The pay-off value of the defector is at least 2T + 2P and the pay-off value of the cooperator is
at most 3. This configuration is illustrated in Figure 5.16, where the defector with pay-off value
2T + 2P is represented by player 0 and the cooperator with pay-off value 3 is represented by
player 2.
Figure 5.16: Configuration of a defector with two cooperators in its open neighbourhood. The case in
which the cooperator positioned at vertex 2 has the largest possible pay-off value of c3 is shown.
If the inequality, 2T + 2P > 3 holds (i.e. the parameters lie within the parameter region C,D
or E in the phase plane in Figure 5.6), player 0, adopting the strategy of defection, will always
achieve a larger pay-off value than each of the cooperators in its open neighbourhood. Therefore,
the defector will retain its strategy of defection during the next round of the game. On the other
hand, if the inequality 2T + 2P < 3 holds (i.e. the parameters lie within feasible region A or
B in the phase plane of Figure 5.6), the cooperator will achieve the largest pay-off value. The
defector will therefore adopt the strategy of cooperation during the next round of the game, and
so defection is only inherently more stable than cooperation if the inequality 2T +2P > 3 holds.
As the ESPD is deterministic (every game state gives rise to a unique game state during the next
round of the game), every vertex in the state graph has out-degree 1. As a defector will persist
with its strategy under the condition 2T +2P > 3, it follows that a player is unable to change its
strategy from defection to cooperation and then back to defection. Therefore, no oscillation of
game states is possible. Hence, the state graph of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
does not contain any limit cycles and so the state graph is a rooted pseudo-forest, and each
component of the state graph has a steady state as its root. 
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It follows from Lemma 7 that the enumeration of the components of the state graph of the
ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph and parameters lying within region C,D or E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6 is equivalent to the enumeration of the equilibrium states as presented
in Theorem 4.
5.5 The probability of persistent cooperation
In order to determine the probability that a random initial game state will lead to some form of
persistent cooperation, all possible substates that allow for cooperation to persist are identified.
This allows for the enumeration of all possible states that contain these substates, thereby
facilitating computation of the probability of a state containing one of these substates.
The following theorem characterises the initial game states of the ESPD with the circulant
Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph which lead to some form of persistent cooperation and therefore
are not attracted by the all-defector state 〈D〉n for the various parameter regions of the phase
plane in Figure 5.6.
Theorem 5. Suppose the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉.
(a) Suppose the parameter inequalities 3T +P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters
lie within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then if and only if a state contains at
least one of the substates DDD〈C〉4DDD, DD〈C〉5DD, DCD〈C〉5DCD, DD〈C〉5DCD,
〈C〉6DD, DCD〈C〉6DCD 〈C〉7DCD, 〈C〉8 (or any of their reverses) it is not in the
component of the state graph which contains the all-defector steady state.
(b) Suppose the parameter inequalities 3T +P > 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters
lie within region B of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then if and only if a state contains at
least one of the substates DDD〈C〉4DDD, DDD〈C〉5DDD, 〈C〉6DDD, 〈C〉8 (or any of
their reverses) it is not in the component of the state graph which contains the all-defector
steady state.
(c) Suppose the parameter inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e.
the parameters lie within region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then if and only if a
state contains at least one of the substates DDD〈C〉5DDD, DDD〈C〉6DDD, 〈C〉7DDD,
〈C〉9 (or any of their reverses) it is not in the component of the state graph which contains
the all-defector steady state.
(d) Suppose the parameter inequalities 3T +P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters
lie within region E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then if and only if a state contains
at least one of the substates DD〈C〉5DD, DCD〈C〉5DCD, DD〈C〉5DCD, DD〈C〉6DD,
DCD〈C〉6DCD, DD〈C〉6DCD, 〈C〉7DD, 〈C〉7DCD, 〈C〉9 (or any of their reverses) it
is not in the component of the state graph which contains the all-defector steady state.
Outline of Proof: All the substates that allow for cooperation to persist are determined
according to Lemma 1 for each parameter region in Figure 5.6. This is established by considering
successively all states consisting of cooperation runs of length i ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. In this way, all
states that lead to one of the characterised states mentioned in Lemma 1 after a single round of
the game are considered. If any of the states contains a previously considered state as a substate
it is not included as it has already been considered. This enables all the possible subsets to be
characterised that will lead to cooperation persisting. 
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The probability P (n) that some form of cooperation will persist from a randomly generated
initial state for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph can now be expressed as
P (n) = 1− bn
2n
,
where bn denotes the total number of states that contain none of the substrings mentioned in
the statement of the theorem, but contain at least one D. In order to determine the value of bn,
the transfer matrix method is adopted.2
In order to demonstrate the use of the transfer matrix method, consider the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph in the case where the inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e.
the parameters lie within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6). In order to determine
P (n), the total number of binary strings bn containing none of the substrings DDD〈C〉4DDD,
DD〈C〉5DD, DCD〈C〉5DCD, DD〈C〉5DCD, D〈C〉6DDD, D〈C〉6DCD, 〈C〉7DD, 〈C〉7DCD
and 〈C〉8 are to be enumerated. Classify a string containing the characters C and D as a legal
string if it contains none of the above-mentioned forbidden substrings. Therefore, bn denotes
the number of possible legal strings.
In order to calculate bn, a digraph D11 of order 2
11 = 2 048 is constructed, because the largest for-
bidden substring has length 11 (i.e. DCD〈C〉5DCD). Within the digraph each vertex represents
a possible string containing the characters C and D. As there are 2 048 possible combinations,
the graph contains 2 048 vertices. A vertex vi representing the string s1s2s3s4s5s6s7s8s9s10s11
is incident to vertex vj representing the string s2s3s4s5s6s7s8s9s10s11s12 in D11 if and only if
s1s2s3s4s5s6s7s8s9s10s11s12 is a legal string. The digraph D11 is depicted in Figure 5.17, merely
to illustrate its complexity. Each legal string of length n has an associated closed, directed walk
of length n in D11, for some n ≥ 12. Therefore, in order to determine the value of bn the number
of closed directed walks of length n can be counted. This principle is illustrated in Figure 5.18,
where the closed, directed walk associated with the legal string DCDCDDDCDDCDD is
shown. Note that the string consists of 13 characters and that the directed walk also has length
13.
Recall, from §2.1.3, that the number of closed walks CD(n) of length n in a digraph D with
adjacency matrix A, is ∑
n=1
CD(n)x
n =
−xQ′(x)
Q(x)
,
where Q(x) = det(I − xA).
LetA be the adjacency matrix of the digraphD11 in Figure 5.17. The structure ofA is illustrated
graphically in Figure 5.19. In fact, det(I−xA) = 1−x−x2−x3−x4−x5−x6−x7 + 2x8 +x9.
As bn = CD(n), it therefore follows that
∞∑
n=1
bnx
n =
−x(−1− 2x− 3x2 − 4x3 − 5x4 − 6x5 − 7x6 + 16x7 + 9x8)
1− x− x2 − x3 − x4 − x5 − x6 − x7 + 2x8 + x9 . (5.11)
The Taylor expansion of the function in (5.11) is given by
F (x) = x+3x2+7x3+15x4+31x5+63x6+106x7+215x8+430x9+843x10+1 651x11+. . . (5.12)
The coefficient of the term xn in this expansion is the number of closed walks of length n.
There are thus, three closed walks of length two, seven closed walks of length three, and so on.
2The transfer matrix method is a method for determining the number of directed walks of a specified length
in a directed graph. The interested reader is referred to [65] for a detailed description of the method.
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Figure 5.17: The digraph D11 for parameter region A. The vertices are labelled by integer representa-
tions in the set {1, . . . , 2048}.
According to the transfer matrix method, the value of bn may therefore be calculated recursively
by solving the linear recurrence relation
bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − 2bn−8 − bn−9. (5.13)
The seed values for (5.13) can be found from the coefficients of the Taylor expansion in (5.12).
These seed values are listed in Table 5.1.
b∗1 b∗2 b∗3 b∗4 b∗5 b∗6 b∗7 b∗8 b∗9 b∗10 b∗11
1 3 7 15 31 63 106 215 430 843 1 651
Table 5.1: The seed values required to solve the recurrence equation (5.13).
Adopting this approach for each parameter region, the probability that a randomly generated
initial state will lead to some form of persistent cooperation can be calculated for the ESPD
with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph, as demonstrated in the following theorem.
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Figure 5.18: A closed walk in D11 associated with the string DCDCDDDCDDCDD.
Figure 5.19: Positions of the unit entries in the adjacency matrix of the digraph D11.
Theorem 6. The probability that some form of cooperation persists from a randomly generated
initial state of the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph is given by
P (n) = 1− bn
2n
, (5.14)
where bn satisfies one of the following relationships with seed values as specified in Table 5.2 for
the associated parameter regions of the game.
(a) If the parameter inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the value of bn satisfies
bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − 2bn−8 − bn−9. (5.15)
(b) If the parameter inequalities 3T + P > 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region B of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the value of bn satisfies
bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + +bn−5 − bn−6 − bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9. (5.16)
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(c) If the parameter inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e. the
parameters lie within region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the value of bn
satisfies
bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − 2bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9. (5.17)
(d) If the parameter inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the value of bn satisfies
bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − bn−8 − bn−9. (5.18)
b∗1 b∗2 b∗3 b∗4 b∗5 b∗6 b∗7 b∗8 b∗9 b∗10 b∗11
Region A 1 3 7 15 31 63 106 215 430 843 1 651
Region B 1 3 7 15 31 63 113 223 457 903 1 772
Region C 1 3 7 15 31 63 120 231 457 903 1 816
Region E 1 3 7 15 31 63 127 239 475 953 1 893
Table 5.2: The seed values required to calculate bn in the recurrence relations (5.15)–(5.18).
The results of Theorem 6 are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.20 for an underlying circulant
of order n ∈ {5, . . . , 100}.
Figure 5.20: The probability of a randomly generated initial state of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as
underlying graph leading to the persistence of some form of cooperation.
In order to investigate the asymptotic behaviour of the probability P (n) in (5.14), it is shown
next that the sequence b1, b2, b3, . . . is positive and strictly increasing for parameter regions
A,B,C and E in Figure 5.6. This result is, however, only proven for the case where the
parameters lie within the region A of the phase plan in Figure 5.6. The same technique may be
used to prove the result for the remaining regions (in these cases, only the result is stated).
Lemma 8. The terms in the sequence b1, b2, b3, . . . are positive and strictly increasing for each
set of recursive relationships and seed values presented in Theorem 6.
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Proof: The proof is given in the strong form of mathematical induction for case (a) in Theorem 6
only. Consider the sequence b1, b2, b3, . . . satisfying the relationship bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 +
bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − 2bn−8 − bn−9 as specified in Theorem 6(a) and the seed values in
the first row of Table 5.1 for parameter region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6.
Suppose the induction hypothesis bn > bn−1 > 0 holds for all n ≤ k. It can be seen from the
seed values in Table 5.1 that the result of the lemma holds for 1 ≤ n ≤ 12. This serves as the
base case for the induction process. Substituting n = k + 1 for all instances of k in the above
recurrence relation gives
bk+1 = bk + bk−1 + bk−2 + bk−3 + bk−4 + bk−5 + bk−6 − 2bk−7 − bk−8.
By the induction hypothesis, the inequality bk−4 > bk−5 > bk−6 > bk−7 > bk−8 holds. By
repeated use of the induction hypothesis the inequality bk−4 + bk−5 + bk−6 > 2bk−7 + bk−8
therefore also holds. It is therefore known that bk−4 + bk−5 + bk−6 − 2bk−7 − bk−8 > 0. As all
the other terms in the substituted recurrence relation are positive, it follows that bk+1 > bk > 0.
Therefore, the sequence b1, b2, b3, . . . is positive and strictly increasing. 
The following asymptotic result may now be established.
Theorem 7. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and if the parameter
inequality T +P < 2 holds (i.e. the parameters lie within region A, B, C or E of the phase plane
in Figure 5.6), then
lim
n→∞P (n) = 1.
Proof: Consider the relationship bn = bn−1+bn−2+bn−3+bn−4+bn−5+bn−6+bn−7−2bn−8−bn−9
specified in Theorem 6 for parameter region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6.
Let Tn = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − 2bn−8 − bn−9. Then
bn = bn−1 + Tn. (5.19)
If the indices in the recurrence relation (5.15) are shifted one position to the left, the relationship
yields
bn−1 = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 + bn−8 − 2bn−9 − bn−10. (5.20)
Taking the difference between bn−1 and Tn, and substituting (5.20) and (5.19) into bn−1 and Tn,
respectively, it follows that
bn−1 − Tn = 3bn−8 − bn−9 − bn−10.
By Lemma 8, bn+1 > bn > 0 and therefore by the repeated use of this inequality 3bn−8− bn−9−
bn−10 > 0. Consequently, Tn < bn−1, and so it follows from (5.19) that 0 < bn < 2bn−1. Dividing
each term in this inequality by 2n, it follows that
0 <
bn
2n
<
bn−1
2n−1
.
The value of bn/2
n is therefore decreasing by the above inequality and positive by Lemma 8,
and so, for some non-negative real constant c,
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= c. (5.21)
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In order to determine the value of c, note that substituting (5.15) into (5.21), gives
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= lim
n→∞
bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − 2bn−8 − bn−9
2n
=
1
2
lim
n→∞
bn−1
2n−1
+
1
22
lim
n→∞
bn−2
2n−2
+
1
23
lim
n→∞
bn−3
2n−3
+
1
24
lim
n→∞
bn−4
2n−4
+
1
25
lim
n→∞
bn−5
2n−5
+
1
26
lim
n→∞
bn−6
2n−6
+
1
27
lim
n→∞
bn−7
2n−7
− 2
28
lim
n→∞
bn−8
2n−8
− 1
29
lim
n→∞
bn−9
2n−9
= c
(
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
24
+
1
25
+
1
26
+
1
27
− 2
28
− 1
29
)
= c.
(5.22)
In order to satisfy (5.22), it is therefore required that c = 0. Hence,
lim
n→∞P (n) = limn→∞
(
1− bn
2n
)
= 1
by (5.14). 
The same argument may be employed to determine the same asymptotic behaviour of the
probability P (n) for parameter regions B,C and E as demonstrated in Appendix C. These
relationships are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.20.
5.6 The effect of extending each player’s neighbourhood
The number of equilibrium states of the ESPD with the cycle Cn〈1〉, as well as with the circulant
Cn〈1, 2〉, as underlying graph is shown in Figure 5.21. As may be seen in the figure, the number
of equilibrium states decreases as each player extends its neighbourhood. The relationship
between the number of equilibrium states and the graph order is exponential for both underlying
graph topologies. The number of components in the state graph is equivalent to the number of
equilibrium states for the ESPD with the cycle as underlying graph, as well as for the ESPD
with the circulant as underlying graph, but only if the inequality 2T + 2P > 3 holds (i.e. the
parameters lie within the region C,D or E in the phase plane of Figure 5.6.) Therefore, as each
player extends its neighbourhood in these cases, the number of components in the state graph
also decreases.
The change in the relationship between the probability of cooperation persisting and the graph
order for the ESPD on a cycle and the ESPD on a circulant is illustrated in Figure 5.22. As may
be seen in the figure, the probability of cooperation persisting decreases as each player extends
its neighbourhood. As the size of the underlying graph increases, however, the probability of
cooperation persisting nevertheless increases towards certainty for both graph topologies, unless
the inequality T > 2 − P holds. If this inequality holds (i.e. for the case where the underlying
graph is a circulant and the parameters lie within region E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6),
cooperation is unable to persist for both graph topologies, unless the strategy of cooperation
is universally adopted by all players initially. Therefore, in the latter case, the likelihood of
cooperation persisting tends towards impossibility as the order of the underlying graph increases,
as also illustrated in Figure 5.22.
It may furthermore be concluded that the values of the parameters T and P have a more
significant effect on the probability of cooperation persisting for the ESPD where the underlying
graph is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 than in the case of the cycle Cn〈1〉. For the cycle, there are only
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Figure 5.21: The number of the equilibrium game states, up to automorphism, of the ESPD with either
the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 or the cycle Cn〈1〉 of order n as underlying graph.
Figure 5.22: The probability of cooperation persisting for a randomly generated initial state of the
ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 or the cycle Cn〈1〉 as underlying graph as a function of graph order.
two parameter regions within the phase plane leading to different game dynamics [11], while for
the circulant, five parameter regions induce different game dynamics (as shown in Figure 5.6).
It may also be seen in Figure 5.22 that for the ESPD with the circulant as underlying graph,
the parameter P more sensitively affects the probability of cooperation persisting than does
the parameter T , as a marginal increase in the parameter P results in a larger decrease in the
probability of cooperation persisting than the same increase in the value of the parameter T .
This supports the modelling choice of Nowak and May [51] of keeping the parameter T constant
and only investigating the change in game dynamics for various values of parameter P in their
work.
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5.7 Chapter summary
Analytical means were employed in this chapter to analyse the long-term game dynamics of
the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. The aim was to determine how the
extension of each player’s (cyclic) neighbourhood affects the likelihood of persistent cooperation
when players are arranged in a cyclic topology.
In §5.1, a brief overview of the analysis of the game dynamics of the ESPD with a cycle as
underlying graph was reviewed from the literature. The focus of the chapter then shifted to
an investigation of the game dynamics of the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph. An appropriate isometric representation of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
was first established in §5.2, in order to facilitate an understanding of the work presented in the
remainder of the chapter. The phase plane was then constructed in §5.3, in which five regions
were identified to induce different game dynamics.
A characterisation and enumeration of the possible ESPD equilibrium states followed in §5.4 for
each of the parameter regions identified in the previous section. The number of equilibrium states
was shown to exhibit an exponential relationship with the order of the underlying graph. The
property that the state graph is a rooted pseudo-forest was also shown to hold if the parameter
inequality 2T + 2P > 3 holds. This property facilitated enumeration of the components of the
state graph to be equivalent to the number of equilibrium states previously enumerated.
Using the characterisation of the equilibrium states in §5.4, the probability of persistent coop-
eration resulting from a random initial state was calculated for each of the parameter regions in
§5.5. This probability tended towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph increases
for parameter regions A,B,C and E.
Finally, the chapter closes with an investigation of the effect of each player extending its cyclic
neighbourhood from that of a cycle as underlying graph in §5.6. This entailed a comparison
of the game dynamics of the ESPD with a cycle as underlying graph with that of the ESPD
with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. It was found that as each player extends
its neighbourhood, the number of equilibrium states, as well as the probability of cooperation
persisting, decreases.
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The ESPD on a toroidal grid graph
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This chapter contains an analysis of the game dynamics of the ESPD with a small toroidal grid
as underlying graph. The objective is to investigate the ability of the toroidal grid graph to
facilitate persistent cooperation in the ESPD. The complexity of this analysis is elucidated in
§6.1 and §6.2, in terms of an inherent combinatorial explosion in the analysis and the various
parameter regions in the phase plane in which the game has to be analysed (independently).
Furthermore, a toroidal grid as underlying graph does not lead to the situation where each
component of the ESPD state graph is a rooted psuedo-tree. This gives rise to the potential
presence of cycles within the state graph, further increasing the complexity of the analysis. A
new analysis visualisation tool, called the equilibrium state diagram, is therefore proposed in
§6.3, which may replace the state graph for larger toroidal grid dimensions in analyses of the
ESPD game dynamics. Section 6.4 contains explanations of a number of algorithms (and their
implementations) for constructing the equilibrium state graph. The equilibrium state diagram
of the ESPD is presented in §6.5 for the case of small toroidal grids as underlying graphs. The
underlying toroidal grids C2×C6, C3×C3, C3×C4, C3×C5, C3×C6, C4×C4, C4×C5, C4×C6,
C5 ×C5, C5 ×C6 and C6 ×C6 are considered. The chapter concludes with a collective analysis
of the ability of small grids to allow for the persistence of cooperation.
6.1 A combinatorial explosion
As noted by Nowak [51], the mathematical analysis of evolutionary games on graphs is a compli-
cated task due to the large number of different configurations that such games can exhibit if the
underlying graphs are large. This chapter is therefore primarily concerned with an investigation
of the game dynamics on small toroidal grids.
75
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Consider the ESPD with a toroidal n × m grid as underlying graph. There are 2nm ways of
assigning the strategies C or D to the various players in such an ESPD instance. Table 6.1
shows the number of distinct initial states for m,n ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The exponential increase in
the number of distinct initial states can clearly be seen in the table as the dimensions of the
underlying graph increases. A combinatorial explosion is, in fact, prevalent even for very small
toroidal grid graphs.
Table 6.1: The number of distinct initial states for the ESPD with the toroidal grid graph Cn ×Cm as
underlying graph. The state graphs corresponding to the entries in boldface are known [72]. A study of
the game dynamics of the ESPD for the underlying toroidal grid graphs corresponding to entries indicated
in red is contributed in this chapter.
HHHHHHn
m
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 4 8 16 32 64
2 16 64 256 1 024 4 096
3 512 4 096 32 768 262 144
4 65 536 1 048 576 16 777 216
5 33 554 432 1 073 741 824
6 68 719 476 740
Because the underlying toroidal grid contains a high level of symmetry as a result of its rectangu-
lar or square shape, a number of the states in Table 6.1 may, however, be considered equivalent.
Van der Merwe [72] enumerated the number of game state automorphism classes for the ESPD
with the toroidal grid graph Cn × Cm as underlying graph. Table 6.2 contains the numbers of
game state automorphism classes for n,m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The reader is reminded that all ini-
tial states within an automorphism class result in equivalent game dynamics. Therefore, when
investigating the ESPD game dynamics in this chapter, only the class representatives are con-
sidered. As the number of non-isomorphic states in Table 6.2 are significantly smaller (two or
three orders of magnitude smaller than the corresponding entries in Table 6.1), this reduces the
combinatorial complexity of the analysis. Figure 6.1 contains an organisation of the 29 = 512
distinct game states for the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph into 26 distinct game
automorphism classes as a means of validation for the entry in row 3 and column 3 of Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: The number of game state automorphism classes for the ESPD with the toroidal grid graph
Cn × Cm as underlying graph [72]. The state graphs corresponding to the entries in boldface are known
[72]. A study of the game dynamics of the ESPD for the underlying toroidal grid graphs corresponding
to the entries indicated in red is contributed in this chapter.
HHHHHHn
m
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 6 8 13
2 6 13 34 78 237
3 26 158 708 4 236
4 805 14 676 184 854
5 172 112 8 999 762
6 239 114 084
The boldfaced entries in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 correspond to the various underlying toroidal grids
for which ESPD game dynamics have already been investigated within the literature [72]. The
red entries in the tables represent the underlying toroidal grids for which ESPD game dynamics
are newly investigated in this chapter.
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6.2 The phase plane
Recall, from §4.3, that the values of the parameters T and P in the normalised pay-off matrix of
the ESPD influence the dynamics of the game significantly. When a change in these parameter
values result in an outcome of the game that is different from that with the original choice of
parameter values, the change is called a phase transition. As discussed in §5.3, the structure of
the underlying graph fundamentally determines where phase transitions occur. When investi-
gating the dynamics of the ESPD, these phase transitions should, of course, also be considered.
Consider the ESPD with the Cartesian product Cn × Cm as the underlying graph. The local
playing structure and neighbourhood of each player is shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: The structure of the closed neighbourhood of a player indicated in red is shown for the
ESPD with the toroidal grid graph Cn × Cm as underlying graph.
The graph underlying the ESPD in this case is 4-regular (i.e. each player has four other players
in its open neighbourhood). Therefore, adopting the same notation and methodology as in §5.3,
the transitions in the phase plane are given by the six isoclines
c4 = d3 ⇒ 4 = 3T + P,
c4 = d2 ⇒ 4 = 2T + 2P,
c4 = d1 ⇒ 4 = T + 3P,
c3 = d2 ⇒ 3 = 2T + 2P,
c3 = d1 ⇒ 3 = T + 3P, and
c2 = d1 ⇒ 2 = T + 3P.
These isoclines result in a phase plane with eleven parameter regions which potentially induce
different game dynamics, as shown in Figure 6.3.
Note that the phase plane in Figure 6.3 is not equivalent to that of the ESPD with the circulant
Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph, because isoclines were removable in the case of the circulant as
underlying graph. The removal of the isoclines for the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 was possible due to
special cases in which no change in the game dynamics was caused by the specific underlying
topology. Similar special cases for a toroidal grid as underlying graph only occur for grids of
dimension n × m, where either n ≤ 3 or m ≤ 3. Hence, for the underlying grids considered
in this thesis, no isoclines can be removed and all eleven parameter regions are to be studied
independently. As the game is to be analysed for each parameter region, this further increases
the complexity of the analysis.
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Figure 6.3: The P -T phase plane for the ESPD with the toroidal grid Cn × Cm as underlying graph,
containing eleven disjoint parameter regions, labelled A to K.
6.3 The equilibrium state diagram
The exponential increase in the number of automorphism class representatives as the dimensions
of the underlying toroidal grid graph increases, as well as the presence of cycles within the state
graph facilitated by its topology, limits the effective use of a state graph as an analysis and
visualisation tool. A new visualisation mechanism for investigating the game dynamics of an
ESPD with larger toroidal grids as underlying graphs is therefore introduced in this section.
6.3.1 The need for a new visualisation mechanism
The game dynamics of the ESPD have been investigated exhaustively for the toroidal grids
C2 × C2, C2 × C3, C2 × C4, C2 × C5 and C3 × C3 as underlying graphs [72]. In order to
investigate these game dynamics, state graphs were constructed, as discussed in §4.4. As only
very small grid sizes were considered, these constructions were achievable by hand. Due to the
combinatorial explosion discussed in §6.1 and illustrated in Table 6.2, however, it is no longer
plausible to attempt an analysis by hand when considering toroidal grids of larger dimensions
as underlying graphs for the ESPD.
Consider, for example, the case of the toroidal grid C4 × C4 as underlying graph. Initially,
65 536 distinct game states have to be organised into 805 automorphism classes. Thereafter, a
state graph containing 805 vertices has to be constructed. The state graph to be constructed in
this case is sufficiently large that it becomes a tedious form of representation. A more compact
visualisation tool is clearly required. The notion of an equilibrium state diagram is therefore
proposed in this section as a simplified summary of the information contained in a state graph.
This new visualisation mechanism is subsequently used throughout the chapter instead of the
notion of a state graph.
Before the equilibrium state diagram is proposed, however, it is important to note that, unlike for
the previous underlying graph structures considered both by Burger et al. [10, 11] and Van der
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
80 Chapter 6. The ESPD on a toroidal grid graph
Merwe [72], each component of the state graph of the ESPD with a toroidal grid as underlying
graph is no longer necessarily a rooted-pseudo tree. As there may potentially be no root, the
game does not necessarily tend towards a steady state.
To elucidate the statement above, consider the neighbourhood topology of each player, as shown
in Figure 6.2, for an ESPD with the toroidal grid Cn×Cm as underlying graph. There are cases
of the ensuing game dynamics in which a defector adopts the strategy of cooperation at a later
stage of the game. An example of such a case is illustrated in Figure 6.4. Player 3, adopting
the strategy of cooperation, receives the payoff value c3, while player 6, adopting the strategy
of defection, receives the payoff value d1. For all parameter regions of the phase plane, except
F, G, J and K, it holds that c3 > d1. Therefore, the defecting player will adopt the strategy
of cooperation during the next round of the game in the case of the remaining phase plane
regions, demonstrating that a defector does not always persist with its strategy as the game
progresses. Hence it is potentially possible that a defector adopts the strategy of cooperation
and then later readopts the strategy of defection in a subsequent round of the game. When
such a case of evolutionary oscillation occurs, there is a possibility that the long-term game
dynamics may result in alternative long-term attracting state structure, such as a transient
steady state or a limit cycle. Hence, the game dynamics do not necessarily tend towards a
static steady state. The components of a state graph can, therefore, potentially contain cycles
(which are prohibited in a rooted-pseudo forest state graph structure). Formal definitions of
the aforementioned types of alternative “equilibrium” states are provided in the next section.
Although the above phenomenon potentially holds for all toroidal grids, the state graphs of the
ESPD with very small toroidal grids as underlying graphs (i.e. C1 × Cn where n = 1, . . . , 6,
C2 × C2, C2 × C3, C2 × C4, C2 × C5 and C3 × C3) which have already been considered in the
literature, do not admit any limit cycles. An important problem considered in this chapter is
therefore to find the smallest underlying toroidal grid dimensions for which the state graph of
the ESPD exhibits a limit cycle.
The visualisation tool proposed in this thesis by which to summarise the dynamics of the ESPD
for larger underlying toroidal grids should facilitate, to some extent, both the notion of com-
binatorial explosion and the various possible types of equilibrium states that may occur in the
game dynamics.
Figure 6.4: A case in which it is possible that the strategy of cooperation is adopted later by a
defecting player when the ESPD is played on a toroidal grid within parameter region A in the phase
plane of Figure 6.3. Black nodes represent players adopting the strategy of cooperation, while white
nodes represent players adopting the strategy of defection.
6.3.2 The various equilibrium states defined
As mentioned in §3.2, an equilibrium state of the ESPD should be understood in the context
of a Nash Equilibrium. The reader is reminded that this is the case when there is no mutant
strategy that any member of the population can adopt that will result in a larger reproductive
fitness value. In the context of a state graph component, an equilibrium state is therefore the
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root of the corresponding pseudotree. An equilibrium state can either be a static steady state,
a transient steady state or a limit cycle:
A static steady state is an evolutionary unvarying state in which all members of the popula-
tion persist with their current strategy indefinitely (i.e. the game state remains constant
for all subsequent rounds of the game).
A transient steady state is a set of evolutionary varying states between which the game
varies in an cyclic fashion indefinitely. Furthermore, these states have the property that
each game state in the cycle is automorphic to the previous game state. Therefore, each
game state contained within the transient steady state forms part of the same automor-
phism class. The number of game states within a full period of oscillation is known as the
length of the transient steady state.
A limit cycle is also a set of evolutionary varying states between which the state of the game
varies in an cyclic fashion indefinitely, but in which at least two game states are not
members of the same automorphism class. The number of game states in a full period of
oscillation is again called the length of the limit cycle.
Both static and transient steady states are represented in the state graph as a vertex that is
adjacent to itself. Because each vertex within the state graph represents an automorphism class,
oscillation between members of a class cannot be accommodated in the state graph (that is, the
state graph representation does not allow for a distinction between static and transient steady
states). A limit cycle can, however, be represented in the state graph as a cycle of length at
least two.
6.3.3 The equilibrium state diagram explained
The deficiency of the state graph representation in terms of being unable to distinguish between
static and transient steady states of the ESPD mentioned above, as well as the exponential
increase in game automorphism classes as the underlying grid dimensions increase, calls for a
new visualisation mechanism for summarising the game dynamics of the game succinctly, which
is effective even for relatively large instances of the underlying graph.
The notion of an equilibrium state diagram is proposed here for this purpose. This diagram
represents each component in the state graph by its equilibrium state only. Each automorphism
class is furthermore still represented by its class representative. The game state with the smallest
lexicographical order within such a class is taken as the class representative. All three types
of equilibrium states described in §6.3.2 are representable in the equilibrium state diagram, as
illustrated in Figure 6.5. In order to convey the same information as can be found in the state
graph, various labels are included in the diagram. These labels are also elucidated in the figure.
In the equilibrium state diagram, each state is labelled by a numerical value denoted by a in
Figure 6.5. The conversion from a graphical game state representation to its numerical label
equivalent is described later. The label denoted by b in the figure represents the weight of the
game state (i.e. the number of cooperators present within the state). The label denoted by c in
Figure 6.5 furthermore represents the number of distinct states within the automorphism class
of the equilibrium state, while the number of distinct initial states that evolve to the particular
equilibrium state is represented by a label denoted d. The length of a transient steady state or
limit cycle is finally denoted by the parameter L and its value is given by e in Figure 6.5(b)–(c).
The convention is adopted that the first state of a limit cycle given in the equilibrium state
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Figure 6.5: Equilibrium state diagram representation of the various equilibrium game states. (a) A
static steady state, (b) a transient steady state and (c) a limit cycle.
diagram is the state of the cycle with the largest weight (the actual state displayed is once again
the automorphism class representative). The remaining states of the cycle are given in the order
in which they would appear if subsequent rounds of the game were to be played. Note that
the latter states are therefore not necessarily the representatives of their various automorphism
classes.
Figure 6.6(a) contains an illustration of how the all-defector steady state component of the
ESPD with the toroidal grid C3 × C3 as underlying graph would be represented in the state
graph, while the same information is contained in the equilibrium state diagram representation
in Figure 6.6(b), both for parameter region A of the phase plane in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.6: Representation of the state graph component containing the all-defector steady state for
the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph in parameter region A of the phase plane in Figure 6.3.
Black cells represent players adopting the strategy of cooperation, while white cells represent players
adopting the strategy of defection. (a) State graph representation and (b) Equilibrium state diagram
representation.
6.4 Computer-aided equilibrium state diagram generation
It is evident that computer aid is required in order to analyse the game dynamics of the ESPD,
even for relatively small underlying toroidal grid graphs. The methods required for analysing
ESPD game dynamics with toroidal grid graphs as underlying graphs is elaborated upon in this
section. The analysis is divided into two main steps. First, the various distinct game states have
to be organised into automorphism classes and their class representatives have to be found. The
computer implementation of this step involves two algorithms, an explicit generation algorithm
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.4. Computer-aided equilibrium state diagram generation 83
and an improved implicit algorithm which reduces the computational expense of this analysis
step. The second step entails identifying the various equilibrium states among the automorphism
class representatives, when considered as initial game states. An algorithm is also proposed for
this purpose in order to reduce the computational expense of this step. Finally, the results
of the previous two steps are used to construct equilibrium state diagrams. All of the above
algorithms are provided in pseudocode form and described in this section, which also contains
a performance review of the various algorithmic implementations.
6.4.1 Encoding an ESPD game instance
In order to perform calculations that allow for the identification of equivalence classes and their
associated class representatives, a means of representing or encoding game states is required.
The following method for encoding a game state is adopted throughout this chapter.
Each player is able to adopt the strategy of either defection or cooperation. These two strategies
may be represented by means of binary values. The binary values 0 and 1 are assigned to
the strategies of defection and cooperation, respectively. As the game is played on an n × m
toroidal grid, a given state can be represented as an n × m binary array, as demonstrated in
Figure 6.7(a)–(c). This state encoding convention facilitates the required calculations in the
analysis of the ESPD game dynamics. It also permits natural visualisation of a state due to the
similar dimensions of the array representation in Figure 6.7(c) and its corresponding state in
Figure 6.7(a), coupled with the simple mapping between the two strategies and their equivalent
binary values.
Figure 6.7: The steps used to represent a graphical state as an array or integer value. (a) A graphical
game state, (b)–(c) its representative binary array, and (d) the concatenated bit string with its equivalent
integer value.
In order to minimise computer memory requirements and facilitate timeous identification of
game class representatives, a more efficient encoding method is, however, required for storing
and comparing states within an equivalence class. For these purposes, each state is further
represented by a binary value. This is achieved by concatenating the binary array into a bit
string. The length of this bit string depends on the dimensions of the underlying grid graph.
For instance, a 4 × 4 toroidal grid graph requires a bit string of 4 × 4 = 16 bits to represent a
state. The bit string is then converted to a decimal value using the well-known binary to decimal
conversion method. The resulting binary value, together with its decimal equivalent, is shown
in Figure 6.7(d). This further state encoding step allows for each state to be associated with a
unique numerical value which is used to label the state within the equilibrium state diagram.
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6.4.2 The identification of automorphism class representatives
In order to identify all automorphism class representatives, the automorphism class associated
with each game state has to be generated and its class representative identified. The generation of
all the states in an automorphism class of a particular game state involves applying permutations
of the symmetry group of the underlying toroidal grid graph to the game state in question.
Consider the symmetry group G = {ι, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, µ1, µ2, δ1, δ2} of a square. Recall, from §2.2.2,
that this symmetry group is a dihedral group. It therefore has the property that the various
combinations of any two permutations within the group yields all the elements of the group.
This property can be combined with the transformation of a toroidal grid along the x- and
y-axis of a Cartesian grid representation by a unit value z ∈ {1, . . . , n} in order to generate
all the states in the automorphism class of a given game state. This principle is employed in
Algorithm 6.1 to generate the automorphism class of each state of the ESPD with the toroidal
grid Cn × Cn as underlying graph.
The algorithm starts by constructing the automorphism class of each game state represented by
a binary value in the integer range {2n2−1, . . . , 2n2−1}. In the case of a 4×4 toroidal grid, for ex-
ample, these game state values are the sequence {1000 0000 0000 0000, . . . , 1111 1111 1111 1111}
(in binary form). As only the states represented by binary numbers starting with a 1 are con-
sidered, the search space is halved. As the class representatives are those with the smallest
lexicographical order and therefore have the largest decimal values within their automorphism
classes, all automorphism class leaders are represented within this reduced search space. The
only exception is the all-defector state, which is therefore added to the list of class representa-
tives at the end of the algorithm. Once each automorphism class has been generated by the
algorithm, all values in such a class other than the class representative are removed from the
list of states. This process prevents duplicate generation of automorphism classes, because the
algorithm considers states in increasing lexicographical order. The output of the algorithm is
a list of all the automorphism class representatives. As the search space is reduced and no un-
necessary automorphism class generation takes place, the computational time of the algorithm
is reduced significantly. All states are also stored in decimal representation form in order to
minimise memory requirements.
Algorithm 6.1 is sufficient for the ESPD game dynamics analysis on an n × m toroidal grid
where n ≤ 3. Thereafter, the number of states becomes so large that the algorithm is no
longer a practical means for automorphism class representative generation. An implicit search
algorithm is therefore proposed for toroidal grids of larger dimensions. This search algorithm
employs a tree structure to generate automorphism class representatives. More specifically,
the search algorithm generates a tree in which each vertex represents an automorphism class
representative. Each level of the tree represents the subset of automorphism class representatives
of weight equal to the level in the tree. The algorithm is therefore able to utilise the previously
determined automorphism class representatives (of a lower weight) in order to generate the
automorphism class representatives of a particular weight. The algorithm is given in pseudocode
form as Algorithm 6.2.
The search process starts in Step 1 of Algorithm 6.2, in which an all-defector game state is
constructed and initialised as the root of the search tree. Each subset of automorphism class
representatives of a certain weight (and hence within the same level in the search tree generated)
is stored in a separate archive. Thus, the root node in level 0 of the tree is stored in archive 0. In
Step 3, the algorithm then moves to the next level in the tree. Each leaf present in the previous
level of the tree is then considered individually, as specified in Step 4. Steps 5 and 6 ensure
that no terminated branch is visited. A branch is terminated if the last element in its array
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Algorithm 6.1: Explicit generation of class representatives
Input : Dimensions of the underlying toroidal grid graph n.
Output: The set of automorphism class representatives.
Automorphism class representatives set ← [2n2 − 1, 2n2 − 2, . . . , 2n2−1 − 1, 2n2−1];1
domain ← {1, 2, . . . , n− 1, n};2
i ← 1;3
if i ≤ the length of Automorphism class representatives set then4
original state ← ith element of Automorphism class representatives set;5
Convert original state into array form;6
j ← 0;7
k ← 0;8
for j ← all elements in domain do9
new state ← Translate original state to the left by j units;10
for k ← all elements in domain do11
new state ← Translate new state upwards by j units;12
Add new state to Equivalence classes;13
count ← 0;14
repeat15
new state ← Rotate new state by 90;16
if new state is not an element in Equivalence class set then17
Add new state to Equivalence class;18
new state ← Reflect new state about y = 0;19
if new state is not an element in Equivalence class set then20
Add new state to Equivalence class;21
count← count+1;22
until count=4 ;23
Convert all elements in Equivalence class to decimal form;24
for all elements in Equivalence class < original state do25
Delete element from Automorphism class representatives set;26
i← i+ 1;27
Add 0 to Automorphism class representatives set;28
representation corresponds to the strategy of cooperation. This ensures that all possible weights
of the branch have already been considered. Steps 7–18 allow for the successive adoption of the
strategy of cooperation for each player present within the ESPD following the last player within
the current array who adopts the strategy of cooperation. In each case, an additional player
of the game is assigned the strategy of cooperation. All states successively generated therefore
correspond to a relative weight increase of 1. For each successive state thus generated, a test
is performed to determine whether the state is automorphic to any other state already present
in the current level of the tree. This is achieved by first following the process in Steps 9–23 of
Algorithm 6.1 in order to generate a state’s equivalence class. If the numerical representation
of any state within its equivalence class is larger than the state being considered, it is not a
class representative and the next state is considered. If, however, a state achieves the largest
numerical representation, it is compared with the other states in the same level of the tree to
ensure that the state has not been considered before. If it is found that the state has indeed been
considered before, the next state is considered. Otherwise, the state is included in the archive of
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Algorithm 6.2: Implicit generation of class representatives
Input : Dimensions of the underlying toroidal grid graph n.
Output: The set of automorphism class representatives.
Construct a n-square zero matrix and add to archive 0;1
x← 1;2
for each level x < n
2
2 do3
for each array in archive x− 1 do4
if n2
th
element in array = 1 then5
break;6
else7
current position ← the position of the last element in array with value 1;8
i = current position +1;9
for i ≤ n2 do10
new array ← array;11
ith element in new array ← 1;12
Check if new array is automorphic to any state within archive x;13
if new array is automorphic then14
break;15
else16
Add new array to archive x;17
i← i+ 1;18
x← x+ 1;19
states for the particular level of the search tree. When each leaf in the previous level of the tree
has thus been considered, the next level of the tree is considered and the process is repeated.
If level bn22 c is reached, the algorithm terminates, because of the inverse property of the ESPD
with a toroidal grid as underlying graph where the automorphism class representatives of weight
x are equivalent to the inverses of the automorphism class representatives of weight n2 − x. A
large portion of the search space therefore does not have to be considered.
The class representative tree for the ESPD with the toroidal grid C3×C3 as underlying graph is
shown as an example in Figure 6.8. As may be seen in the figure, each level of the tree partitions
the automorphism class representative set into the various subsets according to the state weights,
as indicated by the values of w. The tree contains 13 nodes, which is indeed half the number of
equivalence classes previously enumerated by Van der Merwe [72]. The reduction in search space
may be noted as only 42 state automorphism classes are compared in Algorithm 6.2, whereas
255 states are considered in Algorithm 6.1. This translates to a significant reduction in the
required computation time associated with automorphism class representative generation.
6.4.3 The identification of ESPD equilibrium states
Once all the automorphism class representatives have been found, as discussed in §6.4.2, the
game dynamics associated with each class representative has to be investigated and the various
equilibrium states thus reached, identified. The results of this investigation can then be used to
construct the equilibrium state diagram of the game. In order to identify the various equilibrium
states in a computationally inexpensive manner, the search space is further reduced so as to avoid
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.4. Computer-aided equilibrium state diagram generation 87
Figure 6.8: Automorphism class representative tree for the ESPD with a C3×C3 as underlying graph,
constructed by Algorithm 6.2.
consideration of unnecessary automorphism class representatives. The portion of the search
space thus removed is presented in pseudocode form in Algorithm 6.3 and is described in this
section.
If a game state has weight 1, then the state consists of one cooperator and all other players adopt
the strategy of defection. Regardless of the spatial position of the cooperator in the underlying
toroidal grid graph, it will always contain four defectors in its neighbourhood. Therefore, as
c0 < di for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, the cooperator will always adopt the strategy of defection during
the next round of the game, while each defector in the cooperator’s neighbourhood will persist
with their strategy of defection. Since all initial states with weight 1 will lead to the all-defector
steady state, such states do not have to be considered as possible initial states in game dynamics
analysis investigation of Algorithm 6.3.
Consider next the case where the initial state of a game has weight two. If the cooperators are
positioned on the underlying toroidal grid so that they are not adjacent, then (using the same
argument as for an initial state of weight 1) it follows that the state will lead to the all-defector
steady state. If, on the other hand, the two cooperators are adjacent in the underlying graph, as
illustrated in Figure 6.9, each cooperator receives the pay-off value c1 and each defector within
the combined open neighbourhood of the two cooperators receives the pay-off value d1. Since
d1 > c1, all players in the cooperators’ closed neighbourhoods will therefore adopt the strategy
of defection during the next round of the game. Hence, regardless of the dimensions of the
underlying toroidal grid graph, no automorphism classes of weight 1 or 2 have to be considered
in Algorithm 6.3.
The remaining equivalence classes all have to be investigated in order to determine the various
equilibrium states. It is computationally expensive to simulate the outcome of a number of
rounds of the game until an equilibrium state is reached for any specified initial state and record
the unique equilibrium states found. Algorithm 6.3 is consequently used to reduce the number of
states that require a full game dynamic investigation. The algorithm identifies all static steady
states and generates an archive of potential transient steady states or limit cycles that require
a full game dynamic investigation.
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Figure 6.9: The closed neighbourhood of two neighbouring cooperators of an ESPD state of weight 2
with a toroidal grid as underlying graph. The black nodes represent cooperating players, while the white
nodes represent defecting players.
Algorithm 6.3: Initial identification of equilibrium states
Input : Dimensions of the underlying toroidal grid graph n, the feasible region in which
the game is to investigated and the pruned automorphism class representatives
set, Class representatives.
Output: A set of all static steady states, static steady states and an archive of potential
transient steady states or limit cycles, archive.
for each state within the Class representatives set do1
new state ← one round of the ESPD is played on the current state;2
if new state = current state then3
Add new state to static steady states set;4
weight 1 ← current state’s weight;5
weight 2 ← new state’s weight;6
if weight 2 ≥ weight 1 then7
Add new state to archive;8
The first steps in Algorithm 6.3 simulate a single round of the ESPD for each of the automor-
phism class representatives (with a weight greater than 2) as initial state. A single game round
consists of both the playing phase and the updating phase according to the game dynamics de-
scribed in §4.2. The newly generated game state is compared with the initial state in Steps 3–8.
If the states are equivalent, the initial state is a static steady state and is therefore added to the
set of static steady states. In order to identify the other types of equilibrium states, it should be
noted that the weight of a transient steady state remains constant over the various game rounds,
while for a limit cycle the weight of the game state can change as the game progresses. These
properties of transient steady states and limit cycles can be used to facilitate a further reduction
of the search space to be investigated. For this reason, the algorithm also compares the weights
of the initial and newly generated states in the case of non-equivalent state pairs. If the weight
of the state remains constant over a round of the game, the state can potentially be a transient
steady state or a limit cycle. Such states are stored in an archive for further investigation. If the
weight of the state increases, the state can potentially be a limit cycle. Hence, such states are
also added to the algorithm’s archive. The cases in which the weight of the game state decreases
do not have to be considered because in these cases the game state will evolve to one of the
game states that have already been considered.
The archive of states produced by Algorithm 6.3 therefore has to be investigated for all rounds
of the game until an equilibrium state is reached. Since a reduced number of states have to be
investigated for all rounds of the game, however, a significant reduction in the computational
expense of identifying the equilibrium states is achieved. In the full game dynamic investigation,
on the other hand, if a static steady state is reached it need not be recorded as all static steady
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states have already been found. In this case, only transient steady states and limit cycles
are recorded and classified. The aforementioned analyses are, of course, carried out for each
parameter region of the phase plane separately. The set of static steady states, transient steady
states and limit cycles thus found can then be used in constructing the equilibrium state diagrams
corresponding to the various parameter regions.
6.4.4 Relative performance of algorithms
The algorithms described in the previous two sections were all implemented in Wolfram’s Math-
ematica 11.0 [78] in order to construct equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with small
toroidal grids as underlying graphs. The time and memory requirements associated with the
identification of automorphism class representatives, as well as equilibrium states, are provided
in Table 6.3. The computation times were measured on an Intel i7-4770 CPU running at 3.4GHz
with 8GB RAM within a 64-bit Windows 7 operating system.
Table 6.3: The time and memory requirements associated with the implementation of Algorithms
6.1–6.3.
Algorithm 6.1 Algorithm 6.2 Algorithm 6.3
CPU
time
(hh:mm:ss)
Memory
(GB)
CPU
time
(hh:mm:ss)
Memory
(GB)
CPU
time
(hh:mm:ss)
Memory
(GB)
C2 × C6 00:01:07 0.131 00:00:49 0.125 00:00:49 0.126
C3 × C3 00:00:02 0.120 00:00:02 0.119 00:00:01 0.120
C3 × C4 00:00:34 0.121 00:00:26 0.120 00:00:15 0.121
C3 × C5 00:01:06 0.123 00:00:47 0.121 00:00:36 0.122
C3 × C6 00:08:43 0.142 00:02:24 0.128 00:01:58 0.128
C4 × C4 00:00:58 0.146 00:00:42 0.143
C4 × C5 00:20:26 0.230 00:05:38 0.168
C4 × C6 05:33:04 0.841 00:22:50 0.424
C5 × C5 22:54:05 2.037 02:47:57 1.188
C5 × C6 58:16:24 6.145 06:22:12 2.356
C6 × C6 346:24:35 16.532 18:06:19 5.425
As shown in Table 6.3, Algorithm 6.2 reduces both the computation time and memory re-
quirements compared to Algorithm 6.1. As the size of the underlying graph increases, a more
significant improvement is observed. Algorithm 6.1 was only run for grids of dimensions at most
C3 × C6.
Note that the computer memory requirements of Algorithm 6.2 for the case associated with the
C6×C6 grid as underlying graph is larger than the available computer’s RAM. Therefore, a par-
allel computing approach was adopted for this case. More specifically, this entailed partitioning
the state space into subsets and running Algorithm 6.2 for each subset on various computers and
then rerunning the algorithm with a combination of the reduced subsets as the starting state
space. The memory and computational times were calculated merely as a sum of these processes.
As a slightly different implementation approach was taken, the times and memory requirements
for this underlying grid, as shown in Table 6.3, should not be evaluated in comparison with the
other underlying toroidal grid graphs’ time and memory requirements contained in the table.
The algorithmic approach adopted was sufficient for the dimensions of the underlying toroidal
grids considered within the scope of this thesis. However, if the ESPD with larger toroidal grids
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as underlying graphs are to be investigated, the computational power and memory requirements
would become so large that this approach becomes infeasible (even if a low-level programming
language, such as C++, were to be used instead of Mathematica). In such a case, either a
massively parallel approach should be undertaken or else further pruning rules are required in
order to render this analytical approach tractable.
6.5 Analysis of the ESPD dynamics
The results of the long-time game dynamics of the ESPD are presented in this section for the
following eleven toroidal grids as underlying graphs: C2 × C6, C3 × C3, C3 × C4, C3 × C5,
C3 × C6, C4 × C4, C4 × C5, C4 × C6, C5 × C5, C5 × C6 and C6 × C6. The equilibrium state
diagrams in each case are first presented and the number of components in the corresponding
state graph enumerated for every region of the phase plane. This is followed by an analysis of
the probability of reaching a persistent pocket of cooperation from a prescribed initial state for
the various cases.
6.5.1 Equlibrium state analysis
Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph are shown in
Figure 6.10. Van der Merwe [72] has already constructed the state graph for a grid of dimension
3 × 3. His results were used to validate the results returned by the algorithms of §6.4.2 and
§6.4.3 employed to construct the equilibrium state diagrams in Figure 6.10. All the equilibrium
states identified within the equilibrium state diagrams of Figure 6.10 are static steady states.
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Figure 6.10: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3×C3 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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The full equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C2 × C6, C3 × C4, C3 × C5, C3 × C6,
C4 × C4, C4 × C5, C4 × C6, C5 × C5, C5 × C6 and C6 × C6 are listed in Appendix D. The
label d denoting the number of distinct initial states that evolve to the particular equilibrium
state is omitted in the case of the equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3 × C6,
C4×C5, C4×C6, C5×C5, C5×C6 and C6×C6 as underlying graphs. This is due to the excess
computation and memory required. In these cases the label d is only included for the all-defector
steady state, in order to facilitate computation of the probability of cooperation persisting.
It was found that the smallest toroidal grid graph exhibiting a transient steady state within its
equilibrium state diagram is the graph C3 × C4, while the smallest toroidal grid exhibiting a
limit cycle within its equilibrium state diagram is the graph C5 × C5. The longest limit cycle
found during the course of the analysis was of length six and is contained in the equilibrium
state diagram of the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph. All these equilibrium states are
shown in Figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11: (a) A transient steady state for the smallest underlying toroidal grid (C3×C4), (b) a limit
cycle for the smallest underlying toroidal grid (C5×C5) and (c) the longest limit cycle in the ESPD with
C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
Enumerations of the equilibrium states in each of the equilibrium state diagrams are shown in
Table 6.4. The relationships between the number of equilibrium states and the dimensions of
the underlying graph are also illustrated in Figures 6.12 and 6.13 for each of the parameter
regions in the phase plane of Figure 6.3. A weakly defined exponential relationship between
the number of equilibrium states and the dimensions of the underlying graph is observed for
parameter regions A, B, C, E, F, H and I in the phase plane.
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Figure 6.13: The number of equilibrium states in the equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with
the various small toroidal grids as underlying graphs for parameter regions G–K in the phase plane of
Figure 6.3.
6.5.2 The probability of persistent cooperation
Using the constructed equilibrium state diagrams, the probability that some form of cooperation
will persist from a randomly generated initial state of the ESPD with C2×C6, C3×C3, C3×C4,
C3×C5, C3×C6, C4×C4, C4×C5, C4×C6, C5×C5, C5×C6 and C6×C6 as underlying graphs
was determined. These probabilities are shown in Table 6.5 for each parameter region in the
phase plane of Figure 6.3. The relationships between the probability of cooperation persisting
and the dimensions of the underlying toroidal grid graph are illustrated in Figures 6.14 and
6.15. It can be seen in this figure that as the dimensions of the underlying toroidal grid graph
increase, so does the probability of cooperation persisting, except for parameter regions G, J
and K in which it decreases and is approximately zero.
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Figure 6.14: The probability that some form of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with the various
small toroidal grids as underlying graphs for parameter regions A–F in the phase plane.
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Figure 6.15: The probability that some form of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with the various
small toroidal grids as underlying graphs for parameter regions G–K in the phase plane.
In order to further analyse the ability of the small toroidal grid graphs to facilitate the persistence
of cooperation, the conditional probabilities that initial game states of specified weights will lead
to some form of persistent cooperation in the long run are investigated for each of the underlying
toroidal grid graphs.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Starting Weight
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
of
p
er
si
st
en
t
co
op
er
at
io
n
A
B
C
D
E/I
F/H
G/J/K
Figure 6.16: The conditional probability that, given an initial state with a certain weight, some form
of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with C3 × C3 as underlying graph for the various parameter
regions in the phase plane in Figure 6.3.
First, consider the ESPD with C3 ×C3 as underlying graph. The conditional probabilities that
initial game states of specified weights will lead to some form of persistent cooperation in the
long run are shown in Figure 6.16 for each parameter region of the phase plane of Figure 6.3.
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It is interesting to note the nonlinear relationship between the weight of the initial game state
(i.e. the number of cooperators initially present) and the probability of cooperation persisting
in the long run. If a maximum probability of cooperation is desired and the starting weight is
associated with a cost function, the varying graph gradients in the figure should be considered
carefully. For example, the decreasing gradient sections of the graphs (i.e. for a starting weight
of 8 in all regions of the phase plane or a starting weight of 5 for regions A, B and C) will
reduce the probability of cooperation with an increased cost. It may also be seen that for a
starting weight of 8 (i.e. the toroidal grid containing exactly one defector) no form of persistent
cooperation is possible for any region of the phase plane.
The conditional probabilities that initial game states of specified weights will lead to some form
of persistent cooperation in the long run are shown for each of the remaining underlying toroidal
grids in Figures 6.17 for the various parameter regions of the phase plane in Figure 6.3.
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(b) C3 × C4
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(c) C3 × C5
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(d) C3 × C6
Figure 6.17: The conditional probability that, given an initial state with a certain weight, some form
of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with C2 ×C6, C3 ×C4, C3 ×C5, C3 ×C6, C4 ×C4 and C4 ×C5
as underlying graphs. The legends correspond to the various parameter regions in the phase plane of
Figure 6.3.
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(f) C4 × C5
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(g) C4 × C6
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(h) C5 × C5
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Figure 6.17 (continued): The conditional probability that, given an initial state with a certain weight,
some form of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with C4 × C6, C5 × C5, C5 × C6 and C6 × C6
as underlying graphs. The legends correspond to the various parameter regions in the phase plane of
Figure 6.3.
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It can be seen in these figures that for parameter regions A, C, E and I as the dimensions of
the underlying toroidal grid increases, the probability that cooperation persists according to a
fixed weight of the initial state tends towards a linear relationship. For the remaining parameter
regions B, D, F, G, H and J, on the other hand, the probability that cooperation persists is
small if the grid starts with less than approximately 80% cooperators; thereafter the probability
rapidly increases towards certainty. This relationship also becomes more pronounced as the
dimensions of the underlying toroidal grid increases. It is perhaps surprising to note that the
relationship between the probability of cooperation persisting and the weight of the initial state,
for the most part, coincides for the pairs of parameter regions (B,D), (I,E), (F,H) and (G,J).
6.6 The persistence of cooperation in small toroidal grids
The collective ability of small toroidal grids (i.e. grids of dimensions Cn × Cm where n,m ∈
{1, . . . , 6} to allow for the emergence of persistent cooperation is shown in Figure 6.18 for each
of the parameter regions in the phase plane of Figure 6.3. The probabilities of cooperation
persisting for the toroidal grids C1 × Cm where m ∈ {1, . . . , 6} were obtained from the work of
Burger et al. [10] in which the probability of cooperation persisting for the ESPD with a cyclic
underlying topology (Cn w C1×Cn) was considered. Furthermore, the probability of cooperation
persisting for the ESPD with underlying graphs C2 × C2, C2 × C3, C2 × C4 and C2 × C5 were
calculated from the state graphs constructed by Van der Merwe [72]. The probabilities for the
remaining underlying toroidal grids were presented in Table 6.5 in §6.5. In Figure 6.18, only the
upper triangular half of each grid graph is shown. This is because the Cn × Cm toroidal grid is
isomorphic to the Cm×Cn toroidal grid, and so the bottom triangular half of each graph shown
in Figure 6.18 is symmetric to its upper triangular half.
Figure 6.18: The probability that some form of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with the toroidal
grid Cn ×Cm (where n ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}) as underlying graph for parameter regions A–D
in the phase plane of Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.18 (continued): The probability that some form of cooperation will persist for the ESPD with
the toroidal grid Cn × Cm (where n ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}) as underlying graph for parameter
regions A–D in the phase plane of Figure 6.3.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.7. Chapter summary 99
6.7 Chapter summary
Analytical means together with computer aid were employed in this chapter to investigate the
dynamics of the ESPD with small toroidal grids as underlying graphs.
In §6.1, the need of computer aid in the analysis was motivated due to the inherent combinatorial
explosion. The phase plane was then constructed in §6.2, in which eleven regions were identified
to induce different game dynamics. Because of the combinatorial complexity of the ensuing
analysis, a new analysis visualisation tool, called the equilibrium state diagram, was proposed in
§6.3 to replace the state graph for larger toroidal grid dimensions during analyses of the ESPD
game dynamics.
Various algorithms for the computation of the equilibrium state diagrams were proposed in §6.4.
An explicit algorithm and an implicit algorithm for the identification of automorphism class
leaders were proposed and their implementations discussed. The implicit algorithm achieved a
significant improvement in terms of both computational time and computer memory require-
ments over the explicit algorithm. A third algorithm for the identification of static steady states
and a reduction of the state space that requires full game investigation was also presented with
its associated computing time and memory performance evaluated.
The game dynamics for the ESPD with the underlying grid graphs C2 ×C6, C3 ×C3, C3 ×C4,
C3×C5, C3×C6, C4×C4, C4×C5, C4×C6, C5×C5, C5×C6 and C6×C6 were then investigated
in §6.3. First, the equilibrium state diagrams were computed for each of the underlying toroidal
grids and for all the parameter regions in the phase plane, employing the proposed algorithms.
The algorithms were validated against the C3×C3 equilibrium state diagram previously analysed
by Van der Merwe [72]. The enumeration of all the components of the equilibrium state diagrams
then followed for each parameter region. A weakly defined exponential increase in the number of
components in the equilibrium state diagram were identified as the dimensions of the underlying
graph increases. The likelihood of persistent cooperation emerging was also determined for
each toroidal grid. As the dimensions of the underlying graph increases, it was found that the
probability of persistent cooperation emerging also increased for all parameter regions of the
phase plane, except for G, J and K. The conditional probabilities that initial game states of
specified weights will lead to the emergence of persistent cooperation were also computed for
each of the underlying toroidal grid graphs. The chapter finally closed with a collective analysis
of the ability of small toroidal grid to facilitate the emergence of persistent cooperation in the
ESPD.
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Conclusion and future work
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This chapter comprises three sections. In the first section, a brief summary of the work contained
in the thesis is presented while in the second, an appraisal is offered of the contributions of the
thesis. The chapter then closes with a final section devoted to the documentation of possibilities
for related future work.
7.1 Thesis summary
The thesis opened in Chapter 1 with a brief background on the paradoxical nature of the
emergence of cooperation amongst egoistic individuals and the relevant theories that attempt to
explain its occurrence. It was explained that the general area of focus of the research conducted
in this thesis is the mathematical spatio-temporal analysis of cooperation in the context of games
on graphs according to the theory of network reciprocity. The general lack of a fundamental
understanding of the effect of the underlying spatial topology on the emergence of cooperation
was highlighted within this realm of research and this led to the problem statement of this thesis.
The thesis scope was delimited thereafter, with a focus on various assumptions made and the
choice of graph classes to be considered in the thesis as a result of the complexity of analysing
games on graphs in general. The chapter finally closed with the statement on the objectives
pursued in the thesis as well as a description of the organisation of material in the remainder of
the thesis.
Basic mathematical concepts underlying the work in this thesis were introduced in Chapter 2. In
§2.1, fundamental notions from graph theory were reviewed. This review included the concepts
of connectedness and graph isomorphism. Various types of graphs employed in the modelling
of games on graphs, were then reviewed with an emphasis on circulant and grid graphs — the
two graph structures considered in this thesis. The chapter closed in §2.2 with a brief review
of basic notions from group theory, focusing specifically on the Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma as an
enumerative combinatoric tool.
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A survey of the literature on topics related to game theory was conducted in Chapter 3. In §3.1,
basic concepts from classical game theory were reviewed based on the assumption that players
are perfectly rational and that this assumption is common knowledge to all players. This was
followed by a brief overview of the main historical developments within this field. A basic
mathematical framework and various accompanying definitions required for modelling games
were then recounted in §3.2. Various methods for classifying games, as well as their associated
solution concepts, were also presented. In §3.3, various well-known 2-person 2-strategy games
were reviewed from the literature on evolutionary game theory, focusing on the PD. The focus
of the chapter shifted in §3.4 from classical game theory to evolutionary game theory, a field
originating from the relaxation of various assumptions in classical game theory. The main
assumptions of evolutionary game theory are that players have bounded rationality, limited
knowledge of the game played, and are able to adapt and learn good strategies as a game
progresses. The chapter closed with a discussion on the literature related to evolutionary spatial
games with an emphasis on the various analysis techniques adopted (either analytical, numerical
or other less common approaches). Chapter 3 stands in fulfilment of Thesis Objective I.
A mathematical framework for representing the ESPD on relatively simple, small graphs was
presented in Chapter 4, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective II. In §4.1, an evolutionary spatial game
was represented as an ordered pair containing a set of pay-off parameters and an underlying
graph. The deterministic updating rule adopted for modelling the ESPD in this thesis was
also described in §4.2. The notion of an automorphism strategy class was introduced in which
all game states exhibit equivalent subsequent game dynamics. The utility of this notion was
explained as that it reduces the number of initial game states that have to be invested in a
full ESPD game dynamic analysis. Furthermore, the notion of a state graph was presented
as a visualisation tool for a full game dynamic analysis. In §4.4, a normalisation of the pay-off
values was proposed with the purpose of reducing the complexity of modelling the game without
changing the overall game dynamics. The construction of a parameter phase plane was finally
described in order to identify the various parameter value combinations that require independent
game analyses.
In Chapter 5, analytical means (void computer aid) were employed to determine how the exten-
sion of each player’s (cyclic) neighbourhood affects the likelihood of persistent cooperation when
players are arranged in a cyclic topology. The chapter opened with a brief background on the
analysis of the ESPD with a cycle as underlying graph, as found in the literature. The focus of
the chapter then shifted to an investigation of the game dynamics of the ESPD with the circulant
Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. In order to facilitate this analysis, the phase plane of the ESPD
with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph was first constructed in §5.3. Five parameter
regions were thus identified for which independent game dynamic analyses were required.
In §5.4, initial states that allow for the persistence of cooperation were then characterised for
each parameter region of the phase plane. This characterisation was utilised in combination with
the Cauchy-Frobenius Lemma to enumerate the equilibrium states of the game. It was found
that the number of equilibrium states increases exponentially as the order of the underlying
graph increases. The state graph of the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
was found to be a rooted pseudo-forest for three of the phase plane parameter regions. For
each of these parameter regions the number of components in the state graph was shown to be
equivalent to the number of equilibrium states. The characterisation and enumeration of the
equilibrium states were then employed to compute the probability of cooperation persisting. It
was found, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective III, that the likelihood of cooperation persisting
tends towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph increases. The game dynamics of
the ESPD with a cycle as underlying graph was finally compared with that of an ESPD with
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the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective IV. It was found
that as each player extends its neighbourhood, the number of equilibrium states, as well as the
probability of the emergence of persistent cooperation, decreases.
The dynamics of instances of the ESPD with small toroidal grids as underlying graphs was
investigated by analytical means (together with computer aid) in Chapter 6. The chapter
opened with a motivation for the requirement of computer aid in the analysis: The inherent
combinatorial explosion in the analysis as a result of an exponential increases in the initial game
state space as the dimensions of the underlying graph increase rendered the previous analytical
approach (void computer aid), adopted in Chapter 5, infeasible. In §6.2, the phase plane for the
ESPD on a toroidal grid was constructed and eleven parameter regions were identified for which
game dynamics had to be investigated independently. Because of the increased size of the state
space (and hence an increased number of automorphism class representatives) the state graph
was shown no longer to be a practical game dynamic analysis visualisation tool for all but the
tiniest toroidal grids. The notion of an equilibrium state diagram was therefore proposed for the
analysis of the ESPD with larger toroidal grids as underlying graphs in §6.3. The state graph
of a grid cannot be classified as a rooted pseudo-forest for all the possible phase plane regions
of the ESPD with a toroidal grid as underlying graph, it was demonstrated that three types of
equilibrium states can emerge instead, namely a static steady state, a transient steady state and
a limit cycle.
In §6.4, three algorithmic approaches towards constructing the equilibrium state diagram were
put forward. In order to identify the automorphism class representatives, both an explicit and
an implicit algorithm were proposed, together with appropriate pruning rules for reducing the
initial game state space. The implicit algorithm demonstrated an ability to reduce both the
computation and memory requirements significantly when compared to the explicit algorithm.
A final algorithm was proposed for identifying all the static steady states by creating an archive
of game instances that required further full game dynamic investigation.
In §6.5, the aforementioned algorithms were used to compute equilibrium state diagrams for the
ESPD with the eleven toroidal grids C2 × C6, C3 × C4, C3 × C5, C3 × C6, C4 × C4, C4 × C5,
C4 × C6, C5 × C5, C5 × C6 and C6 × C6 as underlying graphs. The equilibrium state diagrams
were then used to enumerate the components in the corresponding state graphs. It was found
that as the dimensions of the underlying grid increases, the number of components in the state
graph also increases according to a weakly-defined exponential relationship. The grid C3 × C4
was identified as the smallest toroidal grid capable of bringing forth an ESPD transient steady
state in its equilibrium state diagrams, while the grid C5 × C5 is the smallest toroidal grid
capable of producing a limit cycle within its ESPD equilibrium state diagrams.
The probability of cooperation persisting in each of the underlying toroidal grids was also com-
puted, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective V. It was found that as the dimensions of the underlying
grid increases, the probability of cooperation persisting also increases. For each underlying spa-
tial topology, the relationship between the weight of the initial state and the probability of
cooperation persisting was also investigated. It was found that in four parameter regions of the
phase plane the relationship between the weight of the initial state and the probability of cooper-
ation persisting tends towards a linear relationship as the dimensions of the underlying toroidal
grid increases. For the remaining six parameter regions, on the other hand, the probability
that cooperation persists was found to be small if the game instance started with fewer than
approximately 80% cooperators; thereafter the probability rapidly increased towards certainty.
The chapter finally closed in §6.6 with an appraisal of the collective ability of toroidal grids of
dimensions at most 6× 6 facilitating the emergence of persistent cooperation in the ESPD.
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7.2 Appraisal of thesis contributions
This section contains a brief appraisal of the five contributions of this thesis to the field of
evolutionary spatial game theory.
Contribution 1 An asymptotic analysis of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph
The phase plane was constructed for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. Five param-
eter regions were identified which required independent game dynamic analyses. The structures
of the initial states that lead to equilibrium states which contain some form of persistent coop-
eration were characterised. An analytic approach (void computer aid) was adopted in order to
enumerate the automorphism classes of these equilibrium states and to determine the likelihood
that a random initial state will result in an equilibrium state accommodating some form of
persistent cooperation.
Contribution 2 Introduction of the notion of an equilibrium state diagram as a new
visualisation tool for the analysis of ESPD game dynamics
A new game dynamic analysis visualisation tool, called an equilibrium state diagram, was pro-
posed to replace the earlier notion in the literature of a state graph during analyses of ESPD
game dynamics with larger underlying graphs. As the dimensions of the underlying graph of
the ESPD increases, so too does the number of automorphism class leaders (at an exponential
rate, in fact). Therefore, the state graph becomes so large, even for moderately sized underlying
graphs of the ESPD, that it is no longer a feasible form of steady state representation. The
equilibrium state diagram conveys the same information required for game dynamic investiga-
tions as the state graph, but in a much more compact form. Furthermore, the equilibrium state
diagram allows for the classification of static steady states, transient steady states and limit
cycles, which is not possible when adopting the state graph as an analysis tool.
Contribution 3 An asymptotic analysis of the ESPD with a small toroidal grid as un-
derlying graph
The complete set of equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with the toroidal grids C2 × C6,
C3×C4, C3×C5, C3×C6, C4×C4, C4×C5, C4×C6, C5×C5, C5×C6 and C6×C6 as underlying
graphs was constructed. The algorithms designed for the construction of these equilibrium state
diagrams are, however, limited to analyses of the ESPD with small toroidal grids as underlying
graphs. As the dimensions of the underlying grid increases, so too do the computational time
and memory requirements — so much so that the approach becomes intractable for toroidal grids
of dimensions larger than 6× 6. For this reason, a documentation of the number of states that
lead to each specific equilibrium state within the equilibrium state diagram was also omitted for
toroidal grids of dimensions larger than 4× 4.
Contribution 4 An investigation into the relationship between the amount of cooperation
in an initial game state and the probability of cooperation persisting in the ESPD with a
toroidal grid as underlying graph
The probability that an initial game state with a specified weight will lead to an equilibrium state
that accommodates some form of cooperation was computed for the ESPD with the toroidal
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grids C2×C6, C3×C3, C3×C4, C3×C5, C3×C6, C4×C4, C4×C5, C4×C6, C5×C5, C5×C6
and C6 × C6 as underlying graphs.
Contribution 5 Identification of the smallest underlying toroidal grid that gives rise to
a transient steady state or a limit cycle
The graph C3 × C4 was identified as the smallest underlying toroidal grid of the ESPD that
exhibits a transient steady state in its equilibrium state diagrams. In a similar vein, the graph
C5 × C5 was identified as the smallest underlying toroidal grid of the ESPD that exhibits a
limited cycle in its equilibrium state diagrams.
7.3 Ideas for future work
In this final section, five suggestions are made for possible avenues of future research, building
on the work presented in this thesis, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective VI.
Analysis of the ESPD with C2 × Cn as underlying graph
A similar analytic approach (without computer aid) as adopted in the game dynamic analysis
of the ESPD with a circulant as underlying graph may be adopted to determine the probability
of persistent cooperation emerging on the underlying toroidal grid C2 × Cn. The phase plane
for this underlying spatial topology is equivalent to the phase plane constructed for toroidal
grids in this thesis. Each of the eleven parameter regions therefore requires an independent
game dynamic analysis. First, the characteristics of the steady states are to be ascertained by
determining which structures allow for pockets of cooperation to persist to the next round of
the game. These characterisations can then be used to enumerate the states that contain such
structures. In this way, the probability of persistent cooperation emerging on the toroidal grid
C2×Cn can be computed. The results of such an analysis may be compared with those obtained
during the neighbourhood underlying spatial topology extension analysis from the cycle Cn to
the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 conducted in Chapter 5. In this manner, the effect of each player extending
its neighbourhood from size two to three or four, when arranged in a cyclic topology, can be
compared and the relationship between the sizes of the neighbourhoods further investigated.
The ESPD with larger grids and small-world networks as underlying graphs
It would be interesting to extend the analysis of Chapter 6 to include larger toroidal grids
in order to determine whether the observed relationship between the emergence of persistent
cooperation and the size of the underlying grid continues to manifest itself. It would also be
interesting to continue the analysis of the relationship between the level of cooperation present
in the initial game state and the probability of cooperation eventually persisting for the various
parameter regions of the phase plane in the case of larger toroidal grid. Such research would
shed light on whether or not the linear relationship observed for small grids between the weight
of the initial game state and the probability of persistent cooperation emerging in the cases of
parameter regions A, C, E and I of the phase plane continues or is an artefact of only considering
small toroidal grids. In order to carry out such an analysis, however, it is anticipated that a
computer simulation approach will be required, because the state space of the initial game states
will quickly grow very large.
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A natural extension of the work in Chapter 5 would be to continue increasing the neighbourhood
sizes of the various players arranged in a cyclic topology. This would involve analysing the
game dynamics of the ESPD on circulants with various connection sets of increasing sizes. As
the size of the connection set increases, however, the size of the initial state space increases
exponentially. Furthermore, as the connection set of the circulant increases in size, the analysis
is complicated considerably by the emergence of additional symmetries. Hence, an analytical
approach is no longer expected to be feasible (i.e. a simulation approach is advised for such an
extended analysis). As a circulant structure can be used to generate a small-world network,
the relationship between the average player neighbourhood size and the emergence of persistent
cooperation in the context of a small-world network may also be investigated.
Fraction of cooperation present in the equilibrium state
A further area of interest is not only to investigate the probability of any form of cooperation
persisting, but also to quantify the amount of cooperation present in the equilibrium states. In
this thesis, only the level of cooperation present in an initial game state and how this affected
the emergence of any form of persistent cooperation were considered. This scope of investigation
may be extended to include variation in the level of cooperation present in game states as the
game progresses and, finally, the level of cooperation present in the resulting equilibrium state.
In this way, the growth and decline of the degree of cooperation within an ESPD game state can
be investigated over time. Patterns of cluster growth similar to those investigated in Conway’s
game of life [7] (such as periodic blinkers and gliders) were observed in the game dynamics of
instances of the ESPD with a toroidal grid as underlying graph, and this may be of interest
when studying the possible dynamics of clusters of cooperators. Potential patterns and cluster
shapes can be identified in initial game states in order to predict the level of cooperation that
will be present in the corresponding equilibrium states.
The global shipping network and the spread of invasive species
The ESPD model may be applied in a real-world case study. An example of such an application
area may be found in the problem of biofouling within the global shipping network. Kaluza et
al. [33] investigated the relationship between economic growth, cargo trade and invasive species
in this context and showed that the spread of invasive species incurred large economic costs to
the countries where they established themselves. They demonstrated that the spread of invasive
species is largely enhanced by cargo trade. In order to understand the relationship between
these three factors, the authors investigated the structure of the international shipping network
and the movement of vessels within this network, as well as their facilitation of bio-invasion.
The global shipping network considered within their work is shown in Figure 7.1.
In order to prevent the spread of invasive species, the hulls of cargo ships are required to be
scraped so as to prevent biofouling. This processes has to occur at the port of origin in order to
prevent bio-invasion at the port of destination. Therefore, the cost of screening and cleaning the
vessels fall to the exporter, while the direct benefit of this process is enjoyed by the importer.
This situation is reminiscent of the type of player interaction in the PD within the context of
the ESPD. Each port can be seen as a player in this context, with the global shipping network,
illustrated in Figure 7.1, as underlying graph. The cost-benefit relationship of screening and
cleaning export vessels can be translated into the ESPD pay-off matrix. Modelling this problem
as an ESPD instance gives rise to the interesting research question: Can a sustainable invasive
biological control programme emerge among some cluster of countries in the form of persistent
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Figure 7.1: The global shipping network showing the routes travelled by large cargo ships (larger
than 10 000 GT) between the largest 300 ports globally. The colour scale indicates the number of ships
travelling along each route, which is directly proportional to the associated bio-invasion probability [33].
cooperation? The major obstacle of this research endeavour may be the accessibility of the
required data. Currently, the data related to Figure 7.1 have to be purchased according to
Kaluza et al. [33].
Variations on the ESPD
As described in §3.3, there are many versions of 2-player 2-strategy evolutionary spatial games
in the literature. Similar analyses to those documented in this thesis may be applied to other
variations on the ESPD, based on alternatives to the PD, such as the Hawk-Dove game. A
particular advantage of the Hawk-Dove game model is that its pay-off matrix can be normalised
to contain only a single pay-off parameter. This reduces the number of phase plane parameter
regions that have to be considered. It was also assumed in this thesis that the interaction
graph and the replacement graph of the evolutionary process in the ESPD are isomorphic.
Situations may, however, be considered in which these graphs are not equivalent. Furthermore,
the interaction between players, as well as with the underlying graph, was assumed to be static
in this thesis. Similar investigations to those documented in Chapters 5 and 6 may also be
carried out on the same relatively simple graph structures, but with co-evolution of strategies
where networks are allowed to change over time.
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APPENDIX A
Characterisation of equilibrium states
The proofs for Lemmas 2–4 of §5.4 are given in this appendix . The various lemmas elucidate
the strategy adoption structures required for cooperation to persist to the next round of the
ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph for parameter regions B, C and E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6. In each case, the lemma is restated after which its proof is presented.
Lemma 2. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P > 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region B of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two or three can persist intact to the next round of the
game, and
(b) a cooperation run of length at least four can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by a run of defectors of length at least three.
Proof:
(a) A cooperation run of length one has the form DCD. Figure A.1 contains an illustration of
this configuration for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. Black vertices
represent players adopting the strategy of cooperation, while white vertices represent players
adopting the strategy of defection. Grey vertices represent players with unknown strategies.
This graphical representation format is used in all figures throughout this proof.
Figure A.1: Configuration of a cooperation run of length one for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
In the configuration shown in Figure A.1, cooperating player 0 requires a pay-off value at least as
large as the largest pay-off value of the two defecting players −1 and 1 in its open neighbourhood
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in order to persist to the next round of the game. As shown previously, di > cj if i ≥ j for all
i, j ∈ N0. Let
ai =
{
0, if player i adopts the strategy of defection, or
1, if player i adopts the strategy of cooperation.
Therefore, the pay-off value of the cooperating player 0 is ca−2+a2 and the pay-off values of the
defecting players −1 and 1 are d1+a−2+a−3 and d1+a2+a3 , respectively. It can now be seen that
a−2 + a2 ≤ 1 + a−2 + a−3 and a−2 + a2 ≤ 1 + a2 + a3. Therefore, d1+a−2+a−3 > ca−2+a2 and
d1+a2+a3 > ca−2+a2 . The cooperating player 0 will consequently not be able to achieve a pay-off
value at least as large as either of its two defecting neighbouring players −1 and 1, and will
hence adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game. This shows that no
cooperation run of length one can remain intact to the next round of the game.
Consider next a cooperation run of length two. Such a run has the form DCCD. This config-
uration is shown in Figure A.2 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
Figure A.2: Configuration of a cooperation run of length two for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
The pay-off values of the cooperating players 0 and 1 are c1+a−2 and c1+a3 , respectively, while
the pay-off values of the defecting players −1 and 2 are d2+a−2+a−3 and d2+a3+a4 , respectively.
Therefore, using a similar logic as for a cooperation run of length one above, it can be seen
that the inequalities c1+a−2 < d2+a−2+a−3 and c1+a3 < d2+a3+a4 hold as a result of the fact that
1+a−2 < 2+a−2 +a−3 and 1+a3 < 2+a3 +a4. The two cooperating players 0 and 1 are hence
unable to achieve pay-off values at least as large as those of their two defecting neighbours −1
and 2, and will consequently adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game.
This shows that no cooperation run of length two can remain intact to the next round of the
game.
Finally, consider a cooperation run of length three. Such a run has the form DCCCD. This
configuration is shown in Figure A.3 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph.
Figure A.3: Configuration of a cooperation run of length three for the ESPD with on the circulant
Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
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The pay-off values of cooperating players 0, 1 and −1 are c2, c2+a−3 and c2+a3 , respectively,
while the pay-off values of the defecting players −2 and 2 are d2+a−3+a−4 and d2+a3+a4 , respec-
tively. Therefore, using a similar logic as for a cooperation run of length one, this results in the
inequalities d2+a−3+a−4 > c2+a−3 , d2+a−3+a−4 > c2, d2+a3+a4 > c2+a3 and d2+a3+a4 > c2 because
of the relationships 2 + a−3 + a−4 ≥ 2 + a−3, 2 + a−3 + a−4 ≥ 2, 2 + a3 + a4 ≥ 2 + a3 and
2 + a3 + a4 ≥ 2. The three cooperating players 0, 1 and −1 are therefore unable to achieve
pay-off values at least as large as those of their two defecting neighbours −2 and 2, and will
hence adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game. This shows that no
cooperation run of length three can remain intact to the next round of the game.
(b) A cooperation run of length four has the form DCCCCD. This configuration is illustrated
in Figure A.4 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
Figure A.4: Configuration of a cooperation run of length four for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
The pay-off values of players −1, 0, 1, 2, representing the run of cooperators of length four, are
c2+a−3 , c3, c3 and c2+a4 , respectively. The largest cooperator pay-off value is therefore c3. Since
only the largest-valued cooperator is relevant in each player’s closed neighbourhood during the
updating process, only c3 is compared with the pay-off value of the players in the cooperation run
of length four. The pay-off values achieved by the defecting players −2 and 3 are d2+a−3+a−4 and
d2+a4+a5 , respectively. In the parameter region B, however, c3 > d2. Therefore, in order for the
inequalities c3 > d2+a−3+a−4 and c3 > d2+a4+a5 to hold, ensuring the largest-valued cooperator
has a larger pay-off value then the largest-valued defector, it must hold that a−3 + a−4 = 0 and
a4 + a5 = 0. In order for these equalities to be satisfied, it is required that a−4 = a−3 = a4 =
a5 = 0. It can therefore be deduced that, in order for the run of cooperators of length four to
persist intact to the next round of the game, it must be flanked by two defection runs, each of
length at least three.
A run of cooperators of length greater than four has the form D〈C〉iD for i > 4. Within
this configuration, the largest cooperator pay-off value is c4. The two outer defectors, namely
players b−n−12 c and dn−12 e obtain the pay-off values d2+a−d i2 e−1+a−d i2 e−2 and d2+ad i2 e+1+ad i2 e+2 ,
respectively. According to the parameter region inequalities, d3 > c4 and d2 < c3. Therefore,
in order for the inequalities d2+a−d i2 e−1
+a−d i2 e−2
< c4 and d2+ad i2 e+1
+ad i2 e+2
< c4 to hold, it is
required that 2+ad i
2
e+1+ad i
2
e+2 < 3 and 2+ad i
2
e+1+ad i
2
e+2 < 3. Hence, both ad i
2
e+1+ad i
2
e+2 = 0
and ad i
2
e+1 + ad i
2
e+2 = 0 must hold. In order for these inequalities to be satisfied, it is required
that ad i
2
e+1 = ad i
2
e+2 = ad i
2
e+1 = ad i
2
e+2 = 0. It can therefore be deduced that, in order for the
run of cooperators of length i ≥ 4 to persist intact to the next round of the game, it must be
flanked by two defection runs, each of length at least three. 
The following lemma is similar to Lemma 2, but holds for parameter region C of the phase plane
in Figure 5.6. A similar method of proof is adopted.
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Lemma 3. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within
region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two, three or four can persist intact to the next round of
the game, and
(b) a cooperation run of length at least five can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by a run of defectors of length at least three.
Proof: (a) Note, that the proof of Theorem 2(a) is only restricted to the parameter region
inequality 2T + 2P < 4. Hence, the proof applies to all parameter regions except parameter
region D in the phase plane of Figure 5.6. Therefore, no cooperation run of length one, two or
three can remain intact to the next round of the game within parameter region C.
Consider a cooperation run of length four which has the form DCCCCD. This configuration is
illustrated in Figure A.4 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. The pay-
off values of players−1, 0, 1, 2, representing the run of cooperators of length four, are c2+a−3 , c3, c3
and c2+a4 , respectively. The largest cooperator pay-off value is therefore c3. Since only the
largest-valued cooperator is relevant in each player’s closed neighbourhood during the updating
process, only c3 is compared with the pay-off value of the players in the cooperation run of
length four. The pay-off values achieved by the defecting players −2 and 3 are d2+a−3+a−4 and
d2+a4+a5 , respectively. In the parameter region C, however, d2 > 3. Therefore, c3 < d2+a−3+a−4
and c3 < d2+a4+a5 holds. The four cooperating players are therefore unable to achieve pay-off
values at least as large as those of their two defecting neighbours, and will hence adopt the
strategy of defection during the next round of the game. This shows that no cooperation run of
length four can remain intact to the next round of the game.
(b) A cooperation run of length five has the form DCCCCCD. This configuration is illustrated
in Figure A.5 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph.
Figure A.5: Configuration of a cooperation run of length five for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉
as underlying graph.
The run of cooperators of length five, consisting of players −2,−1, 0, 1 and 2, achieve the pay-off
values c2+a−4 , c3, c4, c3 and c2+a4 , respectively. The largest pay-off value achieved by a coop-
erator in this run is therefore c4. Since each player compares the pay-off value achieved by
the largest-valued cooperator and defector in its closed neighbourhood, only the largest pay-off
value c4 is relevant. The two neighbouring defectors, players −3 and 3, achieve the pay-off
values d2+a−4+a−5 and d2+a4+a5 , respectively. According to the parameter region inequalities,
however, d3 > c4 and 3 < d2 < 4. Therefore, in order for the inequalities d2+a−4+a−5 < c4
and d2+a4+a5 < c4 to hold, it must hold that a−4 + a−5 = 0 and a4 + a5 = 0. In order for
these equalities to be satisfied, it is required that a−5 = a−4 = a4 = a5 = 0. It can therefore
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be deduced that, in order for the run of cooperators of length five to persist intact to the next
round of the game, it must be flanked by two defection runs, each of length at least three.
A run of cooperators of length greater than five has the form D〈C〉iD for i > 5. Within this
configuration, the largest cooperator pay-off value is c4. The two outer defectors, namely players
b− i+12 c and d i+12 e obtain the pay-off values d2+a−b i+12 c−1+a−b i+12 c−2 and d2+ad i+12 e+1+ad i+12 e+2 ,
respectively. These pay-off values are similar to those for a cooperation run of length five. Since
each player compares the pay-off value achieved by the largest-valued cooperator and defector
in its closed neighbourhood and these are equivalent to the situation for a cooperation run of
length five, the same result as mentioned above is obtained. It can therefore be deduced that, in
order for the run of cooperators of length i ≥ 5 to persist intact to the next round of the game,
the run must be flanked by two defection runs, each of length at least three. 
The last lemma in this appendix is similar to Lemmas 2 and 3, but holds instead for parameter
region E in Figure 5.6. A similar proof technique is again employed.
Lemma 4. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6), then
(a) no cooperation run of length one, two, three or four can persist intact to the next round of
the game, and
(b) a cooperation run of length at least five can persist to the next round of the game if and
only if it is flanked on both sides by either a run of defectors of length at least two or by a
run of the form DCD.
Proof:
(a) As the proof of Theorem 2(a) is only restricted by the parameter region inequality 2T+2P <
4, its proof applies to all parameter regions in the phase plane of Figure 5.6, except for parameter
region D. Therefore no cooperation run of length one, two or three can remain intact to the next
round of the game within parameter region E.
A cooperation run of length four has the form DCCCCD. This configuration is illustrated in
Figure A.4 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. The pay-off values
of players −1, 0, 1, 2, representing the run of cooperators of length four, are c2+a−3 , c3, c3 and
c2+a4 , respectively. The largest cooperator pay-off value is therefore c3. Since only the largest-
valued cooperator is relevant in each player’s closed neighbourhood during the updating process,
only c3 is compared with the pay-off value of the players in the cooperation run of length four.
The pay-off values achieved by the defecting players −2 and 3 are d2+a−3+a−4 and d2+a4+a5 ,
respectively. In the parameter region E, however, d2 > 3. Therefore, c3 < d2+a−3+a−4 and
c3 < d2+a4+a5 hold. The four cooperating players are therefore unable to achieve pay-off values
at least as large as those of their two defecting neighbours, and will hence adopt the strategy
of defection during the next round of the game. This shows that no cooperation run of length
four can remain intact to the next round of the game.
(b) A cooperation run of length five has the form DCCCCCD and the configuration is il-
lustrated in Figure A.5 for the ESPD with the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying graph. The
run of cooperators of length five, consisting of players −2,−1, 0, 1 and 2, achieve the pay-off
values c2+a−4 , c3, c4, c3 and c2+a4 , respectively. The largest pay-off value achieved by a coop-
erator in this run is therefore c4. Since each player compares the pay-off value achieved by
the largest-valued cooperator and defector in its closed neighbourhood, only the largest pay-off
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value c4 is relevant. The two neighbouring defectors, players −3 and 3, achieve the pay-off values
d2+a−4+a−5 and d2+a4+a5 , respectively. According to the parameter region inequalities, however,
d3 < c4. Therefore, in order for the inequalities d2+a−4+a−5 < c4 and d2+a4+a5 < c4 to hold, it is
required that 2 +a−4 +a−5 ≤ 3 and 2 +a4 +a5 ≤ 3. Hence, both a−4 +a−5 ≤ 1 and a4 +a5 ≤ 1
must hold. There are only three binary combinations of (a−4, a−5), namely (0, 0), (1, 0) or (0, 1),
which satisfy the first inequality a−4 +a−5 ≤ 1. These combinations represent the three possible
configurations DD, CD or DC, respectively, which are required to flank the negative side of
DCCCCCD. In the combinations in which a−4 = 0 (i.e. player −4 adopts the strategy of
defection), the strategy of player −5 is irrelevant to the outcome of the updating processes of
the players within the cooperation run of length five. This is because a−5 either has the value
of 0 or 1 for the above inequality to hold. There are also three binary combinations of (a4, a5),
namely (0, 0), (1, 0) or (0, 1), satisfying the second inequality, a4 + a5 ≤ 1. This allows for the
positive side of DCCCCCD to be flanked only by either DD, DC or CD. In the combinations
in which a4 = 0 (i.e. player 4 adopts the strategy of defection), the strategy of player 5 is again
irrelevant to the outcome of the updating processes of the players within the cooperation run of
length five. It can thereby be deduced that, in order for the run of cooperators of length five to
persist intact to the next round of the game, the run must be flanked on both sides by either a
defection run of length at least two or by the configuration DCD.
A run of cooperators of length greater than five has the form D〈C〉iD for i > 5. Within this
configuration, the largest cooperator pay-off value is c4. The two outer defectors, namely players
b− i+12 c and d i+12 e obtain the pay-off values d2+a−d i+12 e−1+a−d i+12 e−2 and d2+ad i+12 e+1+ad i+12 e+2 ,
respectively. These pay-off values are similar to those for a cooperation run of length five. Since
each player compares the pay-off value achieved by the largest-valued cooperator and defector
in its closed neighbourhood and these are equivalent to the situation for a cooperation run of
length five, the same result as mentioned above is obtained. It can therefore be deduced that,
in order for the run of cooperators of length i ≥ 5 to persist intact to the next round of the
game, the run must be flanked on both sides by either a run of defectors of length two or by the
configuration DCD. 
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APPENDIX B
Enumeration of equilibrium states
The proof of Theorem 4 in §5.4.2 for parameter regions A, C and E in the phase plane of
Figure 5.6 is presented in this appendix. First the part of the theorem associated with the
parameter region considered is given, after which its proof is presented in each case.
Theorem 4. (a) Suppose the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉. If the
parameter inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region
A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium states of the game is given
by
2+
bn7 c∑
i=1
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S1
(
(n− 5i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i2 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
+
bn7 c∑
i=1
1
i
[(
n− 6i− 1
i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S1
(
(n− 6i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i2 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + b i2c − 2
b i2c − 2
)]
+
bn−87 c∑
i1=1
bn−7i18 c∑
i2=1
1
2i1 + i2
[(
(i1 + i2 − 2)!
(i1 − 1)!(i2 − 1)!
)(
n− 5i1 − 7i2 − 1
2i1 + i2 − 1
)
+(
(gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 2)!
( i1(2i1+i2)/gcd(2i1+i2,j) − 1)!( i2(2i1+i2)/gcd(2i1+i2,j) − 1)!
)
∑
j∈S2
(
(n− 7i1 − 8i2) gcd(2i1 + i2, j)/(2i1 + i2) + gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 1
gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 1
)
+(2i1 + i2)
(
( i1+i2−22 )!
( i1−12 )!(
i2−1
2 )!
) bn−7i1−8i22 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k + 1)
(
k + b 2i1+i22 c − 2
b 2i1+i22 c − 2
)]
,
(B.1)
where S1 = {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i} and S2 = {x ∈ N | (2i1 + i2) divides
n gcd(2i1 + i2, x) and x < (2i1 + i2)}.
Proof: Recall, from Lemma 6, that for cooperation to persist to the next round of the game,
either a cooperation run of length four flanked on both sides by a defection run of length at
least three or a cooperation run of length at least five flanked on both sides by a defection run
of length at least two is required.
As demonstrated in Figure 5.13 of §5.4.2, the set of all possible game states S can be par-
titioned into two sets X and Y . The set X consists of all states that contain the configu-
ration DDD〈C〉4DDD, while the set Y consists of all states that contain the configuration
121
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DD〈C〉nDD, for some n ≥ 5. The set X ∩ Y contains all states that contain both the configu-
rations DDD〈C〉4DDD and DD〈C〉nDD, for some n ≥ 5. In order to enumerate the number
of equilibrium states of the game, each subset is enumerated and added to the enumeration of
the all-defector and all-cooperator equilibrium states.
First consider the subset X \ (X ∩ Y ) of S, consisting of all game states that contain the
configuration DDD〈C〉4DDD but not the configuration DD〈C〉nDD, for any n ≥ 5.
In order to enumerate the states in X \(X∩Y ), the number of states containing 〈D〉n1〈C〉4〈D〉n2
as substate has to be determined, where n1 ≥ 3 and n2 ≥ 3. These states have the form
CCCCDDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
CCCCDDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
· · · CCCCDDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run i− 1
CCCCDDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run i
, (B.2)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of defectors. As the under-
lying graph is a circulant, it is vertex-transitive. The endpoints in the partial state (B.2) have
therefore been chosen arbitrarily.
Note that as the ordering of the cooperation and defection runs has already been fixed in (B.2),
the symbols C and D can be considered indistinguishable for enumeration purposes, serving
merely as place holders from a combinatorial point of view. The partial state (B.2) contains 7i
symbols, leaving n−7i indistinguishable symbols to be distributed amongst the i distinguishable
runs.
Let Qi denote the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising i cooperation runs and
i defection runs, starting in a run of cooperators and ending in a run of defectors as shown in
(B.2). The total number of equilibrium states in X \ (X ∩ Y ) is therefore given by
bn
7
c∑
i=1
Qi.
Let χ be the set of all states of the form (B.2). In order to determine Qi, the game states within
the set χ have to be partitioned into game state equivalence classes (in order to prevent the
enumeration of equivalent states) and the number of classes enumerated. Let G be the group of
permutations that partitions χ into its equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.2.2, that the Cauchy-
Frobenius Lemma can be used to determine the number of these equivalence classes. The value
of Qi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn7 c} is given by
Qi =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (B.3)
where |Fg| is the number of states in χ that remain invariant under the permutation g ∈ G.
In order to determine the symmetry group G of the states of the form (B.2), let ι be the identity
permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ χ. Let ρj be the permutation which modular
shifts each run in (B.2) j positions to the right. Let δ furthermore be the operation that reverses
the order of the runs in (B.2) so that the first run remains in its original position, followed by runs
b i2c, b i2c− 1, . . . The symmetry group G = {ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρb
i
2
c−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρb
i
2
c−1} of order
i is thus formed under the binary operation of permutation composition. In order to calculate
Qi according to (B.3), the number of states that remain invariant under each permutation in G
has to be determined.
First, consider the identity operator ι. This operator leaves all elements of χ invariant and
therefore |Fι| = |χ|. To calculate the number of states in χ, the number of ways of distributing
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n − 7i indistinguishable symbols amongst i distinguishable runs has to be determined. Using
Lemma 5, it follows that
|Fι| =
(
n− 7i+ i− 1
i− 1
)
=
(
n− 6i− 1
i− 1
)
. (B.4)
Next, consider the permutation ρj . For a state to remain invariant under the permutation ρj , the
first j pairs of runs have to be equivalent to all subsequent runs. Note that if j exactly divides
i, then the first j runs determine the remaining (i − j) runs. Otherwise, the first d = gcd(i, j)
runs determine the remaining (i− d) runs. The number of possible states that remain invariant
under ρj can therefore be determined by finding the number of ways to distribute di (n − 7i)
symbols among the first d runs. The enumeration is given by
|Fρj | =
(d
i (n− 7i) + d− 1
d− 1
)
=
(d
i (n− 6i)− 1
d− 1
)
.
If, however, din is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols to complete the pattern of
runs in order to achieve an invariant state and so |Fρj | = 0. Therefore,
|Fρj | =

( gcd(i,j)
i
(n−6i)−1
gcd(i,j)−1
)
, if gcd(i,j)i n ∈ Z or
0, otherwise.
(B.5)
Consider next the permutation δ, which reverses the order of the runs so that the first run
remains in its original position, the second run is projected onto the last run, the third run is
projected onto the second last run, and so on. Runs 1 and i+ 1 are projected onto themselves,
while runs 2 to i map onto runs i+2 to 2i, respectively. Let k be the number of indistinguishable
symbols that are distributed among the i−1 distinguishable runs not mapping onto themselves.
The number of ways of distributing the k symbols among these i−1 runs is (k+i−2i−2 ), provided that
the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i holds. The remaining n− 7i− 2k symbols are distributed among
the two runs that map onto themselves, which can be done in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1
distinct ways. In order to enumerate the distinct game states that remain invariant under the
permutation δ, all possible values of k are to be considered. Therefore,
|Fδ| =
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
. (B.6)
Finally, consider the permutation composition δρj which shifts the runs j positions to the left
and then reverses the order of the runs. Under this permutation, runs j+ 1 and b i2c+ j+ 1 map
onto themselves, while runs j+2 to b i2c+j map onto runs j−1 to b i2c+j+2, respectively. Once
again, k indistinguishable symbols can be distributed among b i2c−1 distinguishable runs that do
not map onto themselves in
(k+b i
2
c−2
b i
2
c−2
)
different ways, provided that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n−7i
holds. Again, the remaining n − 7i − 2k symbols can be distributed among the two runs that
map onto themselves in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1 distinct ways. Therefore, the number
of distinct game states that remain invariant under the permutation δρj is the number in (B.6).
Taking all the various permutations into account and therefore substituting (B.4), (B.5) and
(B.6) into (B.3), the number of equilibrium states for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
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graph and for which the inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6) is
Qi =
1
i
[(
n− 6i− 1
i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S
(
(n− 6i)gcd(i, j)/i− 1
gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n−7i−2k+ 1)
(
k + b i2c − 2
b i2c − 2
)]
,
where S is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
Next consider the subset Y \ (X ∩Y ) of the set S as illustrated graphically in Figure 5.13. This
includes all game states that contain the configuration DD〈C〉nDD as substate, for some n ≥ 5
but not the configuration DDD〈C〉4DDD. In order to enumerate the states in Y \ (X ∩ Y ),
the number of states containing substates of the form 〈D〉n1〈C〉n2〈D〉n3 has to be determined,
where n1 ≥ 2, n2 ≥ 5 and n2 ≥ 3. These states have the form
CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i− 1
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
, (B.7)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and defectors,
as appropriate. As the underlying graph is a circulant, it is vertex-transitive. The endpoints in
the partial state (B.7) have therefore again been chosen arbitrarily.
As the ordering of the cooperation and defection runs has already been fixed in (B.7), the
symbols C and D can be considered indistinguishable for enumeration purposes, serving merely
as place holders from a combinatorial point of view. The partial state (B.7) contains 7i symbols,
leaving n− 7i indistinguishable symbols to be distributed amongst the 2i distinguishable runs.
Let Qi denote the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising i cooperation runs and
i defection runs, starting in a run of cooperators and ending in a run of defectors as shown in
(B.7). The total number of equilibrium classes is therefore given by
bn
7
c∑
i=1
Qi.
Let χ be the set of all states of the form (B.7). In order to determine Qi, the game states in
the set χ have to be partitioned into game state equivalence classes (in order to prevent the
enumeration of equivalent states) and the number of classes enumerated. Let G be the group of
permutations that partitions χ into its equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.2.2, that the Cauchy-
Frobenius Lemma can be used to determine the number of these equivalence classes. The value
of Qi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn7 c} is therefore given by
Qi =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (B.8)
where |Fg| is the number of states in χ that remain invariant under the permutation g ∈ G.
In order to determine the symmetry group G of the states of the form (B.7), let ι be the identity
permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ χ. Let ρj be the permutation which modular
shifts each run in (B.7) j positions to the right. Let δ furthermore be the operation that reverses
the order of the runs in (B.7) so that the first run remains in its original position, followed by
runs i, i − 1, . . . The symmetry group G = {ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρi−1} of order 2i
is thus formed under the binary operation of permutation composition. In order to calculate Qi
according to (B.8), the number of states that remain invariant under each permutation in G has
to be determined.
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First, consider the identity operator ι. This operator leaves all elements of χ invariant and
therefore |Fι| = |χ|. To calculate the number of states in χ, the number of ways of distributing
n − 7i indistinguishable symbols amongst 2i distinguishable runs has to be determined. Using
Lemma 5, it follows that
|Fι| =
(
n− 5i+ 2i− 1
2i− 1
)
=
(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
. (B.9)
Next, consider the permutation ρj . For a state to remain invariant under the permutation ρj ,
the first j pairs of runs have to be equivalent to all subsequent runs. Note that if j exactly
divides i, then the first j pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i − j) runs. Otherwise, the
first d = gcd(i, j) pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i − d) runs. The number of states
that remain invariant under ρj can therefore be determined by finding the number of ways to
distribute 2d2i (n− 7i) symbols among the first 2d runs. The enumeration is given by
|Fρj | =
(2d
2i (n− 7i) + 2d− 1
2d− 1
)
=
(d
i (n− 5i)− 1
2d− 1
)
.
If, however, din is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols to complete the pattern of
runs in order to achieve an invariant state and so |Fρj | = 0. Therefore,
|Fρj | =

( gcd(i,j)
i
(n−5i)−1
2gcd(i,j)−1
)
, if gcd(i,j)i n ∈ Z or
0, otherwise.
(B.10)
Consider next the permutation δ, which reverses the order of the runs so that the first run
remains in its original position, the second run is projected onto the last run, the third run is
projected onto the second last run, and so on. Runs 1 and i+ 1 are projected onto themselves,
while runs 2 to i map onto runs i+2 to 2i, respectively. Let k be the number of indistinguishable
symbols that are distributed among the i−1 distinguishable runs not mapping onto themselves.
The number of ways of distributing the k symbols among these i−1 runs is (k+i−2i−2 ), provided that
the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i holds. The remaining n− 7i− 2k symbols are distributed among
the two runs that map onto themselves, which can be done in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1
distinct ways. In order to enumerate the distinct game states that remain invariant under the
permutation δ, all possible values of k are to be considered. Therefore,
|Fδ| =
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
. (B.11)
Finally, consider the permutation composition δρj which shifts the runs j positions to the left
and then reverses the order of the runs. Under this permutation, runs j + 1 and i+ j + 1 map
onto themselves, while runs j + 2 to i+ j map onto runs j − 1 to i+ j + 2, respectively. Once
again k indistinguishable symbols can be distributed among i − 1 distinguishable runs that do
not map onto themselves in
(
k+i−2
i−2
)
different ways, provided that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i
holds. Again, the remaining n − 7i − 2k symbols can be distributed among the two runs that
map onto themselves in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n−7i−2k+ 1 distinct ways. Therefore, the number of
distinct game states that remain invariant under the permutation δρj is the number in (B.11).
Taking all the various permutations into account and therefore substituting (B.9), (B.10) and
(B.11) into (B.8), the number of equilibrium states of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
126 Appendix B. Enumeration of equilibrium states
graph and for which the inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6) is
Qi =
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S
(
(n− 5i)gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
where S is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
Finally, consider the subset (X ∩ Y ) of S, consisting of game states that contain at least one
configuration of the form DDD〈C〉4DDD and at least one configuration of the form DD〈C〉nDD
as substates, for some n ≥ 5. These states have the form
DCCCCDDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
· · · CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i1 + i2 − 1
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i1 + i2
, (B.12)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and de-
fectors, as appropriate. Within this configuration there can be i1 pairs of runs of the form
CCCCC . . . and DD . . ., and i2 runs of the form DCCCCDDD . . . The state always starts
with the configuration DCCCCDDD . . . and ends with the pair of configurations CCCCC . . .
and DD . . .
Let Q(i1,i2) denote the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising of i1 pairs of runs of
cooperators of length at least five and defectors of length at least two and i2 runs of the form
DCCCCDDD . . . as shown in (B.12). The total number of equilibrium classes of this form is
therefore given by
bn−8
7
c∑
i1=1
bn−7i1
8
c∑
i2=1
Q(i1,i2).
Let χ be the set of all states of the form (B.12). In order to determine Q(i1,i2), the game states
in the set χ have to be partitioned into game state equivalence classes (in order to prevent the
enumeration of equivalent states) and the number of classes enumerated. Let G be the group of
permutations that partitions χ into its equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.2.2, that the Cauchy-
Frobenius Lemma can be used to determine the number of these equivalence classes. The value
of Q(i1,i2) for i1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn−87 c} and i2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn−7i18 c} is therefore given by
Q(i1,i2) =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (B.13)
where |Fg| is the number of states in χ that remain invariant under the permutation g ∈ G.
In order to determine the symmetry group G of the states of the form (B.12), let ι be the
identity permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ χ. Let ρj be the permuta-
tion which modular shifts each run in (B.12) j positions to the right. Let δ furthermore
be the operation that reverses the order of the runs in (B.12) so that the first run remains
in its original position followed by runs d2i1+i22 e, d2i1+i22 e − 1, . . . The symmetry group G =
{ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρd 2i1+i22 e−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρd 2i1+i22 e−1} of order 2i1 + i2 is thus formed under the
binary operation of permutation composition. In order to calculate Q(i1,i2) according to (B.13),
the number of states that remain invariant under each permutation in G has to be determined.
First, consider the identity operator ι. This operator leaves all elements of χ invariant and
therefore |Fι| = |χ|. To calculate the number of states in χ, the number of ways of distributing
n−7i1−8i2 indistinguishable symbols amongst i1+2i2 distinguishable runs has to be determined.
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As the order of the different runs has not been fixed, except for the first and last run, the number
of orderings of these runs also have to be considered. Using Lemma 5, it follows that
|Fι| = (i1 + i2 − 2)!
(i1 − 1)!(i2 − 1)!
(
n− 7i1 − 8i2 + 2i1 + i2 − 1
2i1 + i2 − 1
)
=
(i1 + i2 − 2)!
(i1 − 1)!(i2 − 1)!
(
n− 5i1 − 7i2 − 1
2i1 + i2 − 1
)
.
(B.14)
Next, consider the permutation ρj . For a state to remain invariant under the permutation ρj ,
the first j pairs of runs have to be equivalent to all subsequent runs. Note that if j exactly
divides 2i1 + i2, then the first j runs determine the remaining (2i1 + i2− j) runs. Otherwise, the
first d = gcd(2i1 +i2, j) runs determine the remaining (2i1 +i2−d) runs. The number of possible
states that remain invariant under ρj can therefore be determined by finding the number of ways
to distribute d2i1+i2 (n−7i1−8i2) symbols among the first d runs. As the ordering of the various
different runs within the first d runs is only fixed for the first and the last run, the various run
orders also have to be taken into account. The enumeration is therefore given by
|Fρj | =
(d− 2)!
( i1(2i1+i2)/d − 1)!(
i2
(2i1+i2)/d
− 1)!
( d
2i1+i2
(n− 7i1 − 8i2) + d− 1
d− 1
)
if
d
2i1 + i2
n ∈ N.
(B.15)
If, however, d2i1+i2n is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols to complete the pattern
of runs in order to achieve an invariant state, and so |Fρj | = 0.
Consider next the permutation δ, which reverses the order of the runs so that the first run remains
in its original position, the second run is projected onto the last run, the third run is projected
onto the second last run, and so on. Runs 1 and b2i1+i22 c + 1 are projected onto themselves,
while runs 2 to b2i1+i22 c map onto runs b2i1+i22 c+2 to 2i1 + i2, respectively. Let k be the number
of indistinguishable symbols that are distributed among the b2i1+i22 c − 1 distinguishable runs
not mapping onto themselves. The number of ways of distributing the k symbols among these
b2i1+i22 c − 1 runs is
(k+b 2i1+i2
2
c−2
b 2i1+i2
2
c−2
)
, provided that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 7i1 − 8i2 holds.
The remaining n − 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k symbols are distributed among the two runs that map onto
themselves, which can be done in
(
n−7i1−8i2−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n − 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k + 1 distinct ways.
As the order of the various runs are not fixed, except for the first and last runs, the number
of different run orders also has to be taken into account. In order to enumerate the distinct
game states that remain invariant under the permutation δ, all possible values of k are to be
considered. Therefore,
|Fδ| =
( i1+i2−22 )!
( i1−12 )!(
i2−1
2 )!
bn−7i1−8i2
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k + 1)
(
k + b2i1+i22 c − 2
b2i1+i22 c − 2
)
. (B.16)
Finally, consider the permutation composition δρj which shifts the runs j positions to the left
and then reverses the order of the runs. Under this permutation, runs j+ 1 and b2i1+i22 c+ j+ 1
map onto themselves, while runs j + 2 to b2i1+i22 c+ j map onto runs j − 1 to b2i1+i22 c+ j + 2,
respectively. Once again, k indistinguishable symbols can be distributed among b2i1+i22 c − 1
distinguishable runs that do not map onto themselves in
(k+b 2i1+i2
2
c−2
b 2i1+i2
2
c−2
)
different ways, provided
that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i1− 8i2 holds. Again, the remaining n− 7i1− 8i2− 2k symbols
can be distributed among the two runs that map onto themselves in
(
n−7i1−8i2−2k+2−1
2−1
)
=
n− 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k+ 1 distinct ways. Therefore, the number of distinct game states that remain
invariant under the permutation δρj is the number in (B.16).
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Taking all the various permutations into account and therefore substituting (B.14), (B.15) and
(B.16) into (B.13), the number of equilibrium states of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph and for which the inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P < 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region A of the phase plane in Figure 5.6) is
Q(i1,i2) =
1
2i1 + i2
[(
(i1 + i2 − 2)!
(i1 − 1)!(i2 − 1)!
)(
n− 5i1 − 7i2 − 1
2i1 + i2 − 1
)
+
(
(gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 2)!
( i1(2i1+i2)/gcd(2i1+i2,j) − 1)!((2i1 + i2)/ i2gcd(2i1+i2,j) − 1)!
)
∑
j∈S2
(
(n− 7i1 − 8i2) gcd(2i1 + i2, j)/(2i1 + i2) + gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 1
gcd(2i1 + i2, j)− 1
)
+(2i1 + i2)
(
( i1+i2−22 )!
( i1−12 )!(
i2−1
2 )!
) bn−7i1−8i22 c∑
k=0
(n− 7i1 − 8i2 − 2k + 1)
(
k + b 2i1+i22 c − 2
b 2i1+i22 c − 2
)]
,
where S2 is the set {x ∈ N | (2i1 + i2) divides n gcd(2i1 + i2, x) and x < (2i1 + i2)}. 
The following result is similar to that of Theorem 4(b), but holds for parameter region C of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6. A similar method of proof is adopted.
Theorem 4. (c) Suppose the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉. If the
parameter inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium states is given
by
2+
bn
8
c∑
i=1
1
2i
[(
n− 6i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S¯
(
(n− 6i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−8i
2
c∑
k=0
(n−8i−2k+1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
(B.17)
where S¯ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
Proof: Recall, from Lemma 3, that for cooperation to persist to the next round of the game,
a cooperation run of length at least five flanked on each side by a run of defectors of length at
least three is required. In order to enumerate the states resulting from such a configuration,
the states containing substates of the form 〈D〉n1〈C〉n2〈D〉n3 have to be counted, where n1 ≥ 3,
n2 ≥ 5 and n3 ≥ 3. These states have the form
CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i− 1
DDD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
, (B.18)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and defectors,
as appropriate. As the underlying graph is a circulant, it is vertex-transitive. The endpoints in
the partial state (B.18) have therefore been chosen arbitrarily.
As the ordering of the cooperation and defection runs has already been fixed in (B.18), the
symbols C and D can be considered indistinguishable for enumeration purposes, serving merely
as place holders from a combinatorial point of view. The partial state (B.18) contains 8i symbols,
leaving n− 8i indistinguishable symbols to be distributed amongst the 2i distinguishable runs.
All equilibrium states can be represented by (B.18), except for the all-cooperator and all-defector
steady states. As deduced from Lemma 3, no run of cooperators of length smaller than five or
run of defectors of length smaller than three prevails in any steady state. Therefore, let Qi denote
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the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising i cooperation runs and i defection runs,
starting in a run of cooperators and ending in a run of defectors as shown in (B.18). The total
number of equilibrium classes is therefore given by
2 +
bn
8
c∑
i=1
Qi.
Let χ be the set of all states of the form (B.18). In order to determine Qi, the game states
in the set χ have to be partitioned into game state equivalence classes (in order to prevent the
enumeration of equivalent states) and the number of classes enumerated. Let G be the group of
permutations that partitions χ into its equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.2.2, that the Cauchy-
Frobenius Lemma can be used to determine the number of these equivalence classes. The value
of Qi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn8 c} is therefore given by
Qi =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (B.19)
where |Fg| is the number of states in χ that remain invariant under the permutation g ∈ G.
In order to determine the symmetry group of the states of the form (B.18), let ι be the identity
permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ χ. Let ρj be the permutation which modular
shifts each run in (B.18) j positions to the right. Let δ furthermore be the operation that reverses
the order of the runs in (B.18) so that the first run remains in its original position, followed by
runs i, i − 1, . . . The symmetry group G = {ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρi−1} of order 2i
is thus formed under the binary operation of permutation composition. In order to calculate Qi
according to (B.19), the number of states that remain invariant under each permutation within
G has to be determined.
First, consider the identity operator ι. This operator leaves all elements of χ invariant and
therefore |Fι| = |χ|. To enumerate the number of states in χ, the number of ways of distributing
n − 7i indistinguishable symbols amongst 2i distinguishable runs has to be determined. Using
Lemma 5, it follows that
|Fι| =
(
n− 6i+ 2i− 1
2i− 1
)
=
(
n− 6i− 1
2i− 1
)
. (B.20)
Next, consider the permutation ρj . For a state to remain invariant under the permutation ρj ,
the first j pairs of runs have to be equivalent to all subsequent runs. To elucidate this claim,
consider applying ρ1 to a state s ∈ χ. When performing this operation, run i is mapped to run
i+ 2 which, in turn, is mapped to run i+ 4, and so on. Hence, the numbers of symbols in runs
1 and 2 determine the numbers of symbols in runs 3 and 4 as well as the numbers of symbols in
runs 5 and 6, and so on. Therefore, each pair of runs have to be equivalent. Hence, the number
of possible states that remain invariant under ρ1 can be determined by finding the number of
distinct ways of distributing 22i(n− 8i) symbols among two containers, which is given by
|Fρ1 | =
(n−8i
i + 2− 1
2− 1
)
=
n− 8i
i
+ 1.
Note that if j exactly divides i, then the first j pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i − j)
runs. Otherwise, the first d = gcd(i, j) pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i− d) runs. The
number of possible states that remain invariant under ρj can therefore be determined by finding
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the number of ways to distribute 2d2i (n− 8i) symbols among the first 2d runs. The enumeration
is given by
|Fρj | =
(2d
2i (n− 8i) + 2d− 1
2d− 1
)
=
(d
i (n− 6i)− 1
2d− 1
)
.
If, however, din is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols to complete the pattern of
runs in order to achieve an invariant state and so |Fρj | = 0. Therefore,
|Fρj | =

( gcd(i,j)
i
(n−6i)−1
2gcd(i,j)−1
)
, if gcd(i,j)i n ∈ Z or
0, otherwise.
(B.21)
Consider next the permutation δ, which reverses the order of the runs so that the first run
remains in its original position, the second run is projected onto the last run, the third run is
projected onto the second last run, and so on. Runs 1 and i+ 1 are projected onto themselves,
while runs 2 to i map onto runs i+2 to 2i, respectively. Let k be the number of indistinguishable
symbols that are distributed among the i−1 distinguishable runs not mapping onto themselves.
The number of ways of distributing the k symbols among these i−1 runs is (k+i−2i−2 ), provided that
the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 8i holds. The remaining n− 8i− 2k symbols are distributed among
the two runs that map onto themselves, which can be done in
(
n−8i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 8i− 2k + 1
distinct ways. In order to enumerate the distinct game states that remain invariant under the
permutation δ, all possible values of k are to be considered. Therefore,
|Fδ| =
bn−8i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 8i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
. (B.22)
Finally, consider the permutation composition δρj which shifts the runs j positions to the left
and then reverses the order of the runs. Under this permutation, runs j + 1 and i+ j + 1 map
onto themselves, while runs j + 2 to i+ j map onto runs j − 1 to i+ j + 2, respectively. Once
again, k indistinguishable symbols can be distributed among i− 1 distinguishable runs that do
not map onto themselves in
(
k+i−2
i−2
)
different ways, provided that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 8i
holds. Again, the remaining n − 8i − 2k symbols can be distributed among the two runs that
map onto themselves in
(
n−8i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n−8i−2k+ 1 distinct ways. Therefore, the number of
distinct game states that remain invariant under the permutation δρj is the number in (B.22).
Taking all the various permutations into account and therefore substituting (B.20), (B.21) and
(B.22) into (B.19), the number of equilibrium states of the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph and for which the inequalities 3T + P > 4, 2T + 2P > 3 and 2T + 2P < 4 hold (i.e. the
parameters lie within region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6) is
Qi =
1
2i
[(
n− 6i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S¯
(
(n− 6i)gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−8i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 8i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
where S¯ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}. 
The following theorem is again similar to Theorem 4(b), but holds for parameter region E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6. A lemma is first established, however, demonstrating a simplification
of the two possible configurations that allow for cooperation to persist to the next round of the
game into a single configuration. Hereby, a similar method of proof as that of Theorem 4(b) can
be adopted for the enumeration of the equivalence classes corresponding to parameter region E.
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Recall, from Lemma 4, that in order for cooperation to persist to the next round of the game, a
cooperation run of length at least five, flanked on each side by either a run of defectors of length
at least two or by the configuration DCD is required. It can be shown in the latter case that
a configuration DCD flanking the cooperator run will transform into the configuration DDD
during the next round of the game. This claim is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and the parameter
inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6), then an equilibrium state must contain a cooperation run of length at
least five flanked on each side by a defection run of length at least two for cooperation to persist.
Proof: Consider a run of cooperators of length at least five with one side flanked by DCD. A
substate of this configuration consisting of a cooperation run of length five flanked on the right
by DCD is illustrated in Figure B.1.
Figure B.1: Configuration of a cooperation run of length five flanked on the right side by DCD. The
pay-off values that are known for the various players within the configuration are denoted above or below
the corresponding vertices. The player marked in red, will adopt the strategy of defection during the
next round of the game, if the parameter values T and P lie within parameter region A.
Consider the playing and updating phases during a single round of the game for the player
marked in red in the figure. During the playing phase, the pay-off value achieved by this player
is at most c2 = 2. Furthermore, during the updating phase, the defector and cooperator with
the largest pay-off value in this player’s closed neighbourhood are compared. The defector with
the largest pay-off value achieves the pay-off value d3 = 3T + P and is marked in blue in the
figure. In order to determine the cooperator with the largest pay-off value, the strategy of
the grey player is required. The grey player can either adopt the strategy of cooperation or
defection. In the case where the grey player adopts the strategy of cooperation, it is able to
achieve the largest pay-off value c3 = 3 of all the cooperating players in the red player’s closed
neighbourhood. Otherwise, in the case where the grey player adopts the strategy of defection,
the red player achieves the largest pay-off value of all the cooperators. In the two cases, the
inequalities d3 > c3 and d3 > c2 hold, respectively. The player indicated in red will therefore
adopt the strategy of defection during the next round of the game. The resulting configuration
after a single round of the game is subsequently 〈C〉5DDD. Hence, in order for cooperation to
be present in an equilibrium state, a run of cooperators of length at least five flanked on each
side by a run of defectors of length at least two is required. 
The following result is similar to that of Theorem 4(b), but holds for parameter region E of the
phase plane in Figure 5.6. A similar method of proof is again adopted.
Theorem 4. (d) Suppose the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉. If the
parameter inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie within region
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E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6), then the number of equilibrium states is given by
2+
bn
7
c∑
i=1
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S˜
(
(n− 5i) gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2 gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n−7i−2k+1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
(B.23)
where S˜ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}.
Proof: Recall, from Lemma 5, that for cooperation to persist to the next round of the game,
a cooperation run of length at least five flanked on each side by a run of defectors of length
at least two is required. In order to enumerate the equilibrium states resulting from such a
configuration, the number of states containing a substate of the form 〈D〉n1〈C〉n2〈D〉n3 has to
be determined, where n1 ≥ 2, n2 ≥ 5 and n2 ≥ 2. These states have the form
CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 1
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2
CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 3
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 4
· · · CCCCC . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i− 1
DD . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
run 2i
, (B.24)
where each run has been populated above with the smallest number of cooperators and defectors,
as appropriate. As the underlying graph is a circulant, it is vertex-transitive. The endpoints in
the partial state (B.24) have therefore been chosen arbitrarily.
As the ordering of the cooperation and defection runs has already been fixed in (B.24), the
symbols C and D can be considered indistinguishable for enumeration purposes, serving merely
as place holders from a combinatorial point of view. The partial state (B.24) contains 7i symbols,
leaving n− 7i indistinguishable symbols to be distributed amongst the 2i distinguishable runs.
All equilibrium states can be represented in the form (B.24), except for the all-cooperator and all-
defector steady states. As deduced from Lemma 4, no run of cooperators of length smaller than
five or run of defectors of length smaller than two prevails in any equilibrium state. Therefore,
let Qi denote the number of states, up to automorphism, comprising i cooperation runs and i
defection runs, starting in a run of cooperators and ending in a run of defectors as shown in
(B.24). The total number of equilibrium classes is therefore given by
2 +
bn
7
c∑
i=1
Qi.
Let χ be the set of all states of the form (B.18). In order to determine Qi, the game states
in the set χ have to be partitioned into game state equivalence classes (in order to prevent the
enumeration of equivalent states) and the number of classes enumerated. Let G be the group of
permutations that partitions χ into its equivalence classes. Recall, from §2.2.2, that the Cauchy-
Frobenius Lemma can be used to determine the number of these equivalence classes. The value
of Qi for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bn7 c} is therefore given by
Qi =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
|Fg|, (B.25)
where |Fg| is the number of states in χ that remain invariant under the permutation g ∈ G.
In order to determine the symmetry group G of the states of the form (B.24), let ι be the
identity permutation on the sequence of runs of a state s ∈ χ. Let ρj be the permutation which
modular shifts each run in (B.24) j positions to the right. Let δ furthermore be the operation
that reverses the order of the runs in (B.24) so that the first run remains in its original position,
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followed by runs i, i − 1, . . . The symmetry group G = {ι, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρi−1, δ, δρ1, δρ2, . . . , δρi−1}
of order 2i is thus formed under the binary operation of permutation composition. In order
to calculate Qi, according to (B.25), all states that remain invariant under each permutation
within G has to be considered.
First, consider the identity operator ι. This operator leaves all elements of χ invariant and
therefore |Fι| = |χ|. To enumerate the states in χ, the number of ways of distributing n − 7i
indistinguishable symbols amongst 2i distinguishable runs has to be determined. Using Lemma
5, it follows that
|Fι| =
(
n− 5i+ 2i− 1
2i− 1
)
=
(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
. (B.26)
Next, consider the permutation ρj . For a state to remain invariant under the permutation ρj ,
the first j pairs of runs have to be equivalent to all subsequent runs. To elucidate this claim,
consider applying ρ1 to a state s ∈ χ. When performing this operation, run i is mapped to run
i+ 2 which, in turn, is mapped to run i+ 4, and so on. Hence, the numbers of symbols in runs
1 and 2 determine the numbers of symbols in runs 3 and 4 as well as the numbers of symbols in
runs 5 and 6, and so on. Therefore, each pair of runs have to be equivalent. Hence, the number
of possible states that remain invariant under ρ1 can be determined by finding the number of
distinct ways of distributing 22i(n− 7i) symbols among two containers, which is given by
|Fρ1 | =
(n−7i
i + 2− 1
2− 1
)
=
n− 7i
i
+ 1.
Note that if j exactly divides i, then the first j pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i − j)
runs. Otherwise, the first d = gcd(i, j) pairs of runs determine the remaining 2(i− d) runs. The
number of possible states that remain invariant under ρj can therefore be determined by finding
the number of ways to distribute 2d2i (n− 7i) symbols among the first 2d runs. The enumeration
is given by
|Fρj | =
(2d
2i (n− 7i) + 2d− 1
2d− 1
)
=
(d
i (n− 5i)− 1
2d− 1
)
.
If, however, din is not an integer, then there are not enough symbols to complete the pattern of
runs in order to achieve an invariant state and so |Fρj | = 0. Therefore,
|Fρj | =

( gcd(i,j)
i
(n−5i)−1
2gcd(i,j)−1
)
, if gcd(i,j)i n ∈ Z or
0, otherwise.
(B.27)
Consider next the permutation δ, which reverses the order of the runs so that the first run
remains in its original position, the second run is projected onto the last run, the third run is
projected onto the second last run, and so on. Runs 1 and i+ 1 are projected onto themselves,
while runs 2 to i map onto runs i+2 to 2i, respectively. Let k be the number of indistinguishable
symbols that are distributed among the i−1 distinguishable runs not mapping onto themselves.
The number of ways of distributing the k symbols among these i−1 runs is (k+i−2i−2 ), provided that
the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i holds. The remaining n− 7i− 2k symbols are distributed among
the two runs that map onto themselves, which can be done in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1
distinct ways. In order to enumerate the number of distinct game states that remain invariant
under the permutation δ, all possible values of k are to be considered. Therefore,
|Fδ| =
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)
. (B.28)
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Finally, consider the permutation composition δρj which shifts the runs j positions to the left
and then reverses the order of the runs. Under this permutation, runs j + 1 and i+ j + 1 map
onto themselves, while runs j + 2 to i+ j map onto runs j − 1 to i+ j + 2, respectively. Once
again, k indistinguishable symbols can be distributed among i− 1 distinguishable runs that do
not map onto themselves in
(
k+i−2
i−2
)
different ways, provided that the inequality 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 7i
holds. Again, the remaining n − 7i − 2k symbols can be distributed among the two runs that
map onto themselves in
(
n−7i−2k+2−1
2−1
)
= n− 7i− 2k + 1 distinct ways. Therefore, the number
of distinct game states that remain invariant under the permutation δρj equals the number in
(B.28).
Taking all the various permutations into account and therefore substituting (B.26),(B.27) and
(B.28) into (B.25), the number of equilibrium states for the ESPD with Cn〈1, 2〉 as underlying
graph and for which the inequalities 3T + P < 4 and 2T + 2P > 3 hold (i.e. the parameters lie
within region E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6) is
Qi =
1
2i
[(
n− 5i− 1
2i− 1
)
+
∑
j∈S˜
(
(n− 5i)gcd(i, j)/i− 1
2gcd(i, j)− 1
)
+ i
bn−7i
2
c∑
k=0
(n− 7i− 2k + 1)
(
k + i− 2
i− 2
)]
,
where S˜ is the set {x ∈ N | i divides n gcd(i, x) and x < i}. 
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APPENDIX C
Asymptotic analysis of the likelihood of
persistent cooperation
The proof of Theorem 7 in §5.5 is presented for parameter regions B, C and E in this appendix.
The theorem is first restated and the proof for each parameter region given thereafter.
Theorem 7. If the underlying graph of the ESPD is the circulant Cn〈1, 2〉 and if the parameter
inequality T +P < 2 holds (i.e. the parameters lie within region A, B, C or E of the phase plane
in Figure 5.6), then
lim
n→∞P (n) = 1.
Proof: (for parameter region B)
Consider the relationship bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9
specified in Theorem 6 for parameter region B of the phase plane in Figure 5.6, and let
Tn = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9. Then
bn = bn−1 + Tn. (C.1)
If the indices in the recurrence relation (5.16) are shifted one position to the left, the relationship
becomes
bn−1 = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 − bn−7 − bn−8 + bn−9 + bn−10. (C.2)
Taking the difference between bn−1 and Tn, and substituting (C.2) and (C.1) into bn−1 and Tn,
respectively, it follows that
bn−1 − Tn = 2bn−6 − 2bn−8 + bn−10.
By Lemma 8, bn+1 > bn > 0 and therefore by the repeated use of this inequality it follows
that 2bn−6 − 2bn−8 + bn−10 > 0. Consequently, Tn < bn−1, and so it follows from (5.19) that
0 < bn < 2bn−1. Dividing each term in this inequality by 2n, it follows that
0 <
bn
2n
<
bn−1
2n−1
.
The value of bn/2
n is therefore decreasing and positive by the above inequality, and so
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= c (C.3)
for some non-negative real constant c.
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In order to determine the value of c, note that substituting (5.16) into (C.3), gives
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= lim
n→∞
bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9
2n
=
1
2
lim
n→∞
bn−1
2n−1
+
1
22
lim
n→∞
bn−2
2n−2
+
1
23
lim
n→∞
bn−3
2n−3
+
1
24
lim
n→∞
bn−4
2n−4
+
1
25
lim
n→∞
bn−5
2n−5
− 1
26
lim
n→∞
bn−6
2n−6
− 1
27
lim
n→∞
bn−7
2n−7
+
1
28
lim
n→∞
bn−8
2n−8
+
1
29
lim
n→∞
bn−9
2n−9
= c
(
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
24
+
1
25
− 1
26
− 1
27
+
2
28
+
1
29
)
= c. (C.4)
In order to satisfy (C.4), it is therefore required that c = 0. Hence,
lim
n→∞P (n) = limn→∞
(
1− bn
2n
)
= 1
by (5.14). 
Proof: (for parameter region C)
Consider the relationship bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − 2bn−7 + bn−8 +
bn−9 specified in Theorem 6 for parameter region C of the phase plane in Figure 5.6, and let
Tn = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − 2bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9. Then
bn = bn−1 + Tn. (C.5)
If the indices in the recurrence relation (5.17) are shifted one position to the left, the relationship
becomes
bn−1 = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 − bn−7 − 2bn−8 + bn−9 + bn−10. (C.6)
Taking the difference between bn−1 and Tn, and substituting (C.6) and (C.5) into bn−1 and Tn,
respectively, it follows that
bn−1 − Tn = 2bn−6 + bn−7 − 3bn−8 + bn−10.
By Lemma 8, bn+1 > bn > 0 and therefore by the repeated use of this inequality, 2bn−6 + bn−7−
3bn−8 + bn−10 > 0. Consequently, Tn < bn−1 and so it follows from (C.5) that 0 < bn < 2bn−1.
Dividing each term in this inequality by 2n, it follows that
0 <
bn
2n
<
bn−1
2n−1
.
The value of bn/2
n is therefore decreasing and positive by the above inequality, and so
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= c (C.7)
for some non-negative real constant c.
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In order to determine the value of c, note that substituting (5.17) into (C.7), gives
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= lim
n→∞
bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 − bn−6 − 2bn−7 + bn−8 + bn−9
2n
=
1
2
lim
n→∞
bn−1
2n−1
+
1
22
lim
n→∞
bn−2
2n−2
+
1
23
lim
n→∞
bn−3
2n−3
+
1
24
lim
n→∞
bn−4
2n−4
+
1
25
lim
n→∞
bn−5
2n−5
− 1
26
lim
n→∞
bn−6
2n−6
− 2
27
lim
n→∞
bn−7
2n−7
+
1
28
lim
n→∞
bn−8
2n−8
+
1
29
lim
n→∞
bn−9
2n−9
= c
(
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
24
+
1
25
− 1
26
− 2
27
+
1
28
+
1
29
)
= c. (C.8)
In order to satisfy (C.8), it is therefore required that c = 0. Hence,
lim
n→∞P (n) = limn→∞
(
1− bn
2n
)
= 1
by (5.14). 
Proof: (for parameter region E)
Consider the relationship bn = bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − bn−8 − bn−9
specified in Theorem 6 for parameter region E of the phase plane in Figure 5.6, and let
Tn = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − bn−8 − bn−9. Then
bn = bn−1 + Tn. (C.9)
If the indices in the recurrence relation (5.18) are shifted one position to the left, the relationship
yields
bn−1 = bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 + bn−8 − bn−9 − bn−10. (C.10)
Taking the difference between bn−1 and Tn, and substituting (C.10) and (C.9) into bn−1 and Tn,
respectively, it follows that
bn−1 − Tn = 2bn−8 − bn−10.
By Lemma 8, bn+1 > bn > 0 and therefore 2bn−8 − bn−10 > 0. Consequently, Tn < bn−1 and so
it follows from (C.9) that 0 < bn < 2bn−1. Dividing each term in this inequality by 2n, it follows
that
0 <
bn
2n
<
bn−1
2n−1
.
The value of bn/2
n is therefore decreasing and positive by the above inequality, and so
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= c (C.11)
for some non-negative real constant c.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
138Appendix C. Asymptotic analysis of the likelihood of persistent cooperation
In order to determine the value of c, note that substituting (5.18) into (C.11), gives
lim
n→∞
bn
2n
= lim
n→∞
bn−1 + bn−2 + bn−3 + bn−4 + bn−5 + bn−6 + bn−7 − bn−8 − bn−9
2n
=
1
2
lim
n→∞
bn−1
2n−1
+
1
22
lim
n→∞
bn−2
2n−2
+
1
23
lim
n→∞
bn−3
2n−3
+
1
24
lim
n→∞
bn−4
2n−4
+
1
25
lim
n→∞
bn−5
2n−5
+
1
26
lim
n→∞
bn−6
2n−6
+
1
27
lim
n→∞
bn−7
2n−7
− 1
28
lim
n→∞
bn−8
2n−8
− 1
29
lim
n→∞
bn−9
2n−9
= c
(
1
2
+
1
22
+
1
23
+
1
24
+
1
25
+
1
26
+
1
27
− 1
28
− 1
29
)
= c. (C.12)
In order to satisfy (C.12), it is therefore required that c = 0. Hence,
lim
n→∞P (n) = limn→∞
(
1− bn
2n
)
= 1
by (5.14). 
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APPENDIX D
Equilibrium state diagrams
This appendix contains the equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C2 × C6, C3 × C4,
C3 × C5, C3 × C6, C4 × C4, C4 × C5, C4 × C6, C5 × C5, C5 × C6 and C6 × C6 as underlying
graphs, given in Figures D.1–D.10, respectively.
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Figure D.1: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C2×C6 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.2: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3×C4 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.3: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3×C5 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.4: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3×C6 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.4 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C3 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.5: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4×C4 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.5 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C4 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.6: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4×C5 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.6 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
148 Appendix D. Equilibrium state diagrams
1039588
1380,
1048132
13,40
1048076
13,80
1048136
13,80
917068
13,80
487118
13,80
904940
13,40
1041644
13,80
912620
13,80
1044044
13,80
1044168
13,80
913100
13,80
1035980
13,80
1043660
13,80
978636
13,40
393188
14,40 ,
1048512
14 40
1048456
14,20 ,
976620
13,40
978 660
13,20
978156
13,40
1046316
14,80
786 400
14,20
1048360
14,20
1048480
14,20
917472
14,40
1048392
14,40
1019374
14,80
1035756
14 40
1036 236
14,20
491214
14,40 1
048 078
14,20
909006
14,40
909 036
14,40
1047 780
14,80
1039596
14,80
1048140
14,80
1048 264
14,80
917196
14,40
1047756
14,20
1011406
14,80
1044046
14,40
1043662
14,40
913132
14,80
1036012
14,40
1043692
14,80
1044172
14,80
978668
14,40
1048364
15,80
1048544
15,40
1048 488
15,40
917476
15,80
1048520
15,80
1035758
15,80
1036268
15,80
909038
15,40
1048 142
15,20
1046 252
15,40
1048 292
15,40
917228
15,80
1047788
15,40 ,
1048 268
1580
1044174
15,80
1048 380
16,20
978670
15,4
1048560
16,5
1044204
15,80 ,
1047804
16 20
1048490
16,10
1048 428
16,40
1048548
16,40
1048552
16,80
917484
16,40
1048524
16,20
,
1036270
16 40
1048270
16,40
1048300
16,80
1044206
16,20
1048568
17,20
1048556
17,80
1048302
17,20
1048 572
18,20
1048558
18,20
1048575
20,1
1039854
16,40
(e) Parameter region E (cont.)
0
0,1
925704
5,20
946 440
8,20
995340
8,20
1048575
20,1
1048 524
16,20
1048560
16,5
978670
15,4
1048 456
14,20
1048392
14,40
1048 512
14,40
912 968
11,80
1044204
15,80
913 132
14,80
1044044
13,80
1048 072
12,80
1044204
15,80
943624
8,40
1036 308
9,20
942904
10,20
1013 252
10,40
1045 004
11,80
1047048
11,40
1048 074
13,40
1048078
14,20
1 039596
14,80
909036
14,40
1044 046
14,40
943 000
10,20
(f) Parameter region F 
1048575
20,1
0
0,1
(g) Parameter region G
943 000
10,20
946968
10,40
0
0,1
925 704
5,20
946 440
8,20
995340
8,20
942904
10,20
1045 004
11,80
978500
11,20
262080
12,20
1048320
12,5
1046 028
12,40
1047 564
12,20
1048448
13,40
904940
13,40
1048 360
14,20
1048 512
14,40
1048456
14,20
978670
15,4
1048560
16,5
1048524
16,20
1048 575
20, 1
(h) Parameter region H
Figure D.6 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.6 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4×C6 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(k) Parameter region I (cont.)
Figure D.7 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C4 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.8: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5×C5 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.8 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.8 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(e) Parameter region E (cont.)
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Figure D.8 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.8 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.8 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C5 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5×C6 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(c) Parameter region C
Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(c) Parameter region C (cont.)
Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.9 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C5 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.10: Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6×C6 as underlying graph. The relevant
parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(a) Parameter region A (cont.)
Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
177
68719470385
29, 288
68719470386
29, 288
68719470387
30, 288
68719470392
29, 288
68719470393
30, 288
68719470396
30, 144
68719470398
31, 36
68719470775
30, 144
68719470894
29, 288
68719470895
30, 144
68719470901
29, 288
68719 470903
30, 144
68719470909
30, 144
68719471650
27, 288
68719471654
28, 288
68719471666
28, 288
68719471667
29, 288
68719471671
30, 144
68719471674
29, 288
68719471675
30, 288
68719471677
30, 288
68719471678
30, 144
68719471799
31, 288
68719471802
30, 288
68719471910
29, 288
68719471911
30, 288
68719471920
28, 288
68719471922
29, 288
68719471923
30, 288
68719471924
29, 288
68719471925
30, 288
68719471926
30, 288
68719471927
31, 288
68719472034
29, 144
68719472050
30, 288
68719472054
31, 144
68719472154
29, 288
68719472158
30, 288
68719472166
29, 288
68719472167
30, 288
68719472179
30, 288
68719472184
29, 288
68719472186
30, 288
68719472187
31, 144
68719472402
29, 288
68719472408
29, 288
68719472414
31, 288
68719472416
28, 288
68719472418
29, 288
68719472419
30, 288
68719472421
30, 288
68719472422
30, 288
68719472423
31, 288
68719472434
30, 288
68719472435
31, 288
68719472441
31, 144
68719472536
30, 288
68719472540
31, 144
68719472546
30, 144
68719472548
30, 288
68719472562
31, 288
68719474692
26, 72
68719474696
26, 144
68719474704
26, 144
68719474706
27, 288
68719474708
27, 288
68719474720
26, 72
68719474944
26, 72
68719474962
28, 72
68719474976
27, 144
68719474980
28, 36
68719475200
26, 144
68719475202
27, 144
68719475205
28, 72
68719475232
27, 288
68719475234
28, 144
68719475236
28, 288
68719475238
29, 288
68719475240
28, 72
68719475328
27, 48
68719475370
30, 24
68719475716
27, 288
68719475720
27, 288
68719475721
28, 144
68719475724
28, 144
68719475725
29, 288
68719475744
27, 288
68719475745
28, 144
68719475746
28, 288
68719475748
28, 288
68719475760
28, 72
68719475968
27, 288
68719475973
29, 288
68719475974
29, 288
68719475986
29, 288
68719475990
30, 144
68719476001
29, 288
68719476002
29, 288
68719476003
30, 288
68719476004
29, 288
68719476005
30, 144
68719476006
30, 144
68719476016
29, 288
68719476018
30, 144
68719476019
31, 288
68719476020
30, 144
68719476096
28, 72
68719476130
30, 144
68719476132
30, 144
68719476144
30, 144
68719476148
31, 288
68719476150
32, 36
68719476229
29, 144
68719476230
29, 288
68719476231
30, 72
68719476261
30, 288
68719476262
30, 288
68719476272
29, 288
68719476273
30, 144
68719476274
30, 288
68719476280
30, 72
68719476299
31, 288
68719476352
28, 144
68719476370
30, 144
68719476384
29, 288
68719476386
30, 288
68719476400
30, 288
68719476402
31, 288
68719476408
31, 144
68719476410
32, 72
68719476480
28, 144
68719476482
29, 288
68719476483
30, 144
68719476498
30, 288
68719476504
30, 144
68719476512
29, 288
68719476513
30, 288
68719476514
30, 288
68719476515
31, 288
68719476518
31, 288
68719476519
32, 72
68719476528
30, 288
68719476529
31, 288
68719476530
31, 288
68719476531
32, 144
68719476536
31, 288
68719476537
32, 144
68719476540
32, 36
68719476608
29, 144
68719476616
30, 144
68719476624
30, 288
68719476632
31, 288
68719476636
32, 144
68719476642
31, 144
68719476644
31, 288
68719476656
31, 288
68719476658
32, 288
68719476664
32, 288
68719476668
33, 144
68719476672
30, 12
68719476704
31, 72
68719476720
32, 72
68719476732
34, 72
68719476735
36, 1
68717379982
20,144
68715422094
21,144
68718626854
22,144
68718428551
21,144
67610556495
3480,144
65379187935
3480,144
65429519582
3625,144
65394332607
24,144
65393791054
17,144
52076478 464
3,144
52077576 192
6,72
52089194 528
8,144
60404335 632
9,288
65379778 820
14 ,144
68309092 392
16 ,288
68631527 558
16,288
66467541 187
19,288
67524166712
15,288
68719443982
24,144
68719448263
27,288
(a) Parameter region A (cont.)
Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(c) Parameter region C
Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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(c) Parameter region C (cont.)
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Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
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29, 288
68 719 475 990
30, 144
68 719 476 003
30, 288
68 719 476 004
29, 288
68 719 476 005
30, 144
68 719 476 006
30, 144
68 719 476 016
29, 288
68 719 476 017
30, 288
68 719 476 018
30, 144
68 719 476 020
30, 144
68 719 476 128
29, 288
68 719 476 130
30, 144
68 719 476 132
30, 144
68 719 476 144
30, 144
68 719 476 148
31, 288
68 719 476 224
27, 144
68 719 476 229
29, 144
68 719 476 231
30, 72
68 719 476 235
30, 288
68 719 476 259
30, 144
68 719 476 260
29, 288
68 719 476 272
29, 288
68 719 476 273
30, 144
68 719 476 280
30, 72
68 719 476 291
30, 288
68 719 476 293
30, 288
68 719 476 320
29, 288
68 719 476 324
30, 288
68 719 476 336
30, 144
68 719 476 354
29, 144
68 719 476 368
29, 144
68 719 476 370
30, 144
68 719 476 384
29, 288
68 719 476 386
30, 288
68 719 476 400
30, 288
68 719 476 402
31, 288
68 719 476 408
31, 144
68 719 476 483
30, 144
68 719 476 512
29, 288
68 719 476 515
31, 288
68 719 476 516
30, 144
68 719 476 518
31, 288
68 719 476 528
30, 288
68 719 476 529
31, 288
68 719 476 530
31, 288
68 719 476 536
31, 288
68 719 476 608
29, 144
68 719 476 616
30, 144
68 719 476 624
30, 288
68 719 476 632
31, 288
68 719 476 640
30, 288
68 719 476 642
31, 144
68 719 476 644
31, 288
68 719 476 656
31, 288
68 719 476 672
30, 12
68 719 476 720
32, 72
68 719 476 735
36, 1
(k) Parameter region I (cont.)
Figure D.10 (continued): Equilibrium state diagrams for the ESPD with C6 × C6 as underlying graph.
The relevant parameter regions A–K of the phase plane are elucidated in Figure 6.3.
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